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Cover
Our painting of the centerboard sloop
Shamrock, ca. 1890, sets the tone for our
lead article by Dr. John Hattendorf ex-
amining the development and current
status of the sometimes uneasy relation-
ship between the U.S. Navy and maritime
(including naval) history. It also signals
the commitment of the Naval War Col-
lege to the study of history—as recently
evidenced by the foundation of a Mari-
time History Department, with Professor
Hattendorf at its head.
Shamrock itself, built for the well-known
yachtsman J. Roger Maxwell in 1887 by
John Mumm, was one of the first vessels
built to the New York Yacht Club’s speci-
fications for Class One. The vessel had an
overall length of seventy-seven feet three
inches, a waterline length of sixty-eight
feet six inches, a beam of nineteen feet
seven inches, and a draft of eight feet five
inches. Shamrock was listed in the New
York Yacht Club Register from 1888 to
1894. The artist is unknown, but the
painting may be an original or a copy of a
work by either James E. Buttersworth
(1817–94) or Elisha Taylor Baker (died
1890).
Mr. and Mrs. Robert G. Morrison of
White Springs, Florida, donated the
painting to the Naval War College Foun-
dation in 2000, to be placed on permanent
loan to the College.
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FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
It is a great pleasure to announce that the present issue is the first to have been
prepared under the supervision of a new editor of the Naval War College Press,
Dr. Catherine McArdle Kelleher.
This is also an occasion for recalling the almost ten years of dedicated service
of her predecessor, Dr. Thomas B. Grassey. Under Tom’s editorship this journal
underwent extensive changes: most conspicuous is a complete typographical re-
design that first appeared in Autumn 2000; in 1996, the Naval War College Press,
which publishes the Review, established itself on the World Wide Web; and shifts
in editorial direction were made to support more closely the mission of the Col-
lege and the needs of the Navy in the new century. A gifted teacher in the field
of moral philosophy, Professor Grassey has been asked by the President of the
Naval War College to become the College’s first Chair of Ethics and Leadership.
I am delighted that Dr. Kelleher, of our Strategic Research Department, has
agreed to oversee the Press. I can give here only an idea of her nearly four decades
of impressive scholarship and public service: she has been director of the Aspen
Institute Berlin, a deputy assistant secretary of defense, the Secretary of Defense’s
Personal Representative in Europe, defense advisor to the U.S. ambassador to
NATO, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and has taught at the Univer-
sities of Maryland and Denver, as well as the Naval War College, besides
authoring and editing scores of substantive books and articles, and becoming
recognized as a leader among women in the field of international security stud-
ies. We are truly privileged to have Catherine’s exceptional abilities and experi-
ence available to us.
I am sure our readers join me in expressing thanks to Dr. Grassey and grati-
tude to Dr. Kelleher for overseeing the Press and Review at this important
juncture.
ALBERTO R. COLL
Dean of Naval Warfare Studies and
Editor-in-Chief
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Rear Admiral Rempt is a 1966 graduate of the U.S.
Naval Academy. Initial assignments included deploy-
ments to Vietnam aboard USS Coontz (DLG 9) and
USS Somers (DDG 34). He later commanded USS
Antelope (PG 86), USS Callaghan (DDG 994), and
USS Bunker Hill (CG 52). Among his shore assign-
ments were the Naval Sea Systems Command as the ini-
tial project officer for the Mark 41 Vertical Launch
System; Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) staff as the
Aegis Weapon System program coordinator; director of
the Prospective Commanding Officer/Executive Officer
Department, Surface Warfare Officers Schools Com-
mand; and Director, Anti-Air Warfare Requirements
Division (OP-75) on the CNO’s staff. Rear Admiral
Rempt also served in the Ballistic Missile Defense Orga-
nization, where he initiated development of Naval
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense, continuing those ef-
forts as Director, Theater Air Defense on the CNO’s
staff. More recently, he was Program Executive Officer,
Theater Air Defense, the first Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of the Navy for Theater Combat Systems, the first
Assistant Chief of Naval Operations for Missile Defense,
and Director, Surface Warfare (N76) on the CNO’s
staff. Rear Admiral Rempt assumed duties as the
forty-eighth President of the Naval War College on 22
August 2001.
He holds master’s degrees in systems analysis from
Stanford University and in national security and strate-
gic studies from the Naval War College.
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PRESIDENT’S FORUM
“A man without a vision is like a ship’s commander without a
destination.”
THIS APPROPRIATELY NAUTICAL QUOTE comes from business pioneer
J. C. Penney, who reflected on the importance of vision nearly a century ago. As
Mr. Penney astutely noted, a man without a vision is largely adrift, but this can
be said with equal certainty about an organization. A bold step has been taken by
the Navy’s leadership to provide direction by crafting a comprehensive vision for
the future of the service—“Seapower 21.” In June 2002, for the first time in a public
forum, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Vern Clark, presented his vision
for the U.S. Navy in a speech delivered at the Naval War College: “My thoughts
on this [“Seapower 21”] have been evolving over the last couple of years through
my visits to the War College, discussions with the Strategic Studies Group here,
talking to the people at the Navy Warfare Development Command, talking to
special groups set up by the President of the Naval War College here, working
with groups in Washington, and talking about what our future is all about.”
The details of this Navy vision have been widely published, and I will not at-
tempt to reiterate them here (readers can find an executive presentation and an
explanatory article at www.nwc.navy.mil). I would, however, like to reflect
rather broadly on the degree to which this new vision is both revolutionary and
transformational.
“Seapower 21” describes a future Navy that will provide the nation with a triad
of capabilities that are unique to the naval service. These capabilities are de-
signed to meet the challenges brought about by the political, strategic, and tech-
nological changes that have occurred since the fall of communism and the onset
of the Terror War.
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Three fundamental concepts constitute the CNO’s vision of the nation’s mari-
time capabilities for the future:
• Sea Strike: the ability to project precise and persistent offensive power from
the sea
• Sea Shield: the ability to extend defensive assurance throughout the world
• Sea Basing: The ability to enhance operational independence and support
for joint forces.
Aspects of each of these concepts will be recognized by naval strategists and
operators as traditional missions for the Navy. On closer examination, however,
“Seapower 21”provides a vision of the future in which the service has significantly
transformed how it views itself and how it can contribute to solving national
challenges.
Navy Roles and Missions—with a Difference!
Sea Strike. For over two centuries American sailors have reached inland from the
sea to influence events ashore. Sometimes it has been direct influence, through
cannon fire against a coastal fort or by putting sailors and Marines ashore. In
other cases, the influence was more indirect in nature, through maritime block-
ade and other means of interrupting seaborne commerce. The concept of Sea
Strike recognizes that technology now allows naval forces to influence decisively
events ashore, with a reach farther inland than was ever imagined by Mahan,
Corbett, or even more recent naval strategists. Operational commanders will
employ strike aircraft, cruise missiles, long-range gunfire, special operations
forces, information operations, Marine (and other-service) ground forces, and
other offensive capabilities from a secure and tactically agile afloat support base.
This capability has already been clearly demonstrated during Operation EN-
DURING FREEDOM, where Navy and Marine Corps forces repeatedly and effec-
tively engaged enemy forces in Afghanistan from ships operating hundreds of
miles from their targets. In the first seventy-six days of operations, the United
States flew 6,500 strike missions over Afghanistan, of which 75 percent were
flown by Navy carrier-based aircraft. New systems and capabilities will provide
the ability to strike or capture vital areas even farther inland in support of na-
tional objectives.
In the future, the Marines, supported from ships at sea, may be called upon to
seize an inland airfield, hold it for a period of time, and ultimately turn it over to
follow-on army and air forces. This was exactly the case in the closing months of
2001 when, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, the first conventional
forces to be engaged in Afghanistan were U.S. Marines from Task Force 58. They
established a forward operating base on a desert airstrip south of Kandahar and
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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held this position until relieved more than sixty days later by elements of the U.S.
Army’s 101st Airborne Division. Such operations hark back to the operational
concept of Marines “seizing and holding bases”—a concept that was planned
(and gamed at the Naval War College) before World War II and then executed
brilliantly in the Pacific campaigns of that war. The concepts embodied in Sea
Strike take the traditional Navy/Marine Corps capabilities and significantly ex-
tend them in range, flexibility, lethality, and endurance.
Sea Shield. Since the days of John Paul Jones, the essence of naval defense has
been the defense of ships and, later, aircraft from attack. The mission was largely
“force protection,” safeguarding the fleet so that it could carry out its offensive
missions. This traditional “defense of the fleet” mission will continue to be im-
portant, especially in facing a terrorist threat, but the concept of Sea Shield ex-
tends naval defensive firepower far beyond the task force, “projecting” defensive
power deep inland. It will provide a defensive umbrella for forces ashore in a
contested theater and even on American shores themselves. Senior Navy leaders
have stated, “Sea Shield will provide a layered defense to protect the homeland,
sustain access to contested littorals, and project a defense umbrella over coali-
tion partners and joint forces ashore in distant theaters” (Vice Admiral Mike
Bucchi, USN, and Vice Admiral Mike Mullen, USN, “Sea Shield: Projecting
Global Defensive Assurance,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 2002,
pp. 56–59).
Sea Shield will have many features and interrelated capabilities, such as air-
borne surveillance and tracking, long-range ship-launched counter-air weap-
ons, and the ability to engage cruise missiles well inland. Most significant will be
the Navy’s contribution to missile defense. It will be the early-arriving cruisers
and destroyers that protect vital ports and airfields to enable our forces to enter
safely theaters of operations overseas. Indeed, our entire national strategy relies
on rapid airlift and heavy sealift to get our Marines, soldiers, and airmen to the
fight. Our sailors will provide the initial defense to enable their comrades in
arms to reach the battlefield. Sea Shield will also provide a protective umbrella
over the continental United States. No task is more important, nor is any more
difficult, than shielding the lives and property of American forces and the Amer-
ican people.
Sea Basing. A fundamental strength of naval forces has always been their ability
to conduct military operations from the sea for extended periods of time. U.S.
Navy ships have always been virtual “islands of sovereign territory” that operate
free from the restrictions of base rights, overflight permission, or political en-
tanglements. The universally recognized “right of free passage” through interna-
tional waters provides the United States with the most independent and secure
P R E S I D E N T ’ S F O R U M 9
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maneuver space for joint military forces. A recent article in the U.S. Naval Insti-
tute Proceedings made this point:
Sea Basing will be increasingly central to joint military planning because the tradi-
tional advantages enjoyed by afloat forces—such as independence, mobility, and se-
curity—are becoming ever more important to military affairs, while traditional
limitations of sea-based forces—including operational reach and connectivity—have
been largely overcome by new technologies and concepts of operations (Vice Admi-
ral Charles W. Moore, Jr., USN, and Lieutenant General Edward Hanlon, Jr., USMC,
“Sea Basing: Operational Independence for a New Century,” U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings, January 2003, pp. 80–85).
The Sea Basing concept brings together the capabilities of the Navy’s combat-
ant, command and control, and support ships with the impressive array of oil-
ers, stores ships, ammunition ships, oceangoing tugs, hospital ships, and
maritime prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command.
Joining this force will be Coast Guard assets and the transports and logistics sup-
port ships operated by the U.S. Army. Netted together with improved C4I (com-
mand, control, communications, computers, and intelligence) systems,
combatant commanders can operate from this powerful multiship “floating
base,” indeed an entire overseas fleet, which can remain on station in support of
combat operations for extended periods. Many components of the Sea Basing
concept exist today, but future capabilities will result from investment in mod-
ern focused prepositioning ships; faster and more capable vertical-lift aircraft;
high-speed surface craft, such as the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), for agile in-
shore transshipment; and new offload and in-stream cargo handling techniques.
Developing the right ships to support a joint force operation in harm’s way
ashore is key to realizing fully the benefits to our nation of basing at sea.
A National Vision for the Future
Many nations see the oceans of the world as barriers, hostile territories they fear
to tread. However, long-term investment in maritime power has made the
United States a master of this challenging environment. Fully two-thirds of the
earth’s surface is covered by water, and “Sea Power 21” is a vision for the future that
exploits our asymmetrical advantage in this realm. For centuries, the oceans
served America as “moats” of great width that no enemy could easily traverse.
Today, the notion of a defensive barrier has less meaning, but the oceans still
provide a nearly unlimited maneuver space, from which our nation can be
protected.
It is our nation’s naval forces that provide national freedom of action for the
application of military power in an increasingly uncertain and complex world.
They provide a commander the greatest operational flexibility and tactical
1 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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agility and offer more options than forces that require overflight permission or
authorization to use ports or airfields in foreign lands. By using a combination
of the right of freedom of the seas, and the might of U.S. forces to keep these
sea-lanes open, naval forces enable the nation to take the fight to the enemy
overseas.
Naval transformation is beginning to emerge as the catalyst for the transfor-
mation of how the nation applies military power. The ongoing transformation
in the sea services is not solely technical, and it is not dependent on new ships,
aircraft, weapon systems, or networks. Nor does this transformation radically al-
ter the mission or essential characteristics of naval forces. Instead, the sea ser-
vices are recognizing that the nation will increasingly project power from “afloat
bases” constituted by battle groups, expeditionary forces, mission-specific ac-
tion groups, and prepositioned ships.
Sea Power 21 is not just a vision for the Navy, it is a vision for the nation, and
in many ways it represents our best hope in defending the American people and
our cherished way of life.
RODNEY P. REMPT
Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy
President, Naval War College
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THE USES OF MARITIME HISTORY IN AND FOR THE NAVY
John B. Hattendorf
The knowledge of the past, the record of truths revealed by experience,
is eminently practical, is an instrument of action, and a power that goes
to the making of the future.
LORD ACTON (1832–1902)
There is an ever-present human tendency to think that all that went before isirrelevant and useless, especially in an era of transformation and change.
Navies are particularly susceptible to this tendency since, in contrast to officers
in other branches of service, naval officers, by and large, have tended to ignore
the value of and advantages to be found in historical insight.
This negative attitude toward history within the Navy has its roots in the pre-
vailing naval culture; it is shared widely among navies that have developed
within the Anglo-American tradition. A dispassionate look at the patterns and
process of innovation in the past, however, reminds us that such tendencies are
to be determinedly guarded against. Maritime history is a central part of an un-
derstanding of the heritage and tradition of navies, but its value lies in more
than heritage alone. Knowing what actually happened in the past is central to
understanding the nature and character of naval power. It assists in knowing the
limits to the usefulness of naval power as well as in understanding where we are
today in the development and progression of the art of naval warfare. As every
navigator understands, it is critical to know where we are and what external
forces affected us on the way there if we are to lay the best course toward where
we want to be.1
These judgments have once again been reaffirmed in the most recent study of
the uses of history by, for, and in the American navy. In 2000 on the recommen-
dation of the Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History,
Secretary Richard Danzig commissioned an independent evaluation of the
Navy’s historical programs. This report, completed in October 2000, concluded
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that the U.S. Navy “has failed to use the rich historical information available to it
in order to manage or apply effectively those resources for internal or external
purposes.”2 Moreover, “while history survives in isolated pockets the use of na-
val heritage history is disjointed, sporadic, inconsistent, and occasionally con-
tradictory. Without a clear service-wide mission, history in the Navy has itself
become an artifact, delivering traditional products for use in a Navy seeking
other types of information.” Subsequent meetings in 2000 and 2002—where
representatives of the perceived stakeholders of naval history throughout the
Navy and supporters of naval history outside the service joined in the discus-
sions—reviewed early drafts for a proposed strategy and a five-year plan for im-
plementing it.
Nonetheless, despite these initiatives, at the beginning of 2003 the Navy still
lacks an integrated policy for employing naval history. The recommendations
and requests of Dr. David A. Rosenberg, the chairman of the Secretary of the
Navy’s Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History, for a strong and detailed pol-
icy statement, establishment of requirements, and the directives necessary to re-
verse the current trend have not yet been answered.3
If this situation is to be rectified, the U.S. Navy’s senior leadership needs to estab-
lish clear policy guidance. The establishment at Newport of the Maritime His-
tory Department this year is but one of the first steps to be taken throughout the
Navy if we are to reap the rewards from the integration of history, its lessons and
its cautions, into all aspects of contemporary naval thinking, doctrine, planning,
and education.
THE PRESENT CONDITION
The stakeholders and supporters of naval history within the U.S. Navy are few. It
has been left largely to civilian specialists at the Naval Historical Center at the
Washington Navy Yard and the handful of academics and administrators in the
Navy’s twelve museums, at the Naval Academy, and the Naval War College. Naval
history finds much more support outside the service, as can easily be seen in the
keen interest in popular novels, films, and television programs with historical
themes. A number of private organizations in the United States promote naval
history and heritage, including the Naval Historical Foundation and the U.S.
Navy Memorial Foundation in Washington, the Naval Order of the United
States, the Historic Naval Ships Association, and the Center for Naval Analyses.
Perhaps the most active publisher of work on U.S. naval history outside of the
Navy is another private organization, the U.S. Naval Institute, which issues not
only its monthly Proceedings but also, since 1986, the quarterly Naval History.
Since the 1960s, the Naval Institute Press has published an increasing number of
1 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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prize-winning books on maritime history. The institute has also established an
important photographic archive, available to the public. Since 1969 it has been
the leader in the field in oral history, producing more than two hundred bound
volumes on recent naval leaders.
For those in, or who work for, the Navy, history is not some amorphous, abstract,
and intellectual creation; it happens around them all the time. What naval pro-
fessionals do every day is part of our nation’s history, as is the work of their pre-
decessors. Ships and shore stations are historic sites, as well as places where
important tasks are carried out today and are prepared for tomorrow. Many na-
val buildings and reservations are historic and even contain archaeological sites
of great cultural importance. Many offices and naval stations contain valuable
objects, historic documents, artwork, and books, or official records destined for
permanent retention in the National Archives. The Navy and Marine Corps rep-
resent a broad cross section of American history; the safekeeping of national
heritage, as reflected in its material culture, has been left to those who manage
the Navy’s assets. In the National Historic Preservation Act, Congress made the
Navy Department responsible to the nation for the preservation of the cultural
resources that it owns. It is an awesome responsibility but one easily forgotten
by people struggling with immediate problems. The Navy needs to balance its
management of these important cultural assets with its responsibilities for na-
tional defense, and it must do so, as the act requires, “in a spirit of stewardship
for the inspiration and benefit of present and future generations.”4
Despite widespread interest and generous outside support, the uniformed
Navy has yet to make full and effective use of maritime history as a resource. The
practical challenge of implementing a Navywide policy for the support and
practical use of maritime history in and for the Navy is a complex one. It involves
promoting a range of interrelated but distinct levels of historical understanding
as well as organizing and supporting a variety of responsibilities, tasks, and
functions across the Navy. If such a program is to succeed, maritime history in
the Navy will have to have the direct attention and the solid and continuing sup-
port of the flag officers who lead the service.
MARITIME AND NAVAL HISTORY DEFINED
To begin a vibrant historical program within the Navy, one needs first to under-
stand what one means by “maritime” and “naval” history, respectively. There has
long been confusion about the two terms, but in the past decade a consensus in
usage has formed that clarifies the matter. Maritime history embraces naval his-
tory; it is the overarching subject that deals with the full range of mankind’s rela-
tionships to the seas and oceans of the world. It is a broad theme that cuts across
H A T T E N D O R F 1 5
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THE HISTORY OF HISTORY IN THE U.S. NAVY AND THE SEA SERVICES
1800 President John Adams orders the first Secretary of the Navy,
Benjamin Stoddard, to gather books for a professional library, “to
consist of the best writings in Dutch, Spanish, French, and espe-
cially English.” This is the origin of the Navy Department Library
(since 1970 it has been housed in the Washington Navy Yard).
1813 Thomas Clark publishes the first historical study of the U.S. Navy,
basing it on personal communications with participants of the
War of 1812.
1814 Congress establishes the Navy’s first museum collection by direct-
ing that all captured naval flags be sent to Navy Department cus-
tody in Washington.
1833 Commander Matthew Perry is instrumental in establishing the
U.S. Naval Lyceum, to “incite the officers of the naval service to in-
creased diligence in the pursuit of professional and general
knowledge.” Following this lead, a similar institution would be es-
tablished at Boston in 1842, and later another at Mare Island in
California. The naval historical collections from New York and
Boston will be donated to the Naval Academy Museum in 1892
and 1922.
1839 James Fenimore Cooper writes the first major history of the U.S.
Navy.
1845–46 The newly established Naval Academy at Annapolis builds its first
library and lyceum. Its permanent museum collection is founded
three years later, with the transfer of the captured War of 1812
flags from the Navy Department.
1873 U.S. Naval Institute is founded. Two of its founders, Captain
Stephen B. Luce and Commodore Foxhall Parker, will become
among the earliest U.S. naval officers to advocate the professional
study of naval history. James R. Soley launches the Naval Acad-
emy’s curriculum first series of lectures on naval history.
1882 The Office of Naval Records and Library is founded. Its head,
James Soley, first systematically compiles the Navy’s records, rare
books, and other historical materials. Comprehensive publication
of operational documents and dispatches relating to the Civil War
begin in 1894 and the Spanish-American War operational records
are published in 1899.
1884 Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce establishes the Naval War College
at Newport. Luce values historical study for learning to deal with
specific situations and developing generalizations; he recruits
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan to research naval history and
thereby explain to rising senior officers the art and science of high
command. Mahan’s pioneering historical work will establish some
concepts that retain value after more than a century.
1899–1900 Captain Charles Stockton of the Naval War College faculty exam-
ines the history of international law and produces the first codifi-
cation of the law of naval warfare.
1905 The remains of John Paul Jones are ceremonially removed from
Paris to Annapolis, reviving widespread interest in the country’s
early naval history.
1917 Rear Admiral William S. Sims, Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval
Forces, Europe, creates the Navy’s first historical section on a ma-
jor operational staff, which will continue until the end of the war.
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A separate historical section is also organized in Washington
within the recently created Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations.
1919 Major General Commandant George Barnett of the Marine Corps
creates a Historical Section under the Adjutant and Inspector’s
Department. The first officer in charge is Major Edwin N.
McClellan.
1921 Captain Dudley W. Knox becomes head of both the Historical Sec-
tion in the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the Office
of Naval Records and Library, launching a monograph series based
on materials collected by the London Historical Section.
1926 The Naval Historical Foundation is founded to collect naval manu-
scripts and artifacts, eventually acquiring and donating to the Li-
brary of Congress the most important single collection of private
naval papers in the United States.
1927 The Historical Section in the Office of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions and the Office of Naval Records and Library in Washington
merge.
1930 Dudley W. Knox assumes additional responsibility as Curator of
the Navy. In 1934, in close personal cooperation with President
Franklin Roosevelt, he will begin publication of a multivolume se-
ries of naval documents on the Barbary Wars and the Quasi-War
with France.
1931 After overhaul, USS Constitution is recommissioned and sent on
tour of American ports.
1938 Congress establishes Naval Academy Museum, authorizing
tax-exempt gifts.
1942 Dudley W. Knox forms an Operational Archive to collect and orga-
nize wartime records. Separate from it, Samuel Eliot Morison of
Harvard receives a direct commission as a lieutenant commander
to prepare an operational naval history, receiving presidential carte
blanche for travel and access. His fifteen-volume History of United
States Naval Operations in World War II will appear 1947–62.
1943 Professor Robert G. Albion of Princeton is appointed to a
part-time position to oversee 150 naval officers writing some two
hundred studies on the Navy’s administrative history during World
War II, a project that will be completed in 1950.
1944 Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal establishes the Office of Na-
val History within the Office of the Secretary of the Navy. Its first
director is retired Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus, twice President of
the Naval War College. Knox becomes deputy director of naval
history under Kalbfus.
1945 The Bureau of Ships establishes the Office of Curator of Ship
Models at the David Taylor Model Basin, to oversee the continuing
acquisition of a collection that dated to the 1883 requirement to
build and retain exhibition-quality models of the Navy’s newest
ships. Now sponsored by the Naval Surface Warfare Center, the
Naval Sea Systems Command, and the Naval Historical Center, it
currently has over 2,100 models as a three-dimensional record of
naval ship and aircraft design.
1947 The Civil Engineer Corp/Seabee Museum opens at Port Hueneme,
California, with a command historian and archive.
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1948 At the recommendation of Admiral Raymond Spruance, the Sec-
retary of the Navy approves establishment of an academic chair of
maritime history at the Naval War College, subsequently named
in 1953 in honor of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King. USS Texas (BB 35)
becomes a memorial and museum ship at San Jacinto State Park,
in Texas.
1949 The Office of Naval History merges with the Office of Naval Re-
cords and Library to create the Naval Records and Library Division
of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. In 1952, it will be-
come the Naval History Division, under the Director of Naval
History.
1952 The Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Committee on Naval History,
an independent group of experts on naval history, is founded to
advise the Navy on its historical programs. Over the years, its
members will include such distinguished American historians as
Samuel Flagg Bemis, Francis L. Berkeley, James Field, John
Kemble, Alan Nevins, and Walter Muir Whitehill, as well as retired
senior flag officers and some of the country’s leading art experts,
museum directors, and librarians.
1957 The Navy transfers ownership of Admiral George Dewey’s flag-
ship, USS Olympia, to a private organization for preservation and
display.
1960 The first Marine Corps Museum is opened at the Marine Corps
Base at Quantico, Virginia. It will come under the control of the
newly created History and Museums Division during 1972–73 and
move to the first floor of the Marine Corps Historical Center in the
Washington Navy Yard during 1976–77. It remains there today.
1961 The U.S. Naval Historical Display Center, the forerunner of the
Navy Museum, is established in Washington, to open in 1963.
1963 The Naval Air Station Pensacola museum, now the National Mu-
seum of Naval Aviation, is founded.
1964 The Submarine Force Library and Museum is established at New
London, Connecticut, with materials acquired from the Electric
Boat Company’s collection.
1967 The Coast Guard establishes a curatorial services department. The
Coast Guard Academy establishes a museum at New London,
Connecticut, to complement its teaching program; in 1971, it will
become the U.S. Coast Guard Museum.
1970 The Naval War College creates Naval Historical Collection for its
archives, manuscript collection, and rare books.
1971 The Naval Historical Center in the Washington Navy Yard is estab-
lished, replacing the Naval Historical Division. Its director (a civil-
ian since 1986), serves on the Navy Staff as the Director of Naval
History.
1972 The U.S. Naval Academy holds its first naval history symposium,
which soon becomes a biennial meeting and the most important
regular academic conference within the field of U.S. naval history.
1974 The Naval Supply Corps School at Athens, Georgia, establishes a
museum.
1976 The private, nonprofit USS Constitution Museum is established.
1977 The Naval Research Laboratory establishes its historical office and
develops writing, research, and oral history programs. The Marine
Corps Historical Center in the Washington Navy Yard opens its
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academic boundaries and builds linkages between disciplines to form a human-
istic understanding of the many dimensions involved. Maritime history involves
in particular the histories of science, technology, cartography, industry, eco-
nomics, trade, politics, international affairs, imperial growth and rivalry, insti-
tutional and organizational development, communications, migration, law,
social affairs, leadership, ethics, art, and literature. The range is immense, and the
possible vantage points and topics are many. Yet the focus is clearly defined—
ships and the sailors who operate them, with specific sets of scientific
H A T T E N D O R F 1 9
doors to house the History and Museums Division of the Marine
Corps, formed in 1973 under Brigadier General Edwin H.
Simmons, USMC.
1978 A museum devoted to the history of aviation test and evaluation
is founded at the Patuxent River Naval Air Station in Maryland.
The Naval War College opens a museum in the College’s first
classroom building. The Marine Corps Aviation Museum is cre-
ated (to be renamed the Marine Corps Air-Ground Museum in
1982–83) as a field activity of the History and Museums Division.
It occupies several exhibit and storage buildings and hangars at
Marine Base Quantico, Virginia, before closing to the public in an-
ticipation of a new National Museum of the Marine Corps to be
opened at Quantico in 2005–2006.
1979 U.S. Merchant Marine Academy at Kings Point, New York, estab-
lishes a museum to complement its teaching of maritime history.
The Commander, Navy Region, Mid-Atlantic establishes the
Hampton Roads Naval Exhibit devoted to the naval history in the
Hampton Roads, Yorktown, and Norfolk, Virginia, areas. The Ma-
rine Corps Historical Foundation is established in the Washington
Navy Yard.
1980 The Bureau of Medicine and Surgery establishes historical activi-
ties as an additional duty for the editor of the Navy Medical De-
partment’s journal, Navy Medicine. The editor developed writing,
research, and oral history programs until the Office of Historian of
the Naval Medical Department was established in September
2002.
1986 The Naval Submarine Base, New London, Connecticut, acquires
the deactivated USS Nautilus for its Submarine Force Museum.
1991 The Naval Undersea Museum at Keyport, Washington, is estab-
lished, devoted to the ocean environment and the history of U.S.
torpedo, mine warfare, and submarine technology.
1995 The Civil Engineering Corps Seabee Museum establishes a branch
on the Gulf Coast at Gulfport, Mississippi.
2000 The Museum of Armament and Technology at the Naval Weapons
Center, China Lake, California, is established to display technol-
ogy and weapons that have played an important role in the previ-
ous six decades of the service’s history.
2003 The Naval War College creates a Maritime History Department,
consolidating its activities and collection in the field of maritime
history and establishing a research unit for basic and applied mari-
time history.
Continued from page 15
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understanding and technological devices, in their hostile sea environment,
which covers the greater part of the globe.
Within the broad field of maritime history, there are a number of recognized
major subspecialties. Among them are the history of navigational and maritime
sciences; the histories of ships and their construction, the aircraft that fly over
the seas, and the submarines that pass under their surface; maritime economic
history; the histories of merchant shipping, fishing, and whaling; the histories of
yachting and other leisure activities at sea and on the seaside; the histories of
geographical exploration and cartography; social and labor history, the health of
seamen; maritime law, maritime art, maritime literature; and naval history.
These subspecialties are interrelated within the framework of maritime history
to varying degrees, but each is tied as well to historical subject areas outside the
maritime field. Characteristically, a maritime subspecialty’s relationship outside
the field defines its perspective on, and approach to, maritime history.
War at sea and the development of its political, technological, institutional,
and financial elements is, thus, the focus of the naval history subspecialty.
Within the structure of maritime history, naval history relates to the other mari-
time subspecialties as a special case, a particular application of the histories of
ships and shipbuilding, geographical exploration, cartography, social and labor
issues, health, law, art, literature, and so on. It also connects to the study of agen-
cies and sea services that cooperate or share responsibilities with navies, such as
(in the United States) the Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Revenue Service, and
Coast Survey. The last three have fulfilled under a variety of organizational
names critical maritime functions as hydrography, policing and safety of navi-
gation, piloting, and the licensing of mariners. Outside the maritime sphere, naval
history is closely associated with, and has adopted the broad approaches of, such
fields as military studies, international affairs, politics, government, and the his-
tory of technology.
Naval history specifically involves the study and analysis of the ways in which
governments have organized and employed force at sea to achieve national ends.
It ranges across all periods of world history and involves a wide variety of na-
tional histories, languages, and archival sources. (Most prominent among the
latter are governmental archives, supplemented by the private papers of individ-
uals who served in or with navies.) The study of naval history involves analysis of
the ways in which decisions were reached and carried out, as well as of the de-
sign, procurement, manufacture, and employment of vessels, aircraft, and weap-
ons to achieve the ends in view. As Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond succinctly put
it, naval history
2 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
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includes the “whys” of strategy in all its phases, from the political sphere to that of
minor strategy and tactics of fleets and squadrons: it includes the “hows” of actual
performances: and, not less important, the “whys” of success and failure. It embraces
all those elements of foreign diplomatic relations, of economics and commerce, of
international law and neutrality, of positions, of the principles of war, of administra-
tion, of the nature of the weapon, and of personality.5
Naval history in the machine age faces the need to explain these matters com-
prehensively, placing individual decisions and the collective interactions of lead-
ers within a wide context of technological, financial, and operational issues.6
A traditional work in the field of naval history traces the ways in which na-
tional leaders dealt with international situations and decided upon courses of
action that involved employment of ships and weapons at sea, and the reasons
why. It then follows the results of those decisions and examines the actual uses of
naval force at sea and its consequences, often in terms of the biographies of par-
ticular admirals, specific battles, campaigns, or accounts of the actions of fleets,
squadrons, and even individual ships and aircraft.
In contrast, modern naval historians have come to understand that navies
and those who serve in uniform do not exist separately from other parts of soci-
ety. In addition to seeing their actions in terms of leadership, tactics, and strat-
egy, scholars must also understand them in terms of the external environment,
domestic politics, bureaucratic politics, the state of technological development
and capabilities, procurement issues, organizational culture, and the capacity of
naval men and women (in a profession marked by rigid hierarchical structures)
for innovation, change, and alternative approaches.7 Modern naval history looks
at navies not only within their national contexts or as instruments of particular
national states but also from wider international and comparative perspectives,
in terms either of the chronological development of specific events or of the
broad, long-term development of navies around the world.8 Clearly the actions
of one navy cannot be considered in isolation from foreign influences, whether
enemies, allies, or world developments.
Naval historians, as practitioners of the wider field of maritime history, are
bound by the same general requirements and standards as apply to scholars who
work, research, or write in any other historical area. Any historical project re-
quires a wide understanding of the context in which the events under study took
place, a deep appreciation of the historical literature addressing the subject and
its broad field, and a thorough examination of the original documents and other
primary source materials that establish authoritatively what occurred, how, and
why.
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THE AUDIENCES FOR MARITIME HISTORY
For the historical program to be successful, the Navy and its historians must be
more strategic in their approaches, recognizing that they must appeal to a num-
ber of different audiences at once. Maritime history in the United States has four
distinct audiences, each of which requires different approaches, levels of under-
standing, and vantage points: Congress and other government leaders, includ-
ing uniformed members of the nonnaval services; the men and women of the
U.S. Navy; academics; and the general public.
The first two audiences—Congress, government leaders, and uniformed men
and women in all the armed services—look to a historical understanding that
provides considerations and insight useful for the current and future develop-
ment of the Navy. Their collective interest and approach may be described as ap-
plied history.9 The last two audiences, the general public and academe, form a
related pair; they look toward broad understanding and evaluation of maritime
and naval events as fundamental and as essential for understanding world his-
tory and national life. Their interests may be described as those of basic history.
The Decision Makers: A Focused Audience
The general public’s understanding of maritime and naval affairs—developed,
corrected, and expanded by the academic community—provides the founda-
tion for at least the initial understandings of the people in charge of leading,
building, funding, and developing the Navy. These decision makers, leaders of
government, are those who make up an important audience for applied history.
However, their needs in maritime and naval history are more detailed, specific,
and technical than those of the public and academe, address professional inter-
ests beyond the scope of popular and academic interests, and typically need to
be formulated and presented in different ways.
Congress and Government Leaders
Members of Congress, congressional staff members, and the uniformed men
and women of services other than the Navy form a distinct audience for certain
aspects of maritime history. This audience is widely varied but may include rep-
resentatives from areas that have long-standing interests in maritime affairs,
such as coastal states, states with traditional Navy ties, vocal groups of naval re-
tirees or veterans, or states where assets for the Navy are produced or its bases are
located. This part of the audience will have special interests in specific aspects of
naval history that relate to their own state and its history, politics, or interests
but may need specific information that builds on their traditional ties or
broadens their regional outlook into a national perspective. Congress and gov-
ernment leaders also include those who do not have such built-in interests but
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need understandings of how and why the Navy has developed, if they are to carry
out their responsibilities effectively.
A component of this audience of specific interest to the Navy comprises the
Navy Department’s senior civilian appointees, such as the Secretary of the Navy,
the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy, and the noncareer deputy assistant secre-
taries. Most typically have short tenures with the Navy Department in the course
of careers that take them to a variety of executive branch positions. Like many
members of Congress and leaders in other services, they do not necessarily have
previous exposure to naval matters. These leaders with important present re-
sponsibilities have a direct, practical need to know about the roles and functions
of the Navy and when, why, and how it has been used, misused, or neglected in
the past. As Sir Basil Liddell Hart once wrote, “History is a catalogue of mistakes.
It is our duty to profit by them.”10
Those who make decisions on present and future naval issues need to profit
from past errors and problems. They always need a sense of the backgrounds of
the difficult issues they are struggling to solve. The Navy’s historians should pro-
vide historical understanding in ways that are accessible to busy leaders, who
need specific information and interpretation focused on particular elements of
maritime history in ways that provide insight into current debates over funding,
policy making, and joint-service operational and technical planning. This type
of information is likely to be precise and detailed, even quantified, pointing to
specific incidents in American historical experience or drawing broad parallels
to situations in American or world history.
The recent independent study commissioned by the Secretary of the Navy,
History and Heritage in the U. S. Navy, found that the Navy does little to support
decision makers by providing them with historical background to current is-
sues. What is being done is scattered informally through a variety of activities,
including the Center for Naval Analyses, the Naval Historical Center, the Navy
Museum, the Naval War College, and several nongovernmental organizations
and museums.11 Plainly the audience of congressional and other government
leaders is a neglected audience, but one neglected at great cost. Whenever the
country faces war, Congress, civilian leaders in the executive branch, the leaders
of other services that cooperate with the Navy, and, above all, the nation’s states-
men critically need to know and understand, in terms of actual practice and ex-
perience, the fundamental roles, limitations, and practicalities of the Navy’s
organization and its ability to provide mobility for military forces, project power
overseas, control and protect sea and air routes, serve the objectives of foreign
policy, and carry out its variety of other functions. They need to understand also
the typical challenges that the Navy faces and the reasons why a number of roles
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that a statesman might be tempted to assign the Navy would be inadvisable,
would distract it from its useful purposes. Leaders who have a broad under-
standing of and insight into maritime history and perceive the historical uses of
and limitations upon fleets will be in a far better position to make proper deci-
sions in regard to the present and future use of navies than those who have none.
Uniformed Men and Women in the Navy
The people who serve in uniform in the Navy provide a special audience with
particular needs for history. For the uniformed Navy naval history is heritage,
but at the same time professionals within the Navy need to analyze critically
their profession’s historical experience in ways that inform their thinking and
decision making.
Understanding maritime history is part of naval professional identity. Under-
standing their own profession leads officers or enlisted personnel alike to feel a
natural bond with other sailors, whatever their form of maritime endeavor or
nationality. Today’s sailors share a proud heritage that includes the world’s great
seamen and world explorers, such as Christopher Columbus, Ferdinand Magel-
lan, and James Cook. Naval leaders, of course, are part of this professional mari-
time pantheon. Here we usually think of the great fighting commanders in the
context of battles and fleet operations: Drake, Tromp, Blake, de Ruyter, Nelson,
Togo, Jellicoe, and Scheer, and within our own navy, Farragut, Dewey, Nimitz,
Spruance, and Halsey. But a navy, of necessity, is made up of people of many
kinds of abilities. Those who specialize in one form of warfare or spend their ca-
reers in science, technology, education, and logistics offer modern sailors mod-
els of inspiration and devotion to their profession no less valuable than those of
fleet commanders.
Among such other models about whom our professionals need to learn, and
toward whom they should look, are the scientist and oceanographer Matthew
Maury, the inventor John Ericsson, the thinker and strategist J. C. Wylie, the
mathematician C. H. Davis, the salvage expert Edward Ellsberg, the gun designer
John Dahlgren, the logistician Henry Eccles, the educator Stephen B. Luce, the
naval engineer B. F. Isherwood, the civil engineer Ben Moreell, the intelligence
officer J. J. Rochefort, the aviator William Moffett, the naval diplomatist
Matthew Perry, and the submariner Charles Lockwood; Joy Bright Hancock, a
pioneering advocate for women in the U.S. Navy; Grace Murray Hopper, the
brilliant developer of computer languages; Charles M. Cooke and Forrest
Sherman, operational planners; H. Kent Hewitt, the amphibious innovator;
Sumner Kimball, of the Life Saving and Revenue Cutter Services; Ellsworth
Bertholf, of the Coast Guard; Spencer Baird, of the U.S. Fish Commission;
Alexander Bache, of the Coast Survey; the many examples to be found in the
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history of the Marine Corps, including Holland Smith, Edson, and Puller; and
a variety of people in the enlisted ranks, whose lives and services to the nation
in a variety of ratings need to be discovered and made available to professionals.
There are even heroes for naval historians: Sir John Knox Laughton, Sir Julian
Corbett, Sir Herbert Richmond, and Captain Stephen Roskill of Britain, alongside
the Americans Alfred Thayer Mahan, Robert G. Albion, and Samuel Eliot Morison.
The professional naval audience has a particular practical interest in mari-
time history in the context of recruiting: inculcating and maintaining service
pride and tradition during the indoctrination and initial training and education
of enlisted recruits, midshipmen, and officer candidates. This also plays a key
role in the naming of buildings and ships, and the creation of memorials. Dr.
William S. Dudley—Director of Naval History on the staff of the Chief of Naval
Operations and director of the Naval Historical Center—has reminded those in
uniform who lead our sailors, “‘Celebrate, commemorate, motivate,’ these
words suggest what history and heritage can contribute to the Navy’s rich hu-
man potential.”12 With this idea in mind, Dudley suggests that the first need is to
give those who serve in the Navy a ready awareness of service history, a founda-
tion upon which to develop deeper professional understanding.
The use of history for patriotic and motivational purposes is very important
and powerful. It is also, however, an approach that can be, and has been, misused
by totalitarian regimes. In a democratic state, great care is required, as is particu-
lar attention to the ideals of academic history—critical analysis of documents,
factual accuracy, and commitment to the truth of what actually happened. One
of the principal reasons for a lack of quality in the subspecialty of naval history is
the lingering suspicion that its practitioners somehow falsify it to achieve a gov-
ernment’s political or institutional objectives.
Historians employed by governmental agencies in a democratic country have
a special obligation to the historical profession in this regard. They must always
bear in mind that the government belongs to the people and is, in its actions, re-
sponsible to them and to public judgment. Congress, the executive branch, and
the courts have established laws and regulations mandating the freedom of pub-
lic information, limiting government control over it, and laying out the respon-
sibilities of agencies, including the National Archives, for the permanent
preservation and eventual release of records. Unless lost, deliberately destroyed,
or weeded out by archivists, information in government files sooner or later be-
comes available for public scrutiny and critical analysis. This very process re-
quires that the government’s historians serve the public interest, not varying
political or institutional interest. American naval history is so rich in experience
and contains so many fine examples of bravery, courage, and professional excel-
lence that there is no need to embellish the record. Quite the contrary—an
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accurate relation of the historical events and their context underscores the real
achievements.
Entertaining and instructive stories that define ideals and motivate profes-
sionals to achieve them is neither all that naval professionals need to know about
maritime history nor all that historians can offer the Navy. As naval officers gain
professional maturity and become involved in broader issues, the historical les-
sons they need begin to overlap with the kinds of information that government
leaders use. Still, there is a professional naval dimension that differentiates their
historical study from that of other users of naval history—the need to think crit-
ically about the naval past in order to deal with the problems of the present and
future. To a greater degree than history used for motivational and leadership
purposes, professional historical knowledge involves clear, critical, rational
analysis of success and failure, in considerably more detail than the information
that is normally useful or relevant to nonspecialist government leaders.
The present-mindedness of American naval culture typically leads serving
professionals to consider as entirely new “bright ideas” that have in fact been
tried before, in circumstances that may cast light on their applicability in a new
and different context. History is particularly valuable for the insight it can bring
to issues that recur only rarely, perhaps once in a generation: reorganization of
the Navy Staff; the interrelationships of the offices of the secretaries of defense
and the Navy, the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations; and the administra-
tion of the Navy’s shore establishment by regions. Similarly, the Navy has long,
useful experience in mine warfare countermeasures. Homeland harbor defense,
a joint Army-Navy–Coast Guard concept that was applied in Vietnam and the
Gulf Wars and is now arising again, was a “live” topic half a century ago but dis-
appeared from view at the end of World War II.
Operational doctrine and the principles of war are attempts to distill such ac-
tual experience—historical experience, even if very recent—into “axioms” that
can be readily applied to the present and future.13 There is no doubt wisdom in
them, but the idea that human conduct can be effectively reduced to axioms is
doubtful. Human actions and reactions do not conform to the laws of physics,
mechanics, or the natural sciences. In the nineteenth century, many thinkers
thought they might, but later analysts discarded such ambitions, decades ago.
Such formulations and professional axioms of the past are merely “rules of
thumb”; they cannot be used blindly. They must be continually and critically
tested against experiences in differing contexts. A study of the past shows what
has worked and what has failed, but no two events are ever quite the same. His-
torical analogies do not create axioms but, more valuably, suggest the questions
that need to be considered and the range of considerations that pertain.
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American naval writers have been all too apt, in particular, to search the writ-
ings of Alfred Thayer Mahan for axioms of naval strategy, but he himself is a part
of history, and his works need to be understood in terms of his intentions and of
how they have since been used, misused, superseded, broadened, and modified.14
Historical study provides the practical basis of, and its approaches develop the
intellectual tools for, an understanding of the nature of strategy and the process
it involves.15 In this connection, historical understanding and knowledge of past
events is not the object but rather one of several means to improve the ability of
professionals to solve problems more wisely than arbitrary choice, pure chance,
or blind intuition would allow.
The General Public
Far more than many academics are willing to grant, the general public’s interest
in the field of maritime history is significant and continues to grow. There is a
large market for popular works across a wide range of media: biographies, nar-
rative books and articles, heavily illustrated books and magazines, historical
novels, feature films, television series on the major networks as well as such out-
lets as Public Broadcasting Service, the History Channel, and the Discovery
Channel. This wide public audience includes former and retired members of the
sea services, but it is not limited to them. A large number of people with no prior
connection to the services are fascinated by naval events, are intrigued by war-
ships, aircraft, and naval equipment, and admire and take an interest in those
who go to sea and have accomplished feats of navigation or geographical explo-
ration. This is an audience with interests that are wide and general but at the
same time often focused on individual events, specific seamen, or heroic actions,
ships, or weapons. The Navy meets the interests of this audience by supplying
historical information; making available historical photographs, films, and
other images; maintaining museums, opening its libraries and archives to the
public, and making available experts who can assist in the production or edito-
rial review of popular works and advise on their historical accuracy. The Navy
also posts a great deal of information on websites, where it is easily accessible to
the public. Most notable among them is that maintained by the Naval Historical
Center in Washington, D.C.;16 on it can be found a wide variety of historical in-
formation, bibliographies, a guide to manuscripts located in repositories in
Washington and throughout the country, and a guide to organizations, pro-
grams, and resources relating to the U.S. Navy’s history. The website also in-
cludes links to numerous naval history–related sites outside the Navy.
In a democratic state, ordinary citizens need to understand why such vast
sums of taxpayers’ money are spent on their navy and what it achieves. They do
not need to know all the technical details, but surely they need a basic sense of
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the importance of naval supremacy in international relations, as well as of the
roles and functions of the navy in both peace and war, if they are to have a com-
plete appreciation of the history of the nation. The wider public in the United
States needs to understand the role of the sea in American history and the essen-
tial roles that mariners played in its colonization, settlement, and early national
development. Among a wide range of other things, the public needs to under-
stand the essential contribution of the French navy to the military decision at
Yorktown, which won American independence. It needs to understand that
nearly the entire income of the federal government in the early decades of the re-
public derived from tariffs on maritime trade. American citizens need to know,
as a matter of their national heritage, about the role and influence of maritime
power on the coasts and on rivers during the Civil War; about the terrific strug-
gles and dramatic victories at sea in the First and Second World Wars; more re-
cently, about how the Soviet naval threat during the Cold War was met; and
about the roles and accomplishments of the Navy in the post–Cold War era, in
the Caribbean, the Adriatic and Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian
Ocean.
Moreover, to stimulate and maintain this broad audience, war monuments
and veterans memorials may be found in virtually every county, if not every
town, in the country. Comparatively judged, there are a large number of mari-
time museums in the United States. The American Council of Maritime Mu-
seums currently has some forty-two institutional members, and twenty-one
other museums are affiliate members. Its membership currently includes two of
the twelve museums that the U.S. Navy operates (the Navy Museum in Washing-
ton and the Naval Academy Museum) and the Navy’s Curator of Ship Models.
Three of the Navy’s twelve museums have been accredited by the American As-
sociation of Museums as having reached high professional standards: the Navy
Museum in Washington, the National Museum of Naval Aviation in Pensacola,
and the Naval Undersea Museum at Keyport, Washington.
In addition, there are more than a hundred historic ships, operated by some
seventy organizations, open to the public in the United States. Moreover, a vari-
ety of other museums and libraries draw large audiences to view major perma-
nent or temporary exhibitions in maritime and naval history.
Not everything of historical interest, of course, can or should be saved, but
neither should they be inappropriately destroyed or left unmanaged. Some
things are intrinsically valuable; some are useful only for the information they
contain; some are both, some neither. The variety is immense. But every item
worthy even of consideration for preservation has a life cycle, comprising identi-
fication, preservation, interpretation, use, and disposition—perhaps, transfer to
appropriate repositories, or disposal. Every historical object needs to be taken
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up by an institutional infrastructure that can manage and preserve it and make it
useful and accessible for professional use or public knowledge. Even tactical and
administrative computer systems that process potentially historic information
should be designed from the outset to preserve that information for future use.
To be a positive historical asset, an object must be placed in the context of a mu-
seum collection, an archive, a library, or some other specially formed collection
with cataloging, identification, and retrieval systems.17 In order to do this in a
way that meets modern professional demands, a major naval shore command
may need a trained historical officer, who is educated in maritime history, serves
as a resource, advises the commander, and coordinates with guidance from the
Director of Naval History in Washington, the entire range of activities relating
to maritime history that the particular command is likely to face—local history,
archaeology, preservation of records, archives, rare books, charts and maps, art,
historical commemorations, museums, and historical objects.
The Academic Audience
By contrast, the academic audience is small and generally limited to a relatively
small number of students and faculty at colleges and universities, but it is an
extremely important audience, far more so than its numbers suggest. Its im-
portance lies in the fact that the independent thinking and scholarship of these
researchers create the fundamental historical understanding of maritime and
naval events that serves as the basis for those of all the other audiences. Other
audiences may use the products of scholarly history in ways that academics
might consider fragmentary or lacking in depth, but their understandings are
ultimately based upon academic perceptions, debates, and prevailing
interpretations.
The most important way in which the Navy interacts with the academic world
is through direct discourse—its participation in academic research, writing, and
professional evaluation of academic literature. This participation is undertaken
largely by the research staff at the Naval Historical Center in Washington and
through the research and publications of faculty members who specialize in na-
val history at the Naval Academy in Annapolis, the Naval War College in New-
port, and the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
The ability of historians within the Navy to publish historical studies that
meet high academic standards and become part of the academic historical dis-
course is essential to the Navy’s ability to inform the public about its contribu-
tions to national life and its role in international affairs. Additionally, the Navy
makes an essential contribution to the academic audience by allowing its own
academic historians to act as advocates within the service. It contributes also by
publishing (on the basis of the professional knowledge and judgment of its
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historians) official documents on naval history and by declassifying and other-
wise making available for scholarly research archival material and historical col-
lections owned by the Navy.18
For a long time, the academic standard of maritime history in the United
States was not of the highest quality; only a few college or university history de-
partments in the United States provided courses in any aspect of the subject.
Nonetheless, over the past decade there have been strong indications that this
trend is being reversed.19 Mystic Seaport’s general history America and the Sea: A
Maritime History (1998) has apparently been adopted as a general textbook for
this purpose on several campuses where the subject was not previously offered.20
It is certainly used at Mystic Seaport in Connecticut, where the Munson Institute
of American Maritime History offers accredited, graduate-level summer courses
in maritime history.21 Today a sizeable number of individual scholars, scattered
across the country in various universities, colleges, and research institutions,
pursue professional research and writing interests in naval history and within
the broader scope of maritime history. It is these established scholars, along with
a growing number of graduate students researching master’s and doctoral theses
within these areas, who constitute the main academic audience within the
United States. They are joined by a similar set of scholars in other countries,
most recently in Australia, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy,
India, Norway, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, Portugal,
Sweden, and Latin America, who share interests in this field and bring to it in-
valuable perspectives from the vantage points of other cultures, navies, and
maritime environments.
The Navy’s single most important interaction with the academic historical
audience is the Naval History Symposium, sponsored by the U.S. Naval Acad-
emy at regular intervals since the first was held in Annapolis in May 1972. Ori-
ginally conceived as an annual event, it has been held biennially since 1973. Since
the third symposium, in 1980, a volume of selected conference papers has usu-
ally been published after each conference, reflecting the new interpretations and
perspectives in naval history of this forum, attended regularly by several hun-
dred historians and graduate students.22
The Navy’s historians, librarians, and archivists assist academic researchers in
finding materials they need for research. In addition to archival guides and offi-
cial naval records made available for research at the National Archives and Re-
cord Services, the Naval Historical Center continually updates on its website a
guide to manuscripts available for research in libraries and archives across the
country.23 Complementing this, the Naval War College, like other institutions,
maintains on its own website a list of its manuscript and archival holdings (in its
Naval Historical Collection) with a list of available research aids.24
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Two commands within the Navy and several civilian organizations have at-
tempted to raise the standards of naval history and promote new academic work
through the establishment of prizes. Among the civilian organizations, the New
York Council of the Navy League of the United States, the Theodore Roosevelt
Association, and the Franklin and Eleanor Roosevelt Institute have joined forces
to recognize annually the best book in U.S. naval history with the Theodore and
Franklin Delano Roosevelt Prize in naval history. In 2002, this award was made a
cash prize of five thousand dollars. In addition, the nation’s professional organiza-
tion for maritime historians, the North American Society of Oceanic Historians
(NASOH), awards annually its prestigious John Lyman Book Prizes for a range of
subjects in maritime history, including one in the category of U.S. naval history.
The Naval Historical Center promotes new academic work through the estab-
lishment of the Rear Admiral John D. Hayes Pre-doctoral Fellowship in U.S. Na-
val History for civilian graduate students; Vice Admiral Edwin B. Hooper
research grants for postdoctoral scholars and accomplished authors; the Samuel
Eliot Morison Naval History Scholarship for active-duty naval and Marine offi-
cers engaged in graduate studies; and the Ernest M. Eller Prize, awarded annu-
ally for the best article on American naval history published in a scholarly
journal.
In addition to these prizes, the Naval War College Foundation awards annu-
ally the Edward S. Miller History Prize for the best article on naval history to ap-
pear in the Naval War College Review. It also funds the Edward S. Miller
Fellowship in Naval History, a thousand-dollar grant to assist a scholar using the
College’s archives and historical collections. The work of naval historians is also
considered for the Samuel Eliot Morison, Victor Gondos, Moncado, and Distin-
guished Book Prizes awarded annually by the Society for Military History in the
broad field of military history. The U.S. Commission on Military History pro-
vides two $2,500 grants to encourage and support American graduate students
seeking to present the results of their research in U.S. naval history topics at the
annual overseas congress of the International Commission on Military History.
MARITIME HISTORY IN THE U.S. NAVY TODAY
A single broad historical theme might be presented to all four audiences, but it
needs to be presented to each in a different way and by different means. Some
audiences and groups may acquire their general knowledge through books and
articles, but others are reached most effectively through images—films, videos,
and dramatizations. An academic researcher may require original documents; a
teenager, an interactive game; a member of Congress, a succinct tabulation of
data; a career naval professional, a technical analysis. The detailed and technical
information that makes maritime history useful for the professional audience
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makes it opaque and useless to the general public. Government leaders seeking
critical analytical insight into current problems quickly dismiss elements of cel-
ebration and commemoration. Maritime historians and those who present their
work must be aware of the differing needs of their audiences and the levels and
approaches to history appropriate to each. There is no “off the rack” history. No
one size and style fits all—but all styles are needed if history is to become more
useful in and for the Navy than it is now.
The issue, however, is more than just a question of the audiences that will
benefit from historical insight, and the differing styles they need. It is far more
basic than that, and the situation is much more critical. In June 1999, the chair-
man of the Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Subcommittee on Naval History
formally reported to Secretary Danzig that the U.S. Navy as an institution
needed to put a much higher priority on preserving and using history—“The
Navy places a far lower priority on history than the other services measured in
competitive dollars and manpower.”25 What money the Navy does receive for its
current historical programs at the Naval Historical Center in Washington, it
“stretches . . . very thin.” The Navy employs fewer professional historians, archi-
vists, or museum specialists than the other services and has nothing comparable
to the separately funded U.S. Military History Research Institute (at the Army War
College at Carlisle Barracks) or the separately funded Air Force’s Historical Research
Agency at the Air University, which complement the work of their Washington-
based service historical offices. For the Navy, the Naval Historical Center in
Washington has had the major burden, researching and writing history while
also running the service’s operational archive, the Navy Museum, an Underwa-
ter Archaeology branch that monitors naval ship and aircraft wrecks around the
world, and the Navy’s art collection. The other services have dispersed networks
of historical offices to ensure that headquarters and operational history are pre-
served and recorded; the U.S. Navy has no similar system outside of Washington.
There are no naval historians permanently attached to operational commands.
The Naval Historical Center has only one naval reserve unit and a small naval
reserve volunteer training unit to handle the job of gathering historical materi-
als from deployed units to form the basis for the permanent historical record of
the Navy’s current operations. In the Navy today, operational history from de-
ployed units is preserved only in summary form, through the annual ship,
squadron, and unit command histories. These reports are often delegated to ju-
nior officers, who have little appreciation of the fact that they are preparing the
permanent official records of their commands’ activities. They sometimes treat
the assignment as a public affairs exercise rather than a serious permanent re-
cord that documents commands’ activities for the history of the Navy as well as
for professional information and use in future decades. Unlike during World
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War II or the Korean and Vietnam Wars, ships and major operational com-
mands no longer submit action reports or keep war diaries; the annual com-
mand history was designed to replace these older methods of reporting, but
operational commanders often overlook this responsibility.
Today, the Navy’s key operational units are the numbered fleets, with their
important battle fleet experiments, carrier battle groups, and amphibious ready
groups, but few, if any, of these have ever produced command histories as per-
manent records of their operations. These operational commanders, of course,
have wars to fight and win; nonetheless, the result of neglecting their historical
obligation is that the nation has no permanent record of their operations for the
benefit of professionals today or of future generations. Congress, government
leaders, the general public, and uniformed and civilian professionals working
within the Navy will entirely lack authoritative records of the contemporary his-
tory of our times, unless some action is taken to rectify the situation.
In some cases where recent records have been created, they have been put into
a microcopy or electronic formats that are not useable on a permanent basis; the
information that these systems were supposed to have saved is entirely lost. In-
formation and raw data that could be used for future historical research and re-
trieval appears in e-mails and the electronic formats that the Navy uses every
day, yet neither operational naval commands nor shore establishments have ef-
fective systems by which electronic archives can be routinely saved and delivered
to safe and permanent archival storage, and the electronic data systems themselves
saved for future use and reference. The paper copies of documents that naval com-
mands have traditionally transferred to archival storage declined by 75 percent be-
tween 1981 and 1990, and the volume of archival acquisitions declined a further
50 percent in the following decade.26 No effective electronic or automated means
of permanent record keeping has yet been created to fill this void.
In December 2001, the chairman of the Secretary of the Navy’s Advisory Sub-
committee on Naval History reiterated these issues to Secretary of the Navy
Gordon England and noted that
for too long the Navy as a whole has viewed history as “someone else’s problem.” As
a result, much of our historical record over the last fifty years has been destroyed,
and few of our Sailors know or appreciate our history. This mindset needs to be chal-
lenged. Every unit of the Navy shares responsibility for preserving records, under-
standing naval history and traditions, and drawing inspiration and wisdom from past
accomplishments.27
As a result of these repeated reports to the Secretary of the Navy, the Vice
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral William J. Fallon, issued an instruction in
August 2002 to all ships and stations to establish a policy for the development
H A T T E N D O R F 3 3
37
Naval War College: Full Spring 2003 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
and use of historical lessons learned and of historical resources to support and
inform naval operations, plans, and programs.28 Despite this clear and positive
step, much remains to be done to implement a more effective and servicewide
historical program for the U.S. Navy.
The Historical Center in Washington has a nine-million-dollar budget, which
includes funding for USS Constitution but not the support of the museums out-
side of Washington and educational activities at the Naval War College and the
Naval Academy. The Navy has not completely neglected maritime history, and
budgets for the Naval Historical Center have not been cut to the extent that the
budgets for other naval commands have been cut in recent years. At the same
time, millions of dollars in the Navy’s funding have gone into the review and de-
classification of archival records of many Navy commands. All this gives some
strength and support to maritime history as it is broadly construed. The primary
issue is not one of increased funding or additional manpower; the major chal-
lenge is one of changing the Navy’s current mind-set and culture, which result in
failure to conserve a permanent record of recent activities. They tend, specifi-
cally, to consider the Naval Historical Center as the only agency with any respon-
sibility for the Navy’s historical interest and to disregard the historical assets that
are already at hand.
The historians who work for and advise the Navy can only point out, as they
have repeatedly done in recent years, that the Navy and the country are in jeop-
ardy of losing the record of a significant portion of their recent past and that the
Navy is not making effective use of its historical assets and information. Only
those who bear direct responsibility, the U.S. Navy’s senior civilian and uni-
formed flag officers, can ever hope to change this mentality. Changing a
servicewide attitude toward something so fundamental as history is no easy task,
but it can be done if flag officers throughout the Navy actively engage themselves
in the process. Even so, however, it cannot happen overnight. To understand how
a professional can use history effectively requires education, reading, reflection,
and knowledge.
The lack of general historical understanding within the U.S. Navy and its cur-
rent inability to use history effectively is emblematic of the larger issue that the
Navy faces in graduate and professional education as a whole. At least 90 percent
of the general officers in the other U.S. armed services have attended both an in-
termediate and a senior service college, where historical understanding plays an
important role in educating senior officers in policy, strategy, and the nature of
warfare. In contrast, only around 30 percent of the serving flag officers in the
U.S. Navy have attended even one senior service college, while less than 5 percent
have attended both an intermediate and a senior service college.29 Thus, even at
the highest level, naval professionals lack education in the whole range of
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disciplines that provide enhanced critical thinking and decision skills for deal-
ing with our modern world, with its increasing complexity and potential for in-
formation overload.
It is astonishing that anyone would seriously argue that historical insight is ir-
relevant to professional understanding, but that is a view one often finds today
in the U.S. Navy. Among the many uses of historical understanding in and for
the Navy, perhaps the most important is the need that our highly technological
and interconnected society creates for an interdisciplinary education.30 Precisely
because our world is highly technological, education in technology and science
alone is insufficient. Among all the disciplines and forms of understanding that
naval professionals can and should use to broaden their outlook and to sharpen
their abilities to deal with the present and the future is history, particularly mari-
time history¯a resource and tool with which the U.S. Navy has made limited
progress. Much more could and should be done for and with maritime history.
H A T T E N D O R F 3 5
MARITIME HISTORY AT THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
At its founding in 1884 and for its first half-century, the Naval War College was a
major force in promoting naval historical understanding. Alfred Thayer Mahan’s
books, The Influence of Sea Power upon History and Influence of Sea Power
upon the French Revolution and Empire, were the published versions of lectures
that he delivered to Naval War College students while serving as the College’s
President. At Admiral Luce’s instigation, Mahan returned to the College on ac-
tive duty in 1910 to revise another set of his earlier college lectures for publica-
tion, as Naval Strategy. Thereafter the culture of present-mindedness in a faculty
that was then limited to active-duty officers serving short tours of duty gradually
eroded the role of innovative historical research at Newport, although the clas-
sics of military and naval history remained part of the curriculum. In 1930, the
College established its first Research and Analysis Department, which in 1931
began research on the history of warship types; a study of grand strategy of
World War I; studies on naval actions in that war (including Jutland and the
Gallipoli campaign); translations of the official German naval history of the war;
and translations of the writings of important foreign naval strategists, such as
Wolfgang Wegener and Raoul Castex.
In 1948, as part of his concept to widen the education of naval officers,
Admiral Raymond Spruance, President of the College, recommended that the
Secretary of the Navy approve a plan to employ civilian academics to teach the
social sciences, political affairs, and naval history. As the College’s chief of staff
explained to Spruance’s successor, a professor of history was to be the “means
by which we clarify our thinking on the significance of sea power and maritime
transportation in modern civilization. He will be one means by which the Naval
War College will regain, maintain, and exercise world leadership in naval
thought.” That goal remains a daunting challenge by any standard and for any
academic, but in the event, the chair, authorized by the secretary on 29 Decem-
ber 1948, remained unfilled until 1951. In 1953, the Secretary of the Navy
named the chair in honor of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (with the admiral’s per-
sonal approval). Over the next twenty years the chair was occupied by a succes-
sion of the country’s leading maritime and military historians—such prominent
historians as John H. Kemble, Charles Haring, James Field, Theodore Ropp,
Stephen Ambrose, and Martin Blumenson—who came to Newport on one-year
visiting appointments.
This practice changed in 1972, when Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner created a
large civilian faculty with longer-term appointments. Turner also explicitly revived
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the ideals toward which Luce and Mahan had striven nearly a century before, by
making intensive use of historical scholarship a key element of the College’s aca-
demic program, designed to educate midcareer officers for leadership roles in
high command and as advisers to national leaders. Under his guidance, the new
Strategy and Policy course carefully selected historical case studies that illus-
trated the recurring and major problems in the formulation of national policy
and strategy.
The College’s two other core courses, Joint Military Operations and National
Security Decision Making, also use in-depth case studies in maritime history. In
addition, a variety of optional electives have been offered in maritime history, in-
cluding one-trimester courses on naval warfare in the age of sail, the Second
World War in the Pacific, underwater archaeology, and the classics of naval
strategy. All these form part of the curriculum for the master of arts degree pro-
gram in national security and strategic studies, for which the College was accred-
ited in 1991.
Turner also made innovations to promote the value of the history of the
Navy. He established a Naval Historical Monograph series, to be published by the
Naval War College Press; its first volume appeared in 1975, and a fifteenth, The
Memoirs of Admiral H. Kent Hewitt, is being prepared for press at this writing.
Building on the initiatives of the College’s archivist, Anthony S. Nicolosi, who
from 1970 had begun to reconstitute the school’s scattered archives and de-
velop a rare book and manuscript collection, Turner approved a concept to es-
tablish a research center for naval history. This original plan was only partially
implemented, but in 1978 the College reacquired its original building from the
Newport Naval Station, arranged for it to be designated as a national historic
landmark, and renovated it as the College’s museum, under Nicolosi’s direction.
In the first months of 2003, Rear Admiral Rodney Rempt, current President
of the College, revived the unfulfilled plan of his predecessor of a quarter-
century earlier and established the Maritime History Department within the Col-
lege’s Center for Naval Warfare Studies. Chaired by the Ernest J. King Professor
of Maritime History, this department is designed to include a research unit with
faculty members equipped to do both basic and applied history and to coordi-
nate all of the College’s activities in maritime history—including the Naval War
College Museum and the Naval Historical Collection of rare books, manuscripts,
and archives of the Henry E. Eccles Library. The new Maritime History Depart-
ment underscores the Naval War College’s long-standing commitment, dating
back to the College’s conception and founding in 1884, to make effective use of
maritime history for professional purposes in and for the Navy.
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FIGHTING AT AND FROM THE SEA
A Second Opinion
Frank Uhlig, Jr.
In our concentration on the excellent sensors, weapons, computers, and com-munications systems now or soon to be in our hands, strategic and operational
naval theory has faded from our minds—in some cases, it may never even have
entered. Hence, the great effects imposed on the Navy and, indeed, on the world
at large by Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan seemingly have passed forever. Since
Mahan, who died nearly ninety years ago, few have ventured into this still ill-
explored field of endeavor, and the names of those who have done so do not
easily come to the minds of others.
However, naval theory beyond the management of arms, sensors, and communi-
cations is alive, if not perfectly well.1 Those writing today in this field invite thought
on several matters, but here I will comment on only one—the methods for the use
of naval forces in war.
One well informed and thoughtful scholar lists six
such methods.2 These, in the order discussed below,
are coastal defense, maritime power projection, com-
merce raiding, the fleet-in-being, fleet battle, and
blockade. Over the centuries navies have used, or tried,
all of them, and others, too. In the last half-century they
have added two new methods. Perhaps a third is in
the offing.
The defense of coasts, and especially of harbors,
against superior forces coming from the sea has most
often and most powerfully been undertaken from
ashore by armies and air forces. The usual result of a
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strong harbor defense is that the potential invader either chooses a less desirable
place through which to begin his campaign ashore, or he does not try at all.
Cases in point are Manila in World War II and, also in World War II, some of the
French Atlantic ports, all of them well defended. The Japanese, impressed by the
harbor defenses at Manila, began their drive upon that city in December 1941 at
Lingayen Gulf, 120 miles to the north. At the time of the Allied amphibious at-
tack at Normandy in 1944, British and American respect for the German de-
fenses of the French Atlantic ports led them to land near none of them. Through
the use of small craft, including submarines, and minefields, local naval forces
can contribute, in an adjunctive manner, to the defense of a coast or port, but
they have seldom had the principal role and seem unlikely to do so often in the
foreseeable future.
Maritime power projection consists of bombardments by aircraft, missiles,
and guns, small-unit raids ashore, and invasions, all coming from across the sea.
Whatever the form, this is what coastal defenses are supposed to thwart. These
offensive actions from the sea are an option for strong navies when the enemy’s
navy is weak and even more so when his coastal defenses, too, are thin. When the
defending enemy is strong the attacking fleet, and the landing force as well, must
be very strong.
Nowadays, it might be argued, a large amphibious force would surely be de-
tected well ahead of time, the defenders alerted, and the amphibious assault
crushed. Still, in most such assaults of the last century, even though the defender
usually did not know exactly when the attack was coming, he hardly ever was un-
prepared to oppose it vigorously. Yet, almost without exception, the amphibious as-
sault carried the day. Thus, one should not refrain from using the amphibious
weapon simply because it may no longer be hidden. In effect, it seldom ever was.
In 2001–2002, Osama bin Laden and his Taliban hosts probably imagined
that in the absence of an Afghan coastline to be assaulted, they were safe from
American reprisals mounted from the sea for bin Laden’s murderous attacks on
the United States of 11 September. No doubt to the consternation of bin Laden
and the others, American diplomacy opened the Pakistani gates between Af-
ghanistan and the Indian Ocean, as well as other gates well inland, and the
American reprisals on the Taliban and their admiring guest came anyway. First
the reprisals came from aircraft flying off carriers in the Arabian Sea and, not
long after, from Air Force aircraft too. Some of the latter flew from Diego Garcia
in the Indian Ocean, others from countries bordering on Afghanistan, and some
directly from the United States. All American aircraft en route to Afghanistan
needed the help of not only diplomacy but also, because of the long distances
they had to fly in order to reach their objectives, that of tanker aircraft. The car-
rier planes were, for instance, “heavily dependent on shore-based tanking, much
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of which was provided by the RAF.”3 Altogether the aircraft, assisted by several
dozen Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles fired from ships at sea, achieved a
great deal. In cooperation with a few hundred Special Forces troops and a num-
ber of Afghan tribal armies, within a short time they chased the Taliban and its
guests out of the lowlands and the cities into the mountains, where the survivors
still lurk. The outcome of the struggle in Afghanistan is unclear and may remain
so for some time. But the aviators flying from afloat and ashore were essential to
the improvements so far achieved.
In whatever form it comes, maritime power projection works best when at
least the immediate objectives are at, or near, the coast, or at most within the
normal combat radius of the fleet’s aircraft, including those of the landing force.
It need not involve any combat afloat, though if such combat is among the possi-
bilities, a navy had best be prepared to engage in it successfully. In 1917–18 this
country advanced an army of two million soldiers across three thousand miles
of the contested Atlantic to
friendly French ports. To protect
the forward-moving battalions,
regiments, brigades, and divisions
in their transports from German
U-boats, the Navy provided each
convoy with a substantial escort of destroyers. Once the troops were disem-
barked, authorities ashore took over and moved them to where they would be
needed, eventually to the fighting front three or four hundred miles inland.
Though not an invasion, that enormous achievement, right up to disembarka-
tion, certainly was “maritime power projection.”
On a much smaller scale but mounted much more swiftly and over a much
greater distance—eight thousand miles—the Royal Navy also projected power
ashore in 1982, in response to the Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands.
The British navy landed the rescuing troops not in a friendly port but across a
hostile, though undefended, beach fifty miles from the objective, which was the
garrisoned village of Port Stanley. The Argentines chose to oppose the British
amphibious assault—that is, they engaged in coastal defense—not with the
troops they had on the islands, nor with missile-armed surface combatants, but
with naval and air force aircraft flying from bases four hundred miles distant. It
was only by a slight margin that the Argentine aviators failed. But they did, and
in a few days the British landing force had recaptured the archipelago.
Whether the objective is near to, or far from, the beach, maritime power pro-
jection has so far had the most influence when the power projected from the
ships consisted chiefly of troops in sufficient numbers to meet the need, and
when the fleet supported them, during the landing and thereafter, with fire and
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logistics. A new form of fire support for forces ashore or about to go ashore is
that of defending them, and the ships in which they are embarked, against attack
by ballistic missiles. This may prove to be a heavy burden, to be borne by only a
small number of ships. In our recent small wars, the primary forces projected,
whether from ashore or afloat, have consisted of bomber and attack aircraft,
with troops and surface-to-surface missiles in a supporting role.4 Be that as it
may, a successfully landed army soon enough will provide its own fire, including
that against ballistic missiles, but while the fighting lasts, its need for logistical
support will be unending.
A few small, short-distance airborne assaults were carried out during World
War II, notably by the Germans at Crete in 1941. But as a rule, the projection of
an army across the water has been successful only when either there was little
danger to shipping at sea or the side that wished to project force ashore had
gained at least momentary command of those parts of the sea that were of inter-
est to it. It had to continue to maintain such command for as long as it wished to
sustain its forces on the other shore. After their air-landed assault forces had de-
feated the British defenders on Crete, the Germans achieved adequate local sea
command, chiefly through the use of shore-based aviation.
Sometimes the weaker side at sea will engage in commerce raiding—that is, at-
tacks on enemy shipping where no core issues are at stake, where distances are
great, and where, while enemy merchant ships may be scarce, enemy warships
are scarcer yet. The objective is, as inexpensively as possible, to annoy and incon-
venience the enemy as much as possible without attracting too much of the en-
emy’s strength to the defense of its distant merchantmen. This mode is
exemplified by the nineteenth-century Confederate raider Alabama and by Ger-
many’s newly armed former merchant ships roaming the lonely southern ocean in
the last century’s world wars. This might still work, but probably not for long.
It was the weaker side too, and it alone, that would engage in the practice of a
fleet-in-being. This required little more than a substantial naval presence with
which to inhibit useful activities on the part of the more powerful opponent.
The mere presence of the large German High Seas Fleet in the southeastern cor-
ner of the North Sea through the entire First World War is an example. It pre-
vented the British from shifting important elements of the more powerful
Grand Fleet (based at Scapa Flow, in that sea’s northwestern corner) to other wa-
ters where they would have been most welcome. As the example suggests, the ef-
fect of a fleet-in-being was likely to be marginal. After 1918 this passive and
largely ineffective form of warfare had just about died. Current means of intelli-
gence and communications have buried the corpse.5
Fleet battle is aimed, through the defeat and even destruction of the enemy’s
main force at sea, at gaining command of that sea. Why does one seek such
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command? What can one do with it? One seeks such command so that friendly
shipping, filled with cargoes or people necessary for the survival of a nation and
the success of its forces in battle, can sail to where it is needed when it is needed,
and so that hostile shipping cannot do those things.
Once the enemy’s main force at sea is defeated or destroyed, one’s own com-
batant ships can then be dispersed in ways that will help ensure the destruction
of the enemy’s weaker warships and the capture, blockade, or destruction of his
military and commercial shipping. Moreover, concentrated anew, they can pro-
tect and support forces engaged in the projection of power ashore.
What do we mean by “shipping”? Commercial shipping, normally privately
owned but in wartime usually under government control, consists of ships car-
rying fuel (gas, coal, oil, refined products), dry bulk cargoes (grains and ores),
food and manufactured goods (now almost always in containers), autos and
trucks, and heavy and bulky structures (sometimes including damaged ships).
Commercial shipping also includes ships and boats engaged in fishing, in
support of those extracting oil and gas from the sea, and in the swift or clandes-
tine transport of such illegal cargoes as drugs and unsought immigrants.
Though they are not ships, oil and gas rigs in the ocean, and transoceanic cables
too, are as worthy of naval attack and defense as any ship might be.
Military shipping, often commissioned naval vessels, includes all those ships that
do not take part in the struggle for command of the sea—such as those intended for
amphibious warfare and for the logistical support of forces engaged in combat
afloat, aloft, or ashore. Ballistic missile submarines come under this heading too.
Though there have been many actions between small and medium-sized na-
val forces—such as at Manila Bay (1898), Dogger Bank (1915), and the bloody
night actions in Ironbottom Sound (1942)—there have never been many fleet
battles. In the First World War there was only Jutland (1916). On that occasion
the German admirals had neither sought nor expected their encounter with the
Grand Fleet; thereafter they made
sure it would not be repeated. The
battle’s most important effect was
that the German navy shifted the
bulk of its effort to direct attack
on hostile shipping by means of
submarines. In the Second World War there were no fleet battles at all in either
the Atlantic or the Mediterranean, and very few in the Pacific. It seems likely that
no one now, or soon to be, in any navy will ever experience such an action.
Blockades attempt in another way to achieve what successful fleet battles the-
oretically do. The military blockade is an attempt by the stronger fleet to keep
the weaker fleet locked in port where it can do its own side no good, its enemy no
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harm. Even in the old days blockades were more common than big battles, be-
cause while the stronger fleet longed for a fleet action, the weaker one dreaded
such a thing. Since the coming of the aircraft and now of the long-range missile
as well, ships in port are not likely to be any safer than those at sea. The difference
is that ships at sea can do things, and they often are hard for an enemy to find,
while those in port can do nothing and are easy for an enemy to find.
Just before the First World War, with the submarine an established part of ev-
ery fleet, the aircraft not far behind, and the effectiveness of minefields upon in-
cautious ships beyond doubt, the British decided that next time they would
establish a “distant” blockade (hundreds of miles from the ports of interest)
rather than a “close” one.
When war broke out in 1914, traffic across the once commercially lively
North Sea ended, as a result of the British blockade; that sea became, in the
words of a German admiral, Edward Wegener, a “dead sea.”6 So it remained as
long as the war lasted. Mainly in its commercial form, the distant blockade was a
great success. Almost no ships, civil or naval, tried to sail from outside into Ger-
man ports or from German ports to destinations outside. Only U-boats tried
that. They made such voyages routinely, but they alone.
In the role of counterblockaders the U-boats proved highly successful. In the
English Channel, the Western Approaches to Britain, and the Mediterranean
too, they could not capture British and other Allied shipping, but they could
sink it. Soon an old truth reasserted itself—that Britain and its allies, much more
than a wholly continental alliance, were dependent for their very lives on the
flow of merchant shipping in and out. The defeat of Allied shipping by the
U-boats would have meant the defeat of the entire Allied war effort. In the nick
of time, the British, both naval officers and merchant mariners, reluctantly rec-
ognized that the way to overcome the deadly threat was to form merchantmen into
convoys guarded by small warships suitable to the task. This they did; as a result, the
threat to shipping was cut to a bearable size. The Allies recovered their strength, and
before the end of 1918 they had defeated Germany on the western front.
In the second war, that of 1939–45, as soon as possible the struggle at sea be-
tween submarines and convoys took the form of submarine “wolf packs” de-
ployed operationally against convoys by headquarters ashore on the strength of
communications intelligence. The convoys, this time protected not only by
small warships but also by large, land-based aircraft, came to depend as well on
advice, commands, and communications intelligence from their own headquar-
ters ashore. In keeping with the Allied objective at sea—the safe and timely ar-
rival of the convoys—the most important use of such intelligence was to route
the convoys away from where it was expected that U-boats would be. The next
most important use of it was to direct Allied aircraft and warships not needed
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for escort of convoys to where U-boats would most likely be found. It took the
Allies three and a half years to win this struggle. Once they had the upper hand
they never loosened their grip, for victory in the Atlantic was the prerequisite for
victory on and over the continent of Europe.
What we have seen here—sustained heavy assault on, and defense of, ship-
ping far at sea—is something not often found in lists of naval functions. How-
ever, since the world wars we have not seen, nor are we likely soon to see again,
anything like it. Rather, the assault on, and defense of, shipping has abandoned
the open oceans and moved into coastal waters and the narrow seas. Aircraft and
surface combatants large and small have engaged in such warfare during the last
half-century in the Sea of Japan, Yellow Sea, Taiwan Strait, South China Sea, Per-
sian Gulf, Red Sea, eastern Mediterranean, and Falkland Sound. Some of their
actions have had much greater influence, or impact, on the course of the war
than the small size of the craft often engaged would lead one to expect.
By the middle of the twentieth century we had seen the end, so it appears, of
commerce raiding, the fleet battle, and the fleet-in-being. What remained for
navies was, by whatever means were both possible technically and acceptable
politically, to ensure that friendly shipping could reach its destination in a safe
and timely fashion and that hostile shipping could not. Should friendly shipping
be able to do as desired, then and only then would it also be possible, if necessary,
to engage in maritime projection of power—that is, to assault the enemy ashore,
in whatever ways seemed most suitable.
Since then, two methods of using naval forces have been added and two strate-
gic conditions have changed. The first new method to be added was the deterrence
of nuclear attack—the forestalling of any such attack upon one country by means
of the threat of an equal or greater nuclear blow upon the country that had
launched the attack. The necessity for this arose shortly after the Soviet Union
demonstrated its ability to manufacture and use nuclear weapons. In the United
States, at first nuclear deterrence was entirely the responsibility of the Air Force,
but over time it shifted toward the sea, and now, through its ballistic-missile sub-
marines, the Navy has a large, perhaps the largest, part to play. For the same reason
as the United States, the Soviets, British, and French also supplied themselves with
such submarines. With Russia having reasserted its own existence in place of the
sinister Soviet Union and the good relations now enjoyed among all four powers
possessing such submarines, the deterrence task has lost the salience it once had.
Moreover, it has no part in our current struggle against a stateless enemy, Osama
bin Laden and his criminal gang of religious zealots. But against a small power po-
tentially possessing some “weapons of mass destruction,” the deterrent effect of
our ready nuclear forces should be as dependable at least as it was in the days of an
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immensely powerful, aggressive, and overtly hostile Soviet Union. As the years go
by it will be important to replace old ships, weapons, and all else necessary to the
success of the force dedicated to the role of nuclear deterrence.
The other new method of employing naval forces is that of making sure
friendly air traffic can pass over the sea and hostile military air traffic cannot. Let
us quickly review an example. In the fall of 1973 the United States responded to
an Israeli demand for help during the war that had broken out between that
country and Egypt (to the southwest) and Syria (to the northeast). U.S. combat
aircraft were flown from this country to Israel; to ensure their safe and timely ar-
rival, the Sixth Fleet strung itself out almost from one end of the Mediterranean
to the other. Its immediate tasks were navigational assistance to transiting air-
craft, protection against air interdiction originating in North Africa, and help in
the event of a mishap. Two carriers of the three available in that theater provided
tanker support to aircraft that needed it, while the third made room for some of
those same aircraft on its flight deck. Shortly, it appeared that the other great
power actively engaged in the area, the Soviet Union, might be preparing to air-
lift some of its own troops to Egypt. In response, the Sixth Fleet concentrated
south of Crete, where, should the situation arise, it could both protect Israeli-
bound shipping and aircraft, and destroy Soviet shipping and aircraft bound for
Egypt. Meanwhile Soviet warships, which had been stationed where they could
protect supply ships and air transports bound for Syria, moved south so they
could provide similar protection to air transports bound for Egypt. They might
have performed that task either by means of surface-to-air missiles with which
to engage U.S. fighter planes headed toward the transport aircraft, or by means
of surface-to-surface missiles with which to engage the carriers from which the
aircraft would fly. By that time, however, a truce respected by both sides had
taken hold ashore. The Soviets did not try to fly their troops to Egypt. Slowly the
ships dispersed, and the crisis wound down.7
At the top of the preceding paragraph is an inequality: a fleet must ensure the
passage of “friendly air traffic”and prevent the passage of “hostile military air traf-
fic.” The reason for protecting all friendly air traffic is plain. But attack on hostile
civil aircraft, at least at the beginning of a war, could result in the destruction of an
airplane filled with hundreds of civilian passengers trying merely to go about their
private lives. In 1988 a U.S. warship did shoot down an Iranian civil airliner (hav-
ing mistaken it for an attacking combat plane), and nearly three hundred people
perished unnecessarily. Nothing much came of this, for the United States ex-
pressed its regrets immediately and did what little it could to make amends. A
more ominous analog was the sinking by a U-boat in 1915 of the British passenger
liner Lusitania, an attack that cost over a thousand lives, including those of many
Americans. Most people in this country had been indifferent to the outcome of
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the European war, but the sinking turned many of them into opponents of Ger-
many and helped bring about the American decision two years later to enter the
war against that country. So, although passage of hostile military aircraft over the
sea, or even inland within reach of the fleet’s weapons, should be prevented, pas-
sage of an enemy’s civil aircraft is a different matter.
The potential third new method of employing naval forces in war or near-war
is that of forward defense of countries friendly to us from attack by ballistic mis-
siles. If this task, which is likely to be separate from that of defending our own
forces, were undertaken by the U.S. Navy, it would require the services of per-
haps a large portion of the nation’s not very numerous modern surface combat-
ants, at some measurable cost to the accomplishment of other assigned, or
assumed, missions.
In order to destroy a hostile ballistic missile before it has gained too much
speed or advanced too far into space for a forward-deployed ship to counter, our
ship might have to be very close to the launching site. However, its being there
would mark it as a clear and present danger to one of the potential enemy’s most
highly prized possessions. Thus, before launching a missile (not necessarily only
one missile), the enemy might reasonably seek to disable, sink, or capture our
forward-located ballistic missile–defense ship. Because the hair-trigger nature of
our ship’s duty will demand the
full attention of all on board, to
assure that it can carry out its
assigned task, we might find it
advisable to deploy additional
forces for its protection. This is
one of those old naval issues that, when ignored, bring great difficulty. Consider
the catastrophes that enveloped those lonely far-forward ships, the USS Liberty
in 1967 and the USS Pueblo in 1968.8
Perhaps the threat to a hostile ruler of being annihilated himself, along with
all he values, posed by our, and other countries’ nuclear deterrent forces, so suc-
cessful for so long, will still prove to be the least provocative, most effective de-
fense we will have against hostile missiles.9
The ability and willingness to counter-attack is inherent in deterrence. So it
will be necessary for the government to make clear to everyone that no matter
what its nature or means of delivery, any “weapon of mass destruction” fired at
this country, at our forces, or at one of our allies who does not itself possess nu-
clear deterrent forces, will yield in return more than one nuclear explosion in the
land of the perpetrator.
The first of the two strategic conditions that changed in the second half of the
last century is that most of the countries that had maintained large navies and
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used them vigorously in the wars of the first half of that century have lost inter-
est in engaging in wars against their neighbors and thus also lost the resources
needed to do so, let alone to engage in warfare against countries at a significant
distance. Thus, except for the United States, they now see no further need to have
large navies. Moreover, though powerful militarily ashore, neither China nor In-
dia seems ready to match its strength there with similar strength afloat. For its
part, with 337 ships in commission at the end of 2001, the U.S. Navy, currently
the biggest in the world by far, has about the same number of ships in commis-
sion as it did during the years of pacifism and economic depression between the
two world wars. This number is far smaller than at any time since those days.10 It
is a number not soon likely to grow.
The second changed strategic condition is that few major countries—China
is the great exception—nowadays man or maintain substantial merchant fleets
under their own flags. Indeed, in Europe and North America, once the world’s
main sources and users of seagoing ships of all kinds, not many people even
know how to build a merchant ship. What has not changed is that almost all
those countries are as dependent as ever on the safe and timely flow of merchant
ships into their ports, each ship filled with necessary or at least desirable im-
ports. In general, they are equally dependent on the safe and timely flow of such
ships out of their ports, many of them filled with important exports. Few people
today know that oceangoing merchant ships are not only much larger than their
predecessors but also more numerous than they have been for a long time.11 The
coming into common use of the highly efficient cargo container, which can
swiftly be moved from ship to truck or train, has led to the economical commer-
cial practice of “just in time” resupply of goods or products from source to store.
No one wishes disruption of this efficient flow—that is, no one except those at
war with important exporters or importers.
During their long war of 1980–88, Iran and Iraq came to attack each other’s
oil exports. Iraq did so by means of missiles launched from aircraft at what
mainly were neutral tankers attempting to fill themselves at Iranian terminals.
Iran did so primarily by laying mines in the channel between Kuwait (which was
Iraq’s seaport proxy) and the exit from the Persian Gulf.
The Iraqi pilots hit many ships with their missiles. But despite the almost com-
plete absence of naval or air protection, the flow of neutral tankers willing to risk
attack never ended—the Iraqi attack on shipping failed. In contrast, the United
States, which favored Iraq as the lesser of evils and feared what the Iranian mines
and other naval instruments might do to Iraq’s ability to continue the war, ar-
ranged to have a number of foreign-flag tankers placed under American colors.
This justified the employment of U.S. warships to protect the tankers from any
form of Iranian attack. A series of skirmishes followed that led, among other
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results, to the destruction of several Iranian warships and oil drilling platforms at
sea, as well as serious mine damage to an American frigate. The most important
effect of these activities, albeit one little noticed, was that all merchant ships under
the protection of the U.S. fleet arrived where they were needed when they were
needed. After a year Iran called a halt to the war, not only that against the United
States but also that against Iraq.12
It is to the advantage of most countries that neither tankers nor container ships
be sunk at sea and that tankers, at least, not be sunk in port either. If a tanker were to
be sunk at sea, someone’s fishing grounds could be ruined, or a coast fouled, for
years—if in port, the result would be even worse. Should a container ship be fatally
damaged at sea, not only would the ship’s entire cargo be lost but hundreds, or even
thousands, of buoyant or semi-
buoyant containers could break
loose from the sinking ship and
form a giant floating minefield,
albeit a nonexplosive one, endan-
gering all ships and craft nearby, perhaps for months. A new task for navies, or for
the U.S. Coast Guard if the problem is in American waters, will be to round up all
those floating containers in such a contingency, either placing them aboard some
self-submerging ship—such as a dock landing ship (LSD) or a heavy-lift ship—or
sinking them so they will be no more a source of danger to others. This task will be
tedious, dangerous, and important. Hence, it is a good thing that the U.S. and other
navies have revived the old practice from sailing ship days of organizing boarding
parties in order to examine, and perhaps seize, merchant ships of interest—as well
as, for intelligence purposes, the people on board. Thus, in this old way
twenty-first-century navies can conduct blockades (or embargoes, quarantines, or
other terms suitable to non-war confrontations) in a highly effective fashion.13
However, that does not mean belligerents opposed to the safe passage of the
enemy’s ships, or enemy-supporting neutral ships, across the seas and oceans
will not resort to whatever means they have to sink them. If the ships in question
are ours or supporting us, the U.S. fleet must protect them. If they are the enemy’s
or supporting the enemy, that same fleet must blockade, capture, or sink them.
For an important reason, it will not be enough for navies just to be able to
board, examine, and perhaps seize merchant ships of interest. They must retain
the ability to sink them, for without that, the people in those ships might choose to
brush off the attentions of would-be boarding parties. When one considers in par-
ticular the current need to keep dangerous ships out of our ports and those of our
neighbors, the importance of retaining the capability to sink them looms large.
For that reason the U.S. fleets should consider establishing on each coast, or
other areas of concern, “flying squadrons” of suitable forces able to concentrate
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on ships of interest as far at sea as intelligence will permit. If such a ship resists
seizure, it should be sunk, and sunk as quickly as possible. No resource of ours
is better suited to that task than a submarine, for no other ships, and few air-
craft, have weapons so effective for that purpose as a submarine’s full-sized
torpedo—or two, or three, as needed. Other resources will be needed to rescue
survivors from the sea and, should any such survivors still be filled with murder-
ous hate, to control them until they are delivered to the authorities ashore.
How does this play out in a world dominated by information?
Commanders in the time of George Washington and Horatio Nelson had to fight
their battles, campaigns, and wars in an era of information poverty. Commanders
now must fight in an era of information wealth, or even of information excess.
We celebrate today the enormous volume, variety, and accuracy of informa-
tion we gather and the speed with which we move it over great distances. We
seek, send, receive, store, and delete information. Sometimes between receiving
information and deleting it we examine and act upon it well. Information now
not only comes from, but also goes to, great numbers of devices that we have
conceived, created, and deployed. One example is the direct coupling of sensors
and navigators to weapons.14 Hitherto, forces were accustomed to firing, launch-
ing, or dropping many weapons in the hope of gaining at most a few hits. With
the current coupling, the likelihood of a hit is so high that only one weapon, or a
few, need be directed at any target. The influence of this change on the require-
ments for ships, aircraft, launchers, weapons, fuel, parts, and crews has been
enormous. Now only a few (or a little) of each of these can achieve as much as
once required many (and much). This both eases a navy’s problem of protecting
logistical ships and aircraft and magnifies the effect of the loss of even one. In time
the enemy, whoever it may be, will be operating under the same influences.
All the foregoing—people, ships, weapons, and the rest—must be harnessed
by the commander in order to carry out his (or her, not yet its) intent. Nowadays
that commander is more likely than ever before to be at a great distance from the
scene of action; yet he possesses the ability to make tactical decisions in a timely
fashion. This ability is something far beyond the reach of Admiral Chester
Nimitz in Hawaii during World War II, or even in the thick of battle, as Vice Ad-
miral Nelson was at Trafalgar in 1805. Current and future very senior officers
and civilian officials having such power likely will see it as a good thing. Among
the others, at least some will see it otherwise.
Whether information comes from near or far, or reaches the recipient
through his eyes or ears, the great efforts we make now (and made in the past,
too) to gain and transmit it are all intended to influence, affect, and direct in a
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timely way their recipients’ thoughts and actions. The same purposes lie behind
efforts to deny the enemy timely access to accurate information and, in the same
fashion, to provide him instead with believable misinformation.15
Hence, both sender and receiver must be able to trust that the signal received is
identical to the signal sent. They must also be able to understand accurately what
has come in and, if a message is just wrong, or fraudulent, to sense that. (Recent ex-
periences in Eastern Europe and Central Asia suggest we have room for improve-
ment here.) Finally, those to whom information is sent must be able to decide
swiftly what to do about it—sometimes to do nothing is best—and send out to their
subordinates orders that are coherent, practical, and suitable to the occasion.
It is in this context that naval forces now and in the foreseeable future must
carry out their missions. How will they do that?
Mainly, it appears, they will make sure that friendly ships, and aircraft flying
over the sea, can go where they are needed when they are needed, and that enemy
ships and military aircraft flying over the sea cannot do those things. Further-
more, if necessary or desirable, they will land forces ashore, supporting them
then, and thereafter, with fire and logistics. (If sufficient ground forces are al-
ready in place, the provision by the fleet of fire and logistics will be enough.) For
those who like labels, this can be called “objective-centered warfare.”
Little of the foregoing is new. Less is dramatic. Often those engaged in a navy’s
work must demonstrate high skill and courage. As they do so, they must under-
stand that the world will most likely have focused its attention elsewhere and
will never notice how well they perform. But those are everlasting characteristics
of war at sea, and from the sea.
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THE CHALLENGES OF AMERICAN IMPERIAL POWER
Michael Ignatieff
We live in a world that has no precedents since the age of the later Romanemperors. What is so remarkable is not simply the military domination
of the world by a single power. In Alfred Thayer Mahan’s time, Britain domi-
nated the seas (but had to share its domination with a number of other navies).
It is not just the fact that this single power, the United States, has achieved its
dominance at incredibly low cost to its economy—some 3.5 percent of gross do-
mestic product. It is not simply the awesome reach of its military capability—
the ability of an air command center in Saudi Arabia to deliver B-52 strikes on a
mountaintop in Afghanistan within seventeen minutes of receiving target
coordinates from special forces on the ground. Nor is
it resolve; terrorists everywhere have been cured of the
illusion created by the American debacle in Somalia in
1993 that America lacks the stomach for a fight. What
is remarkable is the combination of all these: techno-
logical dominance at a lower cost proportional to
wealth than at any other time in history, absense of
peer competitors, and inflexible resolve to defend its
way of life—and those of other nations as well, who,
like Canada (I happen to be a Canadian citizen), are
happy to shelter under American imperial protection.
Parallels to the Roman Empire become evident.
The difference, however, is that the Romans were un-
troubled by having an empire or by the idea of an im-
perial destiny, while the Americans, who have had an
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empire, it could be argued, since Theodore Roosevelt, persist in believing that
they do not. The United States, then, is a unique empire—an imperial power
without consciousness of itself as such. On 11 November 2002, President George
W. Bush, remembering Americans in uniform who had laid down their lives, re-
marked in passing that America is not an empire—it has no imperial designs, no
intention of conquest.* There is no reason not to take the president at his word; I
am speaking of empire in a different way. Empires need not have colonies, need
not be established by conquest and aggression; the United States is an empire in
the sense that it structures the global order. It does so primarily with American
military power, diplomatic resources, and economic assets, and it does so pri-
marily in the service of its own national interests. If its interests can serve those
of allies as well, so be it, but the United States acts on that basis even if they do
not. It is impossible to understand the global order, or the sense in which it is an
order at all, without understanding the permanently structuring role of Ameri-
can global power projection.
The well-known maps indicating the division of the globe into the “areas of
responsibility” of CentCom, NorthCom, and all the other “Coms”† convey an
idea of the architecture underlying the entire global order. This is a different vi-
sion of global order than Europe’s—that of a multilateral world ordered by in-
ternational law. There is a great deal about international law that can be
admired, but it seems to miss the fundamental point—the extent to which
global order is sustained by American power. In November 2002, for instance,
the United Nations Security Council passed, fifteen votes to none, a resolution
on Iraq. We can be perfectly sure, however, that without the inflexible, unrelent-
ing American pursuit, through those multilateral institutions, of the U.S. na-
tional interest, nothing would have happened in respect to Saddam Hussein’s
weapons of mass destruction. Multilateral institutions like the United Nations
are important, but their entire momentum, force, and direction are driven by
American power; literally nothing happens in these institutions unless the
Americans put their shoulders to the wheel. It is in that sense that I refer to
America’s exercise of an imperial structuring and ordering role in the world, and
in that sense that there is an analogy to Rome.
But there is a more troubling parallel—troubling for those who use military
power for a living—with the Roman Empire in its later centuries. It is that
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overwhelming military superiority does not translate into security. Mastery of
the known world does not confer peace of mind. America has now felt the dread
that the ancient world must have known when Rome itself was first threatened
by the Goths. In the fifth century, an imperial people awakened fully to the men-
ace of the barbarians on the frontier when they poured over the marches and
sacked the city; today the menace lies just beyond the zone of stable democratic
states that see the Pentagon, and until 2001 the World Trade Center, as head-
quarters. In those border zones, modern-day barbarians can use technology to
collapse distance, to inflict devastating damage on centers of power far away. In
March 2001, I asked an audience of U.S. Naval Academy midshipmen from
which country the next threat to their ships would come; they could not answer
the question. I suggested Afghanistan, to stunned silence. Even to these educated
young men and women, only five months after the attack on the USS Cole, the
strategic challenge that a tiny country on India’s northwest frontier could pose
to the United States was not evident.
We have now awakened to the barbarians. We have awakened to the radical
collapse and distance that they have wrought. Retribution has been visited on
the barbarians, and more will follow, but the U.S. military knows that it has be-
gun a campaign without an obvious end, and that knowledge has already af-
fected the American way of life and the way Americans think about it. The most
carefree empire in history now confronts the question of whether it can escape
Rome’s ultimate fate. The challenge can be localized, for a moment in Afghani-
stan, then in Iraq, but it is global in character, and that is unsettling. There are
pacification operations, overt or covert, already under way in Yemen, in Somalia,
in the Sudan. According to the Washington Post, al-Qa‘ida attempts to launder
financial assets have been traced to Lebanese business circles that control the ex-
port of diamonds from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Angola, and the Congo. There are
cells to be rooted out in the Philippines and in Indonesia. Now, at this writing,
there is the prospect of an operation against Iraq, of which the primary purpose,
self-evidently, is the elimination not only of weapons of mass destruction but of
the core of Arab rejectionism. Its aim is to break the logjam that has frustrated
Middle East peace for fifty-odd years and then to reorder the map of an entire
area to serve the strategic interests of the United States. If that is not an imperial
project, what is?
An American empire that had since the defeat in Vietnam been cautious in its
designs has been roused to go on the offensive. The awakening was brutal, but
there might be reason, in an ironic way, to be thankful—as a great poet once said,
barbarians are a “kind of solution.”* Barbarism is not new; fanaticism is not
I G N A T I E F F 5 5
* Constantine Cavafy (Konstantinos Kavafis, 1863–1933), in Awaiting the Barbarians: “Now what’s
going to happen to us without barbarians? / Those people were a kind of solution.”
59
Naval War College: Full Spring 2003 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
new. What is new is the connection between barbarian asymmetric methods and
a global ideology, Islam, that provides a bottomless supply of recruits and allies
for a global war. Also new is the way in which fanatics have exploited the values
of our society—our openness and freedom, as well as our technology—to take
war to the heart of the empire.
The single most dangerous thing about terrorism is the claim that terrorists
are responding to grievances about which, in fact, they do not care. The 11 Sep-
tember attackers made no demands at all, declared no explicit political agenda.
They went to their deaths in complete silence. Nonetheless, hundreds of mil-
lions of people accepted them as representatives of their own long-frustrated
political desires—to drive Israel into the sea, to expel America from the holy
places, and so on. The hijackers themselves were more interested in the spectacle
of destruction, in violence for its own sake, than in the redemption of the down-
trodden, but they have been taken as martyrs for political ends.
Unless some of those political ends can be addressed, it is not clear that there
can be an appropriate solution to the problem of terrorism; the U.S. armed
forces are being asked to solve militarily a problem that probably, in the end, has
only political solutions. Robust military responses are needed, but they must be
part of a political strategy—in
fact, a geopolitical strategy, one
that recognizes that the American
homeland has found itself caught
in the crossfire of a civil war. The
terrorists are not attacking only
the United States, or even the West; they are also coming after its Arab allies.
They want nothing more than to return the Arab world to A.D. 640, to the time of
the Prophet. The civil war is a desperate struggle between the politics of pure re-
action, represented by client Arab regimes, and the politics of the impossible—
the desire to take these societies out of modernity altogether. That viewpoint
brings home how exposed politically the United States is. One aspect of that vul-
nerability that the attacks of 11 September 2001 laid bare is the extent to which
the West has treated its Arab allies as mere gas stations. These Arab states have
become decayed and incompetent betrayers of their own people, and betraying
and incompetent defenders of U.S. interests. The American empire is in the pro-
cess of discovering that in the Middle East the pillars upon which it depends for
support are built of sand; that is one element of the political challenge it faces.
Another element, and one of the unacknowledged causes of “9/11,” is the jux-
taposition of globalized prosperity in the “American world” with the disintegra-
tion of states and state order in places that achieved independence from the
colonial empires after the Second World War. American hegemony in the post–
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Cold War world has coincided with a process of state disintegration. The United
States has achieved global hegemony just as the global order is beginning to
come apart at the seams. Not only are the colonial states that arose between 1947
and 1960 in Africa and Asia starting to unravel (Exhibit A being Pakistan), but
the states, like Georgia, that achieved independence with the end of the Soviet
empire are also beginning to fragment. American hegemony, then, is a position
of special fragility.
America as the remaining empire has been left with the problems that the
older empires could not solve—creating nation-state stability in the critical
postcolonial zones. In places like Pakistan, the collapse of state institutions has
been exacerbated by urbanization, by the relentless growth of shantytowns that
collect unemployed or underemployed males who see the promise of globalized
prosperity on television in every cafe but cannot enjoy it themselves. In such
places the collapsing state fabric creates a vacuum. Who fills the vacuum? The
mullahs. They fill the vacuum not simply with indoctrination and cheap hatred
but by provision of real services. A poor parent in rural Pakistan near the north-
west frontier who wants a child to get an education sends him to a madraseh.
Parents with children they cannot look after send them to the mullah. However
uncomfortable it is to accept, terrorist movements are creating legitimacy in this
way, by providing services to fill the gap left by the absence of credible and com-
petent states.
The political Left uses “empire” as an epithet—imperial America, it declares,
can do anything, can shape the world chessboard any way it wants. The implica-
tion of the foregoing, however, is that America is not in a position to create sta-
bility on whatever terms it likes. The United States is the sole guarantor of order,
yet its capacity to control and determine outcomes is often quite limited, and
nowhere are the limitations of American power more evident than in the Middle
East. Since Franklin D. Roosevelt embraced the Saudis and Harry Truman recog-
nized Israel, American leadership has driven out the other potential arbiters, the
Russians and Europeans, without being able to impose its own terms for perma-
nent peace. Presidents have come and gone, but they have not been able to re-
solve this enduring hemorrhage of American national prestige.
For fifty years, the United States paid almost nothing for its support for Israel.
This was a debt of honor, a linkage between two democratic peoples. But three or
four years ago, it began to pay an ever higher strategic price for the continued Is-
raeli occupation of the Palestinian lands—an inability to broker a settlement
that would guarantee security for the Palestinian and Israeli peoples on the ba-
sis, essentially, of partition. American failure to impose such a settlement has
now brought national security costs; the events of 11 September 2001 cannot be
understood apart from that fatal dynamic. But it is a dynamic that indicates the
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limitations of U.S. power, even with close and devoted allies. American presi-
dents may well hesitate to put even more prestige on the line in this issue; if they
overreach in the Middle East, they may lose everything, while if they do not in-
vest enough, they may lose anyway. They are always managing the chief problem
of empire—balancing hubris and prudence. Today, in the face of a global chal-
lenge and the collapsing of distance, the decision “triage”—making the distinc-
tion between hubristic overreach and prudential caution—is much more
complicated. It is much more difficult to dismiss any nation—say, Afghani-
stan—as marginal, of no importance; any such nation is likely suddenly to be-
come a national security threat.
It is not just the Middle East that highlights simultaneously America’s awe-
some power and vulnerability. When American naval planners look south from
the Suez Canal, for instance, they see nothing good. Sudan, Somalia, Djibouti,
Eritrea, Yemen—all are dangerous places, and some of them have been fatal to
American service men and women. One of the traditional diplomatic and politi-
cal functions of the U.S. Navy is to represent and promote American imperial
power by showing presence, going ashore, showing the flag. But as the United
States has realized that forward
land bases for its other kinds of
combat power are more and more
vulnerable, the Navy’s role has be-
gun to shift to that of an offshore
weapons platform. Cutting back
military presence in places that
are too vulnerable to terrorist attack seems to be good news—after the USS Cole
attack, certainly. The cost, however, is that reducing base presence in these places
also reduces influence and potentially increases alienation. This is the
well-known downside to reducing exposure to terrorist attack. Americans come
to be regarded as a mysterious offshore presence, focused on weapons and disci-
pline, not on making friends, not on making alliances, not on making local
contact.
All this makes it apparent that the United States emerged from the Cold War
with very little idea of the strategic challenges that would face it afterward. It
won the Cold War by virtue of a strategic act of political-military discipline car-
ried out by administration after administration from 1947 to 1989. It was one of
the most sustained displays of political and military resolution in the history of
republics, and it brought triumphant success. But the nation’s post-1991 perfor-
mance looks much more like what used to be said of the British—the consolida-
tion of empire in a fit of absence of mind. Successive administrations—this
is not a political point—thought they could have imperial dominion on the
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cheap. They thought that they could rule a postcolonial, post-Soviet world with
the imperial architecture, military alliances, legal institutions, and international-
development organizations that Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill had
created to defeat Hitler. As the world order arranged by Churchill and Roosevelt
comes apart, no new architectures, alliances, institutions, or organizations have
been established to replace the old. What has actually been put in their place is
American military power—and that is asking of it more than it can do. The
Greeks taught the Romans to call this failure hubris. But it is also a failure of his-
torical imagination—making the American military the preferred solution for
disorder that is replicating itself around the globe in overlapping zones and pos-
ing a security threat at home. It is an imperial problem that seems to be heading
for disaster.
A second fundamental imperial problem for the United States, on a par with
its structural vulnerability, is the fact that it is alone. Its neighbor Canada
spends 1.1 percent of its gross domestic policy on national defense, and its
armed forces are incapable even of defending the Canadian homeland. In Eu-
rope, large countries with long military traditions are investing in national de-
fense at levels of 2 percent, 2.2 percent, 2.3 percent of GDP; they are no longer
credible military allies. The military consequence is obvious in combined opera-
tions, but there is also a political aspect, an irony that has received too little at-
tention—that for Europe, spending so little on weapons is an enormous, historic
achievement. The Europeans spent so much on arms for 250 years that they nearly
destroyed their continent in two world wars. Today, they are trading down mili-
tary strength so sharply as to affect their very national identities; the European
states have become postmilitary cultures. In a sense, as Europe integrates into the
European Union, these states are even becoming “postnational” cultures.
This trend is producing a widening gap with the United States, not simply in
defense expenditure and military capability but in mentality. Europeans—whose
ancestors invented the very idea of martial patriotism, national conscription, and
national anthem—now look at American patriotism and think it an utterly alien
phenomenon. The United States, then, is the West’s last military nation-state. It can
no longer call on allies who fully understand the centrality of military power and
sacrifice in national identity. This isolation will be a long-term imperial chal-
lenge, because the decline of European defense budgets seems to be irreversible,
and a particularly difficult one, because America cannot do without Europe in
civilian terms. However contemptible its military capabilities become, Europe’s
social and economic reconstruction capacity is simply essential. The United
States must cooperate with these postnational, postmartial nation-states; with-
out them the American taxpayer will have to foot the entire bill for not only their
own defense but the maintenance of global order.
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Thus, on a specific issue of moment, it is possible that the most efficient solu-
tion to a postinvasion occupation of Iraq would be a U.S. military govern-
ment—a Douglas McArthur in Baghdad. Putting a qualified, tough American
general in charge of a military chain of command would be the most efficient,
and might be the cheapest, way to coordinate effort and resources. But the Euro-
peans would not have it. No Middle Eastern state would have it. The idea is sim-
ply not acceptable internationally; if it were pushed, no one would support the
reconstruction effort; the United States would bear the entire cost.
This instance points to a very different picture of the world than that enter-
tained by liberal international lawyers and human rights activists who hope to
see American power integrated into a transnational legal and economic order
organized around the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, the
World Trade Organization, and human rights treaties. Theirs is a feeble vision,
as we have seen; without American power, the multilateral international order is
a train without an engine.
There is a third imperial problem, or at least an inevitable part of a global war
on terror—nation building. Afghanistan has brought the point home. However
extraterritorial, nonterritorial, or nonnational a terrorist organization may be, it
needs facilities, especially to train its “foot soldiers.” Terrorists cannot sustain
themselves without compliant states who allow them to operate secretly or even,
as in this case, actually to run their foreign and domestic policies and fence off
large pieces of real estate. The United States sat and watched that happen in Af-
ghanistan for four years; that must never, ever, happen again. The United States
has learned that failed states can become direct national security risks and that
accordingly, like the idea or not, it is in the nation-building, or state-reconstruction,
business.
The exercise of nation building, however, raises a number of ethical diffi-
culties. In fact, there lies at the very heart of the matter a fundamental contra-
diction of principle and policy. The concept of human rights, which is the
semiofficial ideology of the Western world, sustains the principle of self-
determination—the right of each people to rule itself, free of outside interfer-
ence. It is a proposition dear to Americans, who fought a revolution to secure the
right to self-determination; it is the core of their democratic culture. How can
the imperial act of nation building be reconciled with it? The old imperial solu-
tion is collapsing; the problem falls ineluctably to the United States; nation
building is unavoidable. But how is it to be done? Bringing order is the paradig-
matic imperial task, but it is essential for reasons both of economy and principle
that it be done without denying local people their right to some degree of self-
determination.
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The old imperialism, the nineteenth-century kind, justified itself as a mission
to civilize, to inculcate in tribes and “lesser breeds” the habits of self-discipline
necessary for the exercise of self-rule. This is not a minor point. We often think
that imperialism and self-determination are completely contradictory—
self-rule by strangers. Interestingly, however, all the nineteenth-century empires
used self-determination to main-
tain themselves. How? By making
a promise: “If you submit to us
now, we will train you to be free
tomorrow.” Self-determination and
imperialism, then, are not the polar
opposites they seem to be; as paradoxical as it may sound, self-determination is a
means by which to perpetuate imperial rule. Canada, for instance, was for a hun-
dred years a self-governing dominion within the British Empire. In the old im-
perialism, self-rule did not have to happen any time soon. The British kept their
hold on India for most of the twentieth century with assurances: “You are not
quite ready yet. Just be patient, and we will hand over to you.” The British man-
date in Palestine took the same tack.
The new imperialism works on a much shorter time span. The contradiction
between imperialism and democracy is much sharper in places like Afghanistan,
Kosovo, and Bosnia. The prospect of self-rule cannot be distant, because the lo-
cal elites are creations of modern nationalism, of which the primary ethical con-
tent is self-determination. In Kosovo, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, and quite
probably in Iraq, the mantra is that local elites must be empowered to take over
as soon as imperial forces create conditions of stability and security. Nation
building thus seeks to reconcile imperial power and local self-determination
through the vehicle of an “exit strategy.” This is imperialism in a hurry to spend
money, get results, to turn over to the locals, and get out. But it is similar to the
old imperialism in the sense that the real power remains in imperial capitals. Lo-
cal leaders, even if elected by their own peoples, exercise limited power and must
always look over their shoulders to Washington. This new imperialism, then, is
humanitarian in theory but imperial in practice; it creates “subsovereignty,” in
which states possess independence in name but not in fact. The reason the
Americans are in Afghanistan, or the Balkans, after all, is to maintain imperial
order in zones essential to the interest of the United States. They are there to
maintain order against a barbarian threat.
Many people, particularly in the United States, feel that this is a terrible mis-
use of American combat power and resources. They consider it hubris that will
suck the nation into open-ended and unmanageable commitments. But are
there alternatives? There seems to be no other way in which to make the world
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safe for the United States. Exercises of imperial power are in themselves neither
illegitimate or immoral. For U.S. forces and resources to create (in Iraq, say) sta-
ble democratic institutions, establish the rule of law, and then leave would be
creditable—provided, of course, that the new democratic elite is not simply an
American puppet. The caveat would be especially critical in Iraq, and reconcil-
ing imperial power and democracy would become particularly delicate there.
We would have to create, or help to create, or help to repatriate a genuinely credi-
ble national leadership. The Iraqi National Congress, the Iraqi exiles in general,
are “not ready for prime time,” and there is no credible counter-elite in the coun-
try itself. The biggest challenge the United States would have in making Iraq
work is to find that elite and sustain it—and yet allow it the independence it
would need to achieve acceptance within the nation. It is not at all clear how that
can be done, but if the United States expels the Saddam Hussein regime, it will
have to be.
Does the United States have the right, in international law, to impose regime
change? I was a member of an international commission on intervention and
state sovereignty funded by the Canadian government and charged to report to
the UN Secretary General in September 2001. Our report set the ethical bar very
high. The commission argued that the only grounds for full-scale military inter-
vention in a state were human rights violations on the order of genocidal massa-
cre or massive ethnic cleansing. We believed that it is not a good idea for America
or any other country to knock over more or less at will sovereign regimes, even
odious ones. The United States would be, or feel, called upon to intervene every-
where, and whatever remains of the UN Charter system governing the use of
force in the postwar world would be destroyed. In that view—embarrassing as it
is for a human rights activist to say—intervention in Iraq is not justifiable on
strict human rights grounds. However, the combination of the regime’s human
rights behavior and its possession (actual or imminent) of weapons of mass de-
struction constitutes that ethical justification—provided that, as required by
just-war theory, the military instrument is the last resort. The exercise of secur-
ing Security Council legitimacy was a matter not of obtaining permission but of
establishing good faith, to document the crucial fact that the use of American
power was being contemplated only after a decade of attempts to disarm
Saddam Hussein by other means.
There is another ethical issue as well—under what obligation is the United
States to build a new Iraqi nation once it has knocked the door down? It is not
obvious in classical just-war theory that commencing hostilities obliges a nation
to clean up afterward. Whether such an obligation exists is a lacuna of just-war
theory. International law lists the things that legitimize the use of military force:
a nation is entitled to meet force with force; when a nation is attacked, it is
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entitled to reply. But must it also rebuild, rehabilitate, reconstruct? What is the
ethical claim here? When the Allies had pulverized the regimes of Adolf Hitler
and the Japanese—as it was entirely right and proper for them to do, with the
totality of their military force—were they then under an obligation to rebuild
Germany and Japan? Many people, like Secretary of the Treasury Henry
Morgenthau, Jr., wanted them turned into pastureland, returned to abject agri-
cultural feudalism forever. The decision to reconstruct the two nations did not
emerge from the just-war tradition; it was made on prudential, political
grounds. Today, as in 1945, there is no strict, ethical obligation, but there is a
prudential, political one, if the United States wants to build stability, in its own
image. The intervention and state sovereignty commission tried to develop an
ethical system that made the right to intervene correlative with an obligation to
rebuild; that, we believed, is the way that the emerging, customary law of nations
should go. But the case to rebuild Iraq is fundamentally not ethical but pruden-
tial—it is a smart thing to do, a smart investment of American power.
Democracy is always thought of as the antithesis of empire, but one of the dra-
mas of American power in the twenty-first century is that empire has become a
precondition for democracy. Neither democracy nor anything like the rule of
law can be established in Afghanistan without a sustained, determined exercise
of American imperial power. There is no chance at all that Iraq will emerge from
forty years of authoritarianism to democracy and the rule of law without Ameri-
can imperial power. The United States was a democracy before it was an empire;
now, suddenly, it is involved in places where the historical relationship is re-
versed. The nation faces a challenge that will test its own legitimacy as a demo-
cratic society—not simply to create stability, to order matters to suit its national
interest, but to create institutions that represent the desire of local populations
to rule themselves. Can it use imperial power to strengthen respect for self-
determination, to give states back to the abused, oppressed people who deserve
to rule them for themselves?
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TARGETING AFTER KOSOVO
Has the Law Changed for Strike Planners?
Colonel Frederic L. Borch, U.S. Army
Recent reports published by Amnesty International1 and Human RightsWatch2 charge that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 1999 air op-
erations against Serbia—Operation ALLIED FORCE3—selected and attacked tar-
gets in violation of the law of armed conflict.4 While the two high-profile
organizations clearly supported NATO’s goal of stopping the bloodshed in
Kosovo, both reports were sharply critical of some NATO combat operations.
Both claimed, for example, that an air strike on a Ser-
bian radio and television station during the campaign
was illegal because it was “a direct attack on a civilian
object.” Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch further charge that the bombing of two bridges
was unlawful because too many civilians were on or
near the structures during the attack. Finally, both
groups contend that the deaths of civilians during
NATO attacks on military targets necessarily meant
that NATO had failed to obey the law’s mandate to min-
imize harm to noncombatants. According to Amnesty
International, “NATO forces did commit serious vio-
lations of the laws of war leading in a number of cases
to the unlawful killings of civilians.”5 Similarly, Hu-
man Rights Watch declared that NATO “illegitimate”
attacks on nonmilitary targets resulted in excessive
civilian casualties.6 If these and other allegations are
true, General Wesley K. Clark, the regional commander
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responsible for the conduct of ALLIED FORCE, as well as the NATO planners who se-
quenced and synchronized the operation, violated the law—and incurred both per-
sonal liability and state responsibility for NATO members and the United States.
Additionally, if the charges are true, commanders and their planners cannot look to
ALLIED FORCE as a model for targeting in future military operations.7
So, what is the truth? Is it illegal to attack a government-owned television sta-
tion? Must a commander instruct a pilot to refrain from attacking a bridge if ci-
vilians can be seen on it? Are commanders and their planners responsible if a
large number of civilians are killed during an attack? This article concludes, after
examining the law relating to targeting and analyzing the facts and circum-
stances surrounding targets that, allegedly, were illegally attacked, that Amnesty
International and Human Rights Watch are wrong, on two grounds. In some in-
stances the facts do not support their claims; where the facts are not in dispute,
the two groups have drawn conclusions based on faulty interpretations of exist-
ing international law.
NATO selected and attacked legitimate military objectives in the Kosovo cam-
paign. The methods and weapons it used to destroy or neutralize these targets
were lawful and proportional to the military advantage expected. Finally, NATO
distinguished between combatants and noncombatants and took proper pre-
cautions to avoid injuring or killing noncombatants.
OPERATION ALLIED FORCE
In 1998, Serbian military and police forces flooded into Kosovo and began sys-
tematically driving ethnic Albanians from their homes. Roughly 250,000
Kosovars were forced to flee; most of these refugees escaped to neighboring Al-
bania and Macedonia, but the Serbs killed hundreds of men, women, and chil-
dren in this act of “ethnic cleansing.”8 When diplomatic efforts advanced by
Germany, France, and Italy did not lead to a negotiated settlement with the pres-
ident of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY),9 Slobodan Milosevic,10 the
United States and its NATO allies decided that only military action would stop the
aggression. On 24 March 1999, after talks at Rambouillet, in France, failed to
stop Serbian violence against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, NATO launched Oper-
ation ALLIED FORCE. In a seventy-eight-day “phased” air operation, aircraft from
thirteen (out of nineteen) NATO member states flew combat sorties against tar-
gets in the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, Serbia proper, and Montenegro.
Ninety of every hundred bombs used in NATO’s attacks on airfields; air defense
emplacements; bridges; command, control, and communication sites; and police
and troop barracks were precision-guided munitions (PGMs)—a significant
fact when one considers that PGMs constituted only 9 percent of bombs
dropped in DESERT STORM.11 In addition to these aircraft-delivered PGMs,
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long-range cruise missiles fired by the United States and the United Kingdom
were used to hit similar targets. The goal of ALLIED FORCE was “to halt or disrupt
a systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing.”12 The means of reaching this end state
were chosen on the basis of the belief that a gradual increase in force and intensity
would cause Milosevic to halt the aggression in Kosovo.13 By the time ALLIED
FORCE ended, NATO had flown more than 38,400 sorties and released 23,600 air
munitions against over nine hundred targets.
Commentators disagree “about
exactly what caused Milosevic to ac-
cept NATO’s conditions.”14 He may
have capitulated because he was po-
litically isolated and realized that he
could not undermine the alliance’s
unity and sense of purpose. On the
other hand, since Serbian army and
police forces had killed or expelled
most Muslim Kosovars by early June
1999, he might have acquiesced be-
cause he had achieved his objectives.
Whatever Milosevic’s reasons, the
fact remains that at the end of NATO’s
air operation, Serbian forces had
ceased their ethnic cleansing opera-
tions in Kosovo.15
THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND TARGET SELECTION
Under the law of armed conflict, all persons, places, and things may be targeted
if they are military objectives. As Article 52(2) of the 1977 Protocol I to the 1949
Geneva Conventions explains, military objectives are “objects which by their na-
ture, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action
and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circum-
stances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.”16 Even if a per-
son, place, or thing qualifies as a military objective, however, that does not mean
that it may be attacked using any imaginable method. Rather, only lawful weap-
ons may be employed.17 Additionally, any attack on a military objective must be
necessary to accomplish a military purpose. By way of example, an enemy fighter
jet is a military objective, but if it cannot be flown because it is parked in the
middle of a city neighborhood miles away from a runway, bombing it is arguably
unlawful, because it would not accomplish a military purpose.
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While noncombatants and civilian property may never be directly targeted,
the law recognizes that an attack on an otherwise lawful military objective may
cause incidental injury and damage to civilians and their property. There are,
however, limits on such incidental or collateral damage. In the words of Article
57(2) of Protocol I, it must not “be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated” (emphasis supplied) from targeting the military
objective. That is, collateral damage not only must be minimized but may not be
disproportionate to any military gain. The law of armed conflict requires attackers
to respect this principle of proportionality by demanding that they “at all times
distinguish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives.”18
Since the adoption of Protocol I in 1977, the principles of distinction and
proportionality have become increasingly important in the selection and attack
of targets. For example, it is now generally accepted that “even a legitimate target
may not be attacked if the collateral civilian casualties would be disproportion-
ate to the specific military gain from the attack.”19 Thus, for example, massive
bombing of the type used by the World War II Allies against Dresden is no lon-
ger lawful—principally because the tens of thousands of German civilians killed
was excessive when balanced against the military need to destroy the German
railway network in that city. Additionally, the bombing accuracy resulting from
the development of PGMs has brought with it a significant reduction in collat-
eral damage. As a result, while the law of armed conflict has not changed—there
is no legal requirement to use PGMs, and injuring civilians and their property is
lawful if incidental to an otherwise legal attack on a military objective—plan-
ners and operators choosing between laser-guided ordnance or “dumb” bombs
now more than ever must consider collateral damage. What constitutes “exces-
sive” collateral damage ultimately is very much affected by the subjective
mind-set of the commander in charge of an operation or campaign.20
Lawful military objectives that almost always satisfy the “military necessity”
test include enemy aircraft, vehicles, and warships; naval and military bases;
warship construction and repair facilities; military storage depots; airfields,
ports, and harbors; troop concentrations and embarkation points; and lines of
communication. Lawful targets also include dual-use objects like bridges,
railheads, road networks, and similar transportation infrastructure used both
by civilians and by enemy armed forces. For example, a power-generating sta-
tion that supplies electricity both to military structures (e.g., command and
control node or air defense site) and public facilities (such as a civilian hospital
or school) may be attacked if military necessity requires it.21 Again, however, re-
gardless of the legitimacy of selecting and attacking a target, collateral damage to
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noncombatants and their property must not be disproportionate to the military
advantage achieved in destroying or neutralizing the target. An electrical power
grid may be targeted if the effect that the loss of power will have on nonmilitary
facilities is not excessive when balanced against the advantage gained by remov-
ing that energy source from the enemy’s military forces.
Finally, because the law of armed conflict requires that “constant care shall be
taken to spare the civilian population” from the effects of military operations,
noncombatants near a legitimate military target must be warned of an impend-
ing bombardment. In the language of Article 57(2)(c) of Protocol I, “effective
warning shall be given of attacks which may affect the civilian population, unless
circumstances do not permit.” This provision is understood to mean that a
warning may be general in nature; it need not be specific if this would jeopardize
the success of the mission. Even then, only “reasonable efforts” to warn are re-
quired by law.22
Finally, in targeting a legitimate military objective, attackers may use meth-
ods that safeguard their own forces, provided they otherwise comply with the
law of armed conflict. In ALLIED FORCE, for example, NATO pilots avoiding Yugo-
slav air defenses dropped ordnance from a “safe” altitude of fifteen thousand
feet. This was entirely lawful. First, at least in regard to attacks on fixed targets,
delivering precision-guided munitions from this height actually furthered the
principle of distinction, because it gave an aircraft more time—undisturbed by
flak or surface-to-air missiles—to acquire the object being attacked and guide
the weapon to it. On the other hand, the fifteen-thousand-foot altitude did
make it arguably harder to minimize collateral damage when attacking moving
or nonfixed targets. On balance, however, NATO’s decision to protect the force
was lawful; it did not violate the principle of distinction.23
In sum, the law of armed conflict requires that each target satisfy the defini-
tion of military objective; that the means selected in attacking the target be pro-
portional to the military advantage gained; and that incidental damage to
civilians and their property be minimized.24 To ensure that every U.S. military
operation follows these legal requirements,25 judge advocates are integrated into
military planning and operations at all levels and a military lawyer reviews every
target for “legal sufficiency” prior to any attack.26
SPECIFIC TARGETS ATTACKED IN ALLIED FORCE
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch claim that NATO’s attacks on at
least five targets were unlawful because either the targets were not lawful military
objectives; or the attack accomplished no “definite military advantage”; or the
bombardment resulted in excessive and disproportionate collateral damage.27
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Laser-Guided Bomb Attack on the Grdelica Railway Bridge
On 12 April 1999, an American F-15E Strike Eagle launched a laser-guided
bomb to destroy a railway bridge in Grdelica, Serbia. While the bomb was on its
way to the target, a passenger train came onto the bridge; the bomb hit the train
rather than the bridge. As General Clark explained at a press conference on 13
April, the pilot realized that he had missed his target. Consequently, he “came back
around to try to strike a different point on the bridge because he was trying to do
[his] job, to take the bridge down.”28 Taking aim “at the opposite end [of the
bridge] from where the train had come,” the pilot launched a second PGM. By this
time, however, the train had moved—and it was hit again. Some ten civilians in
the train were killed and “at least” fifteen injured.29
NATO planners had selected the Grdelica bridge for attack because it was part
of a resupply route for Serb forces in Kosovo; Amnesty International and Hu-
man Rights Watch acknowledge that this military use made it a legitimate target.
Nonetheless, these organizations claimed in their reports that the attack was ille-
gal for two reasons. First, NATO had violated the principle of distinction when the
F-15E pilot did not delay his attack while there was “civilian traffic” on the
bridge.”30 Second, NATO had violated the principle of proportionality because the
civilian deaths were “excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct
military advantage anticipated.”31
In essence, Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch charge
that as there was no need to attack
the bridge at that particular moment—the structure could have been destroyed
ten minutes later, when the passenger train was safely across—the bombard-
ment violated the principle of proportionality.
Under the law of armed conflict, Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch are correct that it was unlawful to attack the Grdelica bridge while a pas-
senger train was on it. While the bridge was a legitimate target, it could have
been attacked when free of civilian train traffic; there is no evidence that the
mission’s success would have been jeopardized if the aircraft had returned later.
That said, the groups’ legal conclusions are irrelevant, as the facts show that the
F-15E pilot and weapons systems officer did not know that the train was on the
bridge until it was too late to prevent collateral damage from the first bomb. As
General Clark explained, the pilot launched his first laser-guided bomb while
still “many miles” from the target, from where he “was not able to put his eyes on
the bridge.” Over the next few minutes, as their aircraft closed on the Grdelica
bridge at very high speed, the pilot and weapons systems officer tracked the
bomb’s trajectory on a five-inch video screen; all seemed in order. Then, “at the
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very last instant with less than a second to go,” the train came upon the bridge
and was struck.32 It is apparent that there was no intent to harm civilians with the
first electro-optical guided bomb. Moreover, the crew intended its second bomb
to hit a point on the bridge some distance away from the train; that it in fact
struck the train was likewise an accident.
An independent investigation conducted by the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) confirmed NATO’s claims that the civil-
ian deaths and injuries at Grdelica had been unintended.33 The lesson to be
learned is that while military operations must be conducted in accordance with
the law of armed conflict, criminal responsibility requires either an intent to vio-
late the law or a reckless disregard of it. Consequently, an attacker who acts rea-
sonably in bombing an otherwise legitimate target has a defense against the
charge that excessive collateral damage occurred. What happened at Grdelica
was a tragic accident, not the result of intentional or reckless conduct; the re-
gional commander and his planners bore no command or individual responsi-
bility for it.34
Bombing of the Refugees on the Djakovica Road
On 14 April 1999, for about two hours in the afternoon, NATO F-16 and Jaguar
aircraft attacked two vehicle convoys traveling on the Djakovica Road in Kosovo.
The convoys had been targeted because NATO believed they carried Serb special
police forces that had been setting fire to houses in order to drive Albanian
Kosovars from their homes. The targets were identified and ordnance released
from an altitude of fifteen thousand feet, for reasons explained above. The attack
was successful, in that many vehicles in the convoys were destroyed or badly
damaged. At some point during the bombing, however, NATO learned that the
convoy might comprise “a mix of military and civilian vehicles”; wanting to
avoid collateral damage to civilians, it suspended the attack until more was
known. It was too late—some seventy civilian men, women, and children had
been killed and about a hundred injured. Most of the vehicles in the convoy
turned out to have been farm tractors.
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports charged that the at-
tack was unlawful on the ground that NATO’s concerns with protecting its own
pilots had caused it to ignore the principle of distinction.35 That is, by flying at fif-
teen thousand feet to avoid surface-to-air missiles, NATO attackers had been unable
to distinguish between military objectives and noncombatants and their property.
NATO countered that as the pilots had believed they were seeing and attacking
military vehicles, the civilian deaths and injuries were accidental.
Was the bombing of the Djakovica road refugees a war crime? No. The F-16
and Jaguar pilots thought they were attacking military vehicles belonging to FRY
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special police units conducting ethnic cleansing. The danger to them from en-
emy air defenses made it reasonable to attack from fifteen thousand feet. Finally,
while civilians were killed, their deaths were not the result of an intentional or
reckless failure to honor the principle of distinction. Just as it had after the
Grdelica incident, the ICTY concluded that NATO had not acted improperly at
Djakovica: “While this incident is one where it appears the aircrews could have
benefited from lower altitude scrutiny of the target at an early stage, the commit-
tee is of the opinion that neither the aircrew nor their commanders displayed the
degree of recklessness in failing to take precautionary measures which would
sustain criminal charges.”36
While NATO was cleared of wrongdoing at Djakovica, the committee’s lan-
guage suggested that there was a bombing altitude—somewhere above fifteen
thousand feet—at which ALLIED FORCE aircraft would have been acting with
criminal recklessness. Attackers may not adopt self-protection measures that so
reduce their ability to honor the principle of distinction that a reasonable per-
son would view them as reckless. At what “line” the reasonable becomes reckless,
however, is most difficult to determine. But if NATO’s self-protection measures
had made its pilots unable to distinguish between combatants and noncom-
batants, these measures would have made it difficult—if not impossible—to
carry out any lawful attacks.
Attack on the Lunane Bridge
On 1 May 1999, in the middle of the day, NATO warplanes bombed the Lunane
Bridge in Kosovo. Apparently the bridge itself suffered only minimal damage,
but a civilian bus on the bridge during the attack was blown in half. An unknown
number of civilians were killed.37
No one—not even Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch—dis-
putes that the bridge was a legitimate military objective; it was on the main re-
supply road between Nis, Serbia’s second-largest city, and Pristina, the capital of
Kosovo. Rather, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch charged that
NATO had violated the law of armed conflict in that the alliance “did not take the
precautionary steps necessary to avoid civilian casualties.” The two organiza-
tions insist that NATO could have attacked the bridge at night, when civilian traf-
fic across it was reduced. Alternatively, the two groups argue, by attacking the
bridge when a civilian bus was crossing it, the NATO pilots ignored the presence
of noncombatants and disregarded the principles of distinction and propor-
tionality. Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reasoned that if NATO
had been conducting aerial operations in accordance with the law of armed con-
flict, its pilots would necessarily have seen the bus; realizing that attacking the
bridge at that moment likely would result in excessive collateral damage, they
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would have halted the attack and resumed it only after the bus had crossed the
bridge to safety.
Did NATO violate the law because its attack on a legitimate military objective
also resulted in civilian casualties? It did not. At a 2 May 1999 press conference, a
NATO spokesman explained that the bus had crossed the bridge “after weapons
release” and that there had been no intent to target it. Interestingly, when asked if
NATO could conduct its attacks on bridges at night—so as to minimize the dan-
ger to civilian buses and trains—the spokesman said, “We did not target the bus
as we have not targeted earlier the train. We target bridges, and I am sure that the
Serb authorities know that these bridges are of extreme value to their lines of com-
munications and [that] when they allow public traffic over these bridges, then
they risk a lot of lives of their own citizens.”38
The reference to the Grdelica train indicates that NATO viewed the Lunane
Bridge as a similar situation—the attacking pilots had intended to destroy a le-
gitimate military objective. That their ordnance struck a bus was an accident.
NATO further maintained that if the damage to the bus and injury to its passen-
gers was in fact accidental, as explained, it had not violated the law of armed con-
flict; on the contrary, it was, arguably, the Yugoslav government that had done
so, as it had no doubt understood that the bridge was a lawful military objective.
Article 58(c) of Protocol I requires government officials to take “necessary pre-
cautions to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian ob-
jects under their control against the dangers resulting from military
operations.”39 By allowing its citizens to use transportation facilities that were al-
most certain to be attacked, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had put their
lives at risk. At Lunane the consequences were tragic.
Missile Attack on Serbian Radio and Television Station
On 23 April 1999, U.S. missiles40 struck the downtown Belgrade studios of a Serbian-
owned radio and television station.41 The facility housed commercial telephone,
fiber-optic cable, high-frequency radio, and microwave communication equip-
ment. It was connected with more than a hundred radio relay sites in Yugosla-
via—forming a network that was principally civilian but that NATO intelligence
had determined was integrated with the government’s strategic and operational
command and control structure. As NATO officials were to explain at a press con-
ference after the attack, “military traffic [had been] routed through the civilian sys-
tem,” and the station’s equipment had been used “to support the activities of FRY
military and special police forces.”42
On about 12 April, NATO issued a general warning43 to Western media outlets
that the radio and television station might be attacked, and in turn the Belgrade
government learned of the fact from media reports. When the facility was not
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immediately bombed, however, Belgrade apparently discounted the warning
and failed to inform the station’s staff .44 Consequently, when NATO ordnance hit
the facility, between ten and seventeen civilians—technicians, security workers,
and makeup artists—were killed, and about the same number wounded.45
According to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, the attack
“was a deliberate attack on a civilian object and as such constitutes a war
crime.”46 They argued in their reports that as the station transmitted civilian
programming only, it had not made “an effective contribution to military ac-
tion” and so could not have been a proper military objective. Additionally, the
groups charged that bombing the facility had been illegal because, even if it sat-
isfied the military objective test, its destruction would not give NATO the “defi-
nite military advantage” required by Article 52(2) of Protocol I. The fact the
station had been back in operation within hours and had not been reattacked,
they argued, necessarily meant that it had little military utility. Amnesty Inter-
national and Human Rights Watch further maintain that the attack was illegal
because the number of civilians killed in the attack had been excessive in relation
to any military advantage gained.47
Was it lawful to target the Serbian radio and television station? Yes. It had a
dual use; it broadcast civilian programming but also was an integral part of the
Yugoslav/Serbian military command and control network. This fact made it a
lawful military objective. The purpose in targeting it was to degrade the enemy’s
strategic and operational capabilities—the “definite military advantage” re-
quired by Protocol I. That the attack did not permanently neutralize enemy
command and control did not
make it any less legal. Finally, even
if one assumes for the sake of ar-
gument that the civilian casualties
were excessive, the true cause of
this collateral damage was not
NATO’s bombardment. On the contrary, the deaths and injuries resulted from
Belgrade’s failure to protect its own citizens in light of the warning received
some ten days earlier. If the Milosevic government had informed the station’s
employees that their workplace was a possible target, at least some of these civil-
ians would not have been in the building when it was hit;48 the missiles most
likely would have harmed no one.
One more issue deserves comment. Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain and
NATO officials suggested that propaganda broadcasts made by the radio and tele-
vision station had also justified its attack. Not surprisingly, Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch harshly criticized this view, claiming that there
is no legal basis for it. The committee of the International Criminal Tribunal for
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the Former Yugoslavia examining the matter agreed that this rationale probably
could not be the sole basis for an attack. The committee, however, determined
that NATO’s attack had nonetheless been lawful; its propaganda justification had
been “an incidental (albeit complementary) aim of its primary goal of disabling
the Serbian military command and control system.” However, the committee
cautioned that had the station gone beyond broadcasting propaganda and actu-
ally urged its listeners to kill Albanian Kosovars or engage in other crimes against
humanity, it would have become a lawful military objective.49
Bombardment of Korisa Village
During the night of 13–14 May 1999, three NATO aircraft dropped ten laser-
guided and gravity bombs on Korisa, a village on the highway between Prize and
Pristina. The primary target was a Serbian military camp and command post a
short distance from Korisa. NATO intelligence believed that there were no civil-
ians in the immediate area. In any event, the NATO pilots “visually identified” an
armored personnel carrier, ten artillery pieces, and “dug-in military revetted po-
sitions” prior to dropping their bombs.50 The attack on the military objective
was a success; however, the bombs also struck ethnic Albanian refugees living
nearby. A “relatively large number of civilians”—as many as fifty—were killed
and a roughly equal number injured.51 Subsequent investigations have not dis-
closed why these men, women, and children were present in the area. It may have
been simply fortuitous that they had encamped near the Korisa military camp.
There is, however, evidence that Serbian forces had forced refugees to remain
near their positions as “human shields.”52
While acknowledging that the military command post was a legitimate mili-
tary target and agreeing that it was a serious violation of the law to use the refu-
gees as human shields,53 Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch
nonetheless charged that NATO’s attack was unlawful. NATO’s pilots, they held,
had “failed to take sufficient precautionary measures to ascertain that there were
no civilians present” before they dropped their bombs. The high number of ci-
vilian casualties, the organizations maintained, had been excessive in relation to
the military gain—a violation of the principle of proportionality.54
The basic problem with the stance taken by Amnesty International and Hu-
man Rights Watch is that it does not comport with existing law. NATO forces at-
tacked a legitimate military objective. The facts that NATO intelligence officers
believed that no civilians were in the area and that the pilots saw none undercut
any conclusion that the civilian deaths resulted from any NATO failure. If the
commander authorizing the aerial attack and the officers planning it did not
know that there were civilians present—as they might well not know, in wartime
conditions—the law offers a “mistake of fact” defense. The history of warfare is
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replete with examples of “fog of war” producing unintended consequences—
especially harm to innocent civilian men, women, and children. While such
episodes are always regrettable, it does not necessarily follow that some person
or state is responsible for them. Not surprisingly, the ICTY committee investi-
gating the Korisa attack concluded that “credible information available is not
sufficient to tend to show that a crime . . . has been committed by the aircrew or
by superiors in the NATO chain of command.”55
HARD AND FAST RULES?
Roughly five hundred civilians were killed by the NATO air campaign in Kosovo.56
While this loss of life is both sad and lamentable, the ratio of sorties to civilian
deaths in that campaign was more than seventy-five to one. This ratio certainly
supports the conclusion that NATO tried to minimize casualties and conducted
ALLIED FORCE in accordance with the law of armed conflict.
For high-profile groups like Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch, however, civilian casualties or other collateral damage will never be ac-
ceptable. Such organizations have the not-so-hidden agenda of promoting rules
that would make the legal conduct of war impossible, in order to end warfare
itself—at least by law-abiding states. Amnesty International, for example, insists
that an attacker has a “responsibility under international humanitarian law to take
all possible precautions to avoid harming civilians.”57 The law of armed conflict,
however, places no such requirement on combatants. Protocol I states clearly that
“civilians enjoy general protection against dangers arising from military opera-
tions”;58 this means that no crime has been committed if civilians are harmed in a
military attack if such injury is collateral and not disproportionate to the definite
military advantage gained.
Recognizing that “hard and fast rules” would advance their long-term goal,
Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and others steadfastly insist that
the law of armed conflict is a collection of clear and unambiguous strictures. But
any rule is subject to subjective judgment, in terms of how it is applied to a par-
ticular set of circumstances. Thus, for example, there is no requirement for an
attacker to warn civilians near a target of the specific time and place of a future
attack. On the contrary, because it seeks to regulate rather than outlaw military
operations, the law of armed conflict requires only that “reasonable efforts” be
made to warn, and then only when the military situation permits. It is in the face
of this clear legal standard that Human Rights Watch insists that NATO “did not
take adequate precautions in warning civilians” prior to its attack on the Bel-
grade radio and television station.59
Applying the law of armed conflict is not like using a calculator to solve a
mathematical equation. On the contrary, because of the many subjective
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variables involved in military operations, the law necessarily requires that those
responsible apply and balance many factors both tangible and intangible. It fol-
lows that the claim that the law of armed conflict can be applied with precision is
dangerous, for two reasons. First, when groups like Amnesty International and
Human Rights Watch claim that NATO committed war crimes, some individuals
and governments inevitably believe that it is true. This threatens to deprive the
United States and NATO of the moral high ground—an important component of
success. Further, if America’s friends believe that it selects and attacks targets in
violation of the law, they will stand aloof from future coalition operations in
which the United States participates—a direct threat to its national security
strategy of engagement. Second, such false claims could restrict the flexibility of
regional commanders in carrying out warfighting missions. If Amnesty Interna-
tional and Human Rights Watch repeat their allegations often enough, Con-
gress, the White House, and the Pentagon may ultimately accept them and
thereafter make target-related decisions on the basis of misinformation about
the law. It is critical that leaders at the strategic and operational levels of war un-
derstand that NATO’s attacks on targets in ALLIED FORCE were entirely lawful. The
law of armed conflict did not change before, during, or after the operation. Only
legitimate military objectives were targeted and attacked, and no collateral dam-
age occurred as a result of violations of the law.
Regional commanders and their planners can properly look to ALLIED FORCE
as a model for targeting in such campaigns in the future. They must choose law-
ful military objectives and plan legal attacks on those targets. But these com-
manders and operational planners—and the judge advocates serving them—
must be just as vigilant in countering those who would improperly restrict the
lawful waging of war.60
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4. The “law of armed conflict” is a general term
that includes the more restrictive categories of
“law of war” (customs and laws regulating war)
and “international humanitarian law” (customs
and laws regulating the treatment of noncom-
batants, like civilians and prisoners of war). For
the purposes of this article, the law of armed
conflict includes the principles enunciated in the
Hague Conventions of 1907, the Geneva Con-
ventions of 1949, and the 1977 Protocol I to the
Geneva Conventions. The United States has
never ratified Protocol I; however, it views some
provisions as either legally binding as customary
international law or acceptable practice though
not legally binding. For example, the United
States accepts the legality of Article 51 (protec-
tion of the civilian population), Article 52 (gen-
eral protection of civilian objects), and Article
57 (precautions in attack)—all of which govern
the selection and attack of targets. For more on
the U.S. view of Protocol I, see “Remarks of
Michael J. Matheson, Session One: The United
States Position on the Relation of Customary
International Law to the 1977 Protocols
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,”
American University Journal of International Law
& Policy 2, no. 419 (1987). Additionally, regard-
less of the legal status of Protocol I vis-à-vis the
United States, all NATO members other than
Turkey have ratified it. Accordingly, as ALLIED
FORCE was conducted by a coalition almost all
thirteen members of which had ratified Protocol
I, as a practical matter its provisions applied to
all military operations in that campaign.
5. Amnesty International, Report: NATO/Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia: Collateral Damage or Un-
lawful Killings? [hereafter Amnesty International
Report], web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/
EUR700182000?OpenDocument&of=
COUNTRIES\YUGOSLAVI [11 March 2000], p. 1.
6. Human Rights Watch, Report: The Crisis in
Kosovo: Civilian Deaths in the NATO Air Cam-
paign [sic] [hereafter Human Rights Watch Re-
port], www.hrw.org/reports/2000/nato/
Natbm200-01.htm [10 February 2000], p. 1.
7. Others claiming that NATO committed “war
crimes” during ALLIED FORCE agreed with Am-
nesty International and Human Rights Watch.
For example, Canadian law professor Michael
Mandel described the bombing campaign “as a
coward’s war . . . not even partially legitimized
by the Security Council of the United Nations”;
Charles Trueheart, “Taking NATO to Court,”
Washington Post, 20 January 2000, p. A15. This
article, however, addresses only the Amnesty In-
ternational and Human Rights Watch
allegations.
8. The expression “ethnic cleansing” is relatively
new. In the context of the conflict in Kosovo,
the phrase means “rendering an area ethnically
homogenous by using force or intimidation to
remove persons of given groups from the area.”
Ethnic cleansing, which has included murder,
torture, arbitrary arrest and detention, rape and
sexual assault, deportation, and the like, consti-
tutes “crimes against humanity” and is a viola-
tion of international law. W. Michael Reisman
and Chris T. Antonio, The Laws of War (New
York: Vintage Books, 1994), p. 389.
9. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) con-
sists of Serbia and Montenegro; both are some-
times called “Former Yugoslav Republics”—a
reference to the Yugoslav federation that existed
during the Cold War. Serbia, as the largest and
most populous republic, dominates the FRY.
Kosovo is the southernmost province of Serbia.
B O R C H 7 7
81
Naval War College: Full Spring 2003 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
10. For a recent and thorough examination of
Milosevic’s conduct during ALLIED FORCE, see
Joseph Lelyveld, “The Defendant,” The New
Yorker, 27 May 2002, pp. 82–95. Milosevic is
now on trial for war crimes at the ICTY in the
Hague, Netherlands. A guilty verdict is both
likely and expected. For more on the ICTY, see
note 29.
11. Eric Schmitt, “It Costs a Lot More to Kill Fewer
People,” New York Times, 2 May 1999, p. WK5.
12. General Wesley K. Clark, Remarks to the Ameri-
can Enterprise Institute, 31 August 1999, quoted
in Human Rights Watch Report, p. 2.
13. But there was sharp disagreement among both
the NATO members and the military about how
to apply pressure on Milosevic. For a thorough
discussion of differing views in the alliance, see
U.S. General Accounting Office, Kosovo Air Op-
erations: Need to Maintain Alliance Cohesion Re-
sulted in Doctrinal Departures (Washington,
D.C.: 2001). In the military, the disagreement
was equally pronounced. General Clark, for ex-
ample, believed that Serbian army and police
units in Kosovo should be the focus of the
bombing. Lieutenant General Michael Short, on
the other hand, “believed this to be a waste of
valuable munitions and sorties.” Consequently,
Short advocated bombing strategic targets that
would destroy Milosevic and his leadership
structure. Scott A. Cooper, “The Politics of
Airstrikes,” Policy Review (June and July 2001),
www.policyreview.org/jun01/cooper.html. See
also “Operation ALLIED FORCE from the Per-
spective of the NATO Air Commander,” key-
note address, Legal and Ethical Lessons in
NATO’s Campaign in Kosovo conference, Naval
War College, Newport, R.I., reprinted in Legal
and Ethical Lessons in NATO’s Campaign in
Kosovo, ed. Andru E. Wall, International Law
Studies, vol. 78 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War Col-
lege, forthcoming 2003), pp. 23–26; David A.
Deptula, “Firing for Effects,” Air Force Maga-
zine, April 2001, pp. 46–53.
14. U.S. Department of Defense, Report to Congress:
Kosovo/Operation ALLIED FORCE After Action
Report, 31 January 2000, reprinted as JMO
NWC 2102 (Newport, R.I.: Naval War College),
p. 10. See also Stephen T. Hosmer, “The Con-
flict over Kosovo: Why Milosevic Decided to
Settle When He Did,” Report MR-1351-AF
(Santa Monica: Calif.: RAND, 2001),
www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1351.
15. For less laudatory perspectives on NATO opera-
tions in ALLIED FORCE, see Tariq Ali, “After the
War,” in Masters of the Universe: NATO’s Balkan
Crusade (New York: Verso, 2000), p. ix.
16. Additional Protocol I (1977) to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, 1125 UNTS 3 [hereafter Protocol I].
17. Weapons may be illegal per se or illegal by an
improper use. Biological and chemical weapons
are per se illegal. Certain projectiles (i.e., “dum-
dum” bullets) also are outlawed. An otherwise
legal weapon chosen with an intent to cause un-
necessary suffering would be an example of im-
proper, and therefore illegal, use. In any event,
every weapon in the U.S. inventory must be re-
viewed for legality under the law of war. For
more on this requirement, see U.S. Army Judge
Advocate General’s School, Operational Law
Handbook (Charlottesville, Va.: Judge Advocate
General’s School, 2000), pp. 5–11.
18. Protocol I, art. 48 [emphasis supplied].
19. International Court of Justice, “Advisory Opin-
ion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nu-
clear Weapons,” International Legal Materials 35
(1996), p. 936.
20. For a good discussion of the PGMs/collateral
damage issue, see Stuart W. Belt, “Missiles over
Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary
Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions
in Urban Areas,” Naval Law Review 47 (2000),
pp. 115–75; C. B. Shotwell, “Economy and Hu-
manity in the Use of Force: A Look at the Aerial
Rules of Engagement in the 1991 Gulf War,”
Journal of Legal Studies (1993), pp. 27–29.
21. For an exhaustive list of proper targets, see U.S.
Navy Dept., The Commander’s Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations, Naval Warfare Publi-
cation 1-14M/U.S. Marine Corps MCPW 5-2.1
(Washington, D.C.: Department of the Navy,
October 1995), para. 8.1.1.
22. Ibid., para. 8.5.2; Reisman and Antonio, pp. 92–93.
23. For more on NATO’s force protection decision,
see note 35.
24. Despite the clear and unequivocal requirements
of the law, a recent article by two Air Force offi-
cers claims that a target should only be attacked
if “moral” and “consistent with our cultural
norms.” Jeffrey L. Gingras and Tomislav Z.
Ruby, “Morality and Modern Air War,” Joint
Forces Quarterly (Summer 2000), p. 109. Fortu-
nately, as will be argued, there is no legal basis
for this idea.
7 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
82
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/1
25. Defense Dept. Directive 5100.77 requires the
U.S. armed forces “to comply with the law of
war in the conduct of military operations and
related activities.” Joint doctrine echoes this re-
quirement in stating that “the Armed Forces of
the United States must account for our actions”
in conducting military operations [emphasis in
original]. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Warfare
of the Armed Forces of the United States, Joint
Publication 1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 10
January 1995), p. ix.
26. Judge advocates at the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM) carefully evaluated ALLIED FORCE
targets and advised General Clark and his plan-
ners and operators on the legality of selecting
and attacking each and every one. Col. Warren
D. Hall III, Staff Judge Advocate, U.S. European
Command (EUCOM), Stuttgart, Germany, tele-
phone interview by author, 20 April 2001; Lt.
Col. Tony E. Montgomery, deputy staff judge
advocate and chief, Operational Law Division,
EUCOM, Stuttgart, Germany, e-mail interview
by author, 27 April 2001. See also Michael
Ignatieff, Virtual War (New York: Metropolitan
Books, 2000), pp. 197–98.
27. Amnesty International Report, pp. 2–4.
28. Ibid., p. 23.
29. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), “Final Report to the Prose-
cutor by the Committee Established to Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign against the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia” [hereafter ICTY
Report], International Legal Materials 39, p.
1257. The ICTY was established on 25 May 1993
by UN Security Council Resolution 827. The tri-
bunal’s mission is to prosecute persons respon-
sible for serious violations of humanitarian law
committed in the territory of the former Yugo-
slavia between 1 January 1991 and a date to be
determined. Since its creation, the ICTY has
heard criminal cases involving mass killings, the
organized detention and rape of women, and the
practice of “ethnic cleansing.” After Amnesty In-
ternational and Human Rights Watch charged
NATO with violating the law of armed conflict
during ALLIED FORCE, a committee appointed
by the ICTY prosecutor conducted an indepen-
dent investigation of the allegations. While this
article contends that the ICTY Report is legally
sound, not all agree. For less favorable views, see
Michael Bothe, “The Protection of the Civilian
Population and NATO Bombing on Yugoslavia:
Comments on a Report to the Prosecutor of the
ICTY,” European Journal of International Law 12
(2001), pp. 531–35; and Natalino Ronzitti, “Is
the Non Liquet of the Final Report by the Com-
mittee Established to Review the NATO
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia Acceptable?” International Review
of the Red Cross 82 (2000), pp. 1017–28.
30. Amnesty International Report, p. 23.
31. Ibid.
32. General Wesley K. Clark, press conference,
NATO Headquarters, Brussels, 13 April 2001,
quoted in ICTY Report, p. 1273.
33. Ibid., p. 1275.
34. Even where a regional commander intends a spe-
cific act, if the intent is based on an honest
(however mistaken) belief that the act is legiti-
mate, that commander has a defense. For exam-
ple, after World War II, Generaloberst (Colonel
General) Lothar was acquitted at Nuremberg of
charges that he had unlawfully destroyed civilian
property and driven forty-three thousand Nor-
wegians from their homes in a “scorched earth”
policy taken to stop the advancing Red Army. In
fact, the Soviets were not near Rendulic’s forces,
but he did not know this. The tribunal con-
cluded that “the conditions, as they appeared to
the defendant [Rendulic] at the time were suffi-
cient upon which he could honestly conclude
that urgent military necessity warranted the de-
cision made.” See Shotwell, n. 144.
35. Both the Amnesty International and Human
Rights Watch reports suggest that NATO air-
craft in ALLIED FORCE placed too great a pre-
mium on their own safety—and that flying at
high altitudes was generally unnecessary. This
view, however, is erroneous. The threat to allied
aircraft was very real; the Serbs, dispersing their
anti-air assets and selectively emitting their ra-
dars, “forced NATO aircrews to remain wary
and denied them the freedom to operate at will
in hostile airspace.” NATO was unable to suppress
anti-air assets completely, and its pilots were
obliged to take “aggressive and hair-raising
countertactics” to avoid being shot down.
Benjamin S. Lambeth, “NATO’s Air War for
Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assess-
ment,” Report MR-1365-AF (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, 2001), p. 76 n. 22.
36. ICTY Report, p. 1277.
37. FRY officials claimed that forty civilians riding
on the bus had been killed; NATO conceded that
B O R C H 7 9
83
Naval War College: Full Spring 2003 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
there had been casualties but did not agree to
a specific number.
38. Amnesty International Report, p. 35.
39. Protocol I, art. 48.
40. Eight Tomahawk missiles were used to hit the
state-run radio and television station in Bel-
grade. In all, the United States and United King-
dom launched a total of 238 Block III
Tomahawk missiles during Operation ALLIED
FORCE. The 198 that hit their targets accounted
for nearly half of all government, military, and
police headquarters, integrated air defense sys-
tems, and electric power grids in the country.
Bryan Bender, “Tomahawk Achieves New Ef-
fects in Kosovo,” Jane’s Defence Weekly,
www.janes.com/defence/naval_forces/news/jdw/
jdw000718_1_n.shtml [18 July 2000].
41. This was part of a coordinated attack; on the
same night, radio-relay towers and power sta-
tions supplying electricity to these facilities were
also hit. ICTY Report, p. 1277.
42. Amnesty International Report, p. 42; ICTY Re-
port, p. 1277.
43. Amnesty International Report, p. 33.
44. Human Rights Watch provides this explanation
as to why the warning was disregarded. Human
Rights Watch Report, p. 12.
45. Human Rights Watch claims that sixteen civil-
ians were killed and sixteen wounded; Human
Rights Watch Report, p. 12. The ICTY prosecu-
tor’s report, however, argues that “there is some
doubt over exact casualty figures”; ICTY Report,
p. 1277.
46. Steven Erlanger, “Rights Group Says NATO
Bombing in Yugoslavia Violated Law,” New
York Times, 8 June 2000, p. A8.
47. Amnesty International Report, p. 31.
48. Any civilian employee who chose to continue
working in the facility would have knowingly ac-
cepted the risk. Interestingly, the Daily Telegraph
(London) recently reported that the head of the
station at the time was later arrested for failing
to warn his employees that a NATO attack was
likely. Alex Todorovic, “Serb TV Chief Accused
over Air Raid,” Daily Telegraph (London), 14
February 2001, p. 19.
49. ICTY Report, pp. 1278–79. After the ICTY Re-
port was published, the European Court of Hu-
man Rights decided Bankovic v. Belgium and
Others. In that case, six Yugoslav nationals (five
acting on behalf of deceased radio station em-
ployees and the sixth acting on his own behalf
for personal injuries suffered in the attack)
sought compensation from the seventeen Euro-
pean members of NATO; the United States and
Canada were not named in the suit, since they
are not members of the Council of Europe or
signatories to the Convention on Human
Rights. The plaintiffs argued that NATO had vio-
lated the European Charter on Human Rights
guarantee of a right to life in bombing the Bel-
grade station, in that the attack had killed
innocent civilians. On 19 December 2001, a
unanimous European Court refused to hear the
case, holding that it had no jurisdiction over an
event occurring in Yugoslavia, as Yugoslavia was
not part of the forty-three-member Council of
Europe. In any case, said the Court, the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights “was not
designed to be applied throughout the world.”
The jurisdictional basis of the Court’s decision
meant that there had been no examination of—
let alone decision on—the merits of the case.
Bankovic et al. v. Belgium et al., 11 Butterworths
Human Rights Cases 435 (2002), www.echr.coe.int.
See also “Serbian TV Bombing Case Thrown
Out,” CNN.com/World, 20 December 2001,
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/Europe/12/
19/Brussels.yugo/?related.
50. Amnesty International Report, p. 39; ICTY Re-
port, p. 1282.
51. ICTY Report, p. 1282.
52. Ibid., p. 40.
53. Using civilians (or other protected persons) as
human shields violates customary international
law and Article 51(7) of Protocol I.
54. Amnesty International Report, p. 41.
55. ICTY Report, p. 1282.
56. Human Rights Watch concludes that “as few as
489 and as many as 528 Yugoslav civilians were
killed by NATO bombardments during ALLIED
FORCE.” Human Rights Watch Report, p. 4.
57. Emphasis supplied. Amnesty International News
Release, “Kosovo: Amnesty International Con-
cerns Relating to NATO Bombings,” www
.amnesty.org/news/1999/47006999.htm [18 May
1999].
58. Protocol I, art. 51.1 [emphasis supplied].
59. Human Rights Watch Report, p. 9.
8 0 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
84
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/1
60. For more on the legality of NATO’s operations in
Kosovo, see Catherine Guicherd, “International
Law and the War in Kosovo,” International In-
stitute for Strategic Studies 41 (1999), p. 20;
Heike Krieger, ed., The Kosovo Conflict and In-
ternational Law, Cambridge [Univ.] Interna-
tional Documentation Series (Cambridge, U.K.:
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001); Michael E.
Smith, “NATO, the Kosovo Liberation Army,
and the War for an Independent Kosovo:
Unlawful Aggression or Legitimate Exercise
of Self-Determination?” Army Lawyer
(February 2001), pp. 1–22; Christopher
Greenwood, “The Applicability of International
Humanitarian Law and the Law of Neutrality to
the Kosovo Campaign,” in Legal and Ethical Les-
sons in NATO’s Campaign in Kosovo, ed. Wall,
pp. 39–74; Adam Roberts, “The Laws of War af-
ter Kosovo,” in ibid., pp. 405–36.
B O R C H 8 1
85
Naval War College: Full Spring 2003 Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2003
The Naval War College in the late 1960s
86
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/1
SMALL NAVIES AND NETWORK-CENTRIC WARFARE
Is There a Role?
Paul T. Mitchell
Is there a place for small navies in network-centric warfare? Will they be able tomake any sort of contribution in multinational naval operations of the future? Or
will they be relegated to the sidelines, undertaking the most menial of tasks, en-
couraged to stay out of the way—or stay at home? If the recent experience of the
Canadian navy is any guide, small navies have every right to be concerned about
their future in network-centric operations. For while the Canadian navy has
achieved a high degree of success within U.S. naval formations, it has done so only
by virtue of highly privileged access. To date, the challenges posed by the revolu-
tion in military affairs in general and network-centric warfare (NCW) in specific
have been framed in terms of technology and investment.1 The allies and partners
of the United States are lagging in technology and
investment therein, and they need to make significant
capital investments in order to catch up. Worse,
“dynamic coalitions,” developed rapidly to deal with
crisis situations, may become the most common
form of military cooperation. In such coalitions, de-
tailed, prearranged plans and doctrine are likely to be
entirely absent. Partners will have had little in-depth
operational experience or knowledge of their own
capabilities. Technical standardization will be low;
national logistical support may be limited or entirely
absent. Significantly, there may be serious questions
regarding the professionalism of personnel partici-
pating in these coalitions.2
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How dynamic coalitions will function in network-centric warfare is un-
doubtedly problematic. One commentator has recently suggested that the na-
ture of NCW may ultimately result in more unilateral (or virtually unilateral)
U.S. operations, such as that recently conducted in Afghanistan. In effect, the
risk of “clueless coalitions” may drive the United States, however unwillingly, to-
ward a more unilateralist military policy, irrespective of that enunciated in its
national security strategy.3 The Joint Chiefs of Staff have called for a more “tai-
lored approach to interoperability that accommodates a wide range of needs
and capabilities” without implying “access without restraint.”4 In the unstruc-
tured environment implied by the concept of dynamic coalitions, however, the
policy restraints upon information sharing, surely the heart of network-centric
warfare, may be considerable. As Thomas Barnett has pointed out, “Not only
will our allies have little to contribute to the come-as-you-are party, they won’t
be able to track the course of the conversation.”5
This article examines the nature of NCW, the challenges it presents to coali-
tion operations, and some recent developments that seek to overcome these
challenges. It uses the Canadian navy’s recent and ongoing experience of directly
integrating into U.S. carrier battle group operations as a test case. The article
finds that the principal challenges that will be raised by NCW are not likely to be
technical ones, although undoubtedly these will be formidable. Rather, the most
challenging issues for all navies, and small ones in particular, stem from policy. If
Canada’s example is typical, navies that have less well developed relationships
with the U.S. Navy are likely to confront such crippling difficulties in integrating
into NCW-dominated operations as to be excluded from them.
THE NATURE OF NCW
Much of what has been revolutionary in the revolution in military affairs is not
so revolutionary from a naval perspective.6 Navies have been working with in-
formation technology since 1957, when the CANUKUS Naval Data Transmis-
sion Working Group, after three years of deliberations, ratified the technical
standard for data exchange.7
Link 11 is more or less standard among Western navies. Primarily used to
share tactical information so as to develop what is now known as a “common
operational picture” within a task group, Link 11 data is also used by the U.S.
Navy to transmit certain engagement orders. However, for many reasons, Link
11 is relatively slow. Because of significant lag times between target detection
and the posting of data onto the Link network, its information is not of fire-control
quality. Further, it passes to linked ships only the data that has already been pro-
cessed on board the contributing ship. This occasionally leads to duplicate
tracks or conflicting information about the same target. Link 11 demands a high
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degree of professional competence on the part of track coordinators in order to
keep the operating picture “clean.”8
Network-centric warfare aims at increasing the efficiency of the transfer of
maritime information among participating units (or nodes). By optimizing the
efficiency of operations through information exchange, even small naval forma-
tions can generate additional combat power.9 Data is manipulated by a series of
dynamic and interlinked “grids”: sensor grids gather the data, information grids
fuse and process it, and engagement grids manage the operations generated.10
Improved operational efficiency results not only from the increased speed at
which operations can proceed but also from the “self-synchronization” that is
generated between units.11 This speed and synchronization ultimately merge the
strategic “recognized maritime picture” with common operational and tactical
pictures.12 For example, in Canadian ships, the recognized maritime picture is
provided to ships by shore-based facilities, whereas ship-based sensors and tac-
tical data links generate local information. At the moment, neither informs the
other, which can often lead to discrepancies. With the merging of information
into a common pool distributed by linked systems, plans and operations will be-
come much more dynamic. They will be able to react instantly to changes in the
battle space, by virtue of their enhanced awareness of them. For navies having
this capability, the result is a competitive advantage, an ability to “lock in suc-
cess” while locking out enemy initiative.13
The original requirement to increase reaction speeds arose in the Cold War in
order to deal with hypothesized regiment-sized air attacks on surface ships; the
present impetus for speed and synchronization is the return of fleet operations
to their traditional setting, in and around the littorals. The sheer density of mar-
itime and air traffic, the presence of naval, commercial, and recreational mari-
time vehicles, results in a level of complexity that blue-water operations rarely
encounter. This web of activity is made all the worse by the influence of micro-
climates, complex oceanography, and unique geographical features. Finally, in
the littoral, there are few places where a warship does not stand out, whereas
defenders are afforded a multitude of opportunities to hide their forces,
whether geographically or through deception, basing them on nonnaval plat-
forms.14 In effect, naval forces are forced onto an “asymmetrical” battlefield in
the littorals.15
In response, networked operations permit enhanced speed and synchroniza-
tion, which generate predictive planning and preemption, resulting in proactive,
“maneuverist,”effects-based operations; integrated force management, allowing
synchronization of missions and resources; and execution of time-critical mis-
sions, employing “near optimal weapons pairings.”16
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The most explicit technological development stemming from these concep-
tual underpinnings has been “cooperative engagement,” which passed its opera-
tional evaluation trials in September 2001.17 Cooperative engagement, like Link
11, seeks to develop the common operational picture; unlike Link 11, however, it
also aims to coordinate threat decisions in real time. Further, it also attempts to
distribute fire-control-quality information to participating network nodes.18
Cooperative engagement improves a force’s ability to share data, even that of a
fragmentary nature. For example, because of stealth technology or terrain-
masking effects, a ship’s sensors may be unable to collect precise and complete
information on a particular target. In a formation equipped with cooperative
engagement, ships would auto-
matically cue other sensors within
the formation, producing a more
detailed picture. All this informa-
tion could then be pooled with
the data collected by other more
distant ships to assemble a “composite picture” of the target that no single ship
would have been able to generate. Units might thereby receive fire-control-quality
information on targets outside their sensor horizons; they could fire weapons
before threats appeared to them, allowing engagements to take place at maxi-
mum distance from the targets.19 The end result of all this would be a consider-
able increase in the time available to make decisions—more time to assess
threats and respond—and operations faster than the opponent can sense and re-
spond to himself. Cooperative engagement is not the only technical develop-
ment speeding up the pace and efficiency of naval operations within the U.S.
Navy. Much like the private business world in the last five years, the U.S. military
has taken advantage of the Internet to improve the flow of information. The
Defense Message System, backed up by the Secret Internet Protocol Routing
Network (SIPRNET), has introduced a series of World Wide Web–based ap-
plications such as e-mail with attachments, “chat rooms,” and web pages.20
SIPRNET in particular seems to have had a revolutionary impact on the plan-
ning and conduct of operations within the U.S. military. It has transformed la-
borious manual procedures into rapid electronic ones. This became most
evident during Operation ALLIED FORCE, when the sheer amount of paperwork
forced planners to use electronic formats, “which were substantially easier to
create, pass via e-mail, and maintain visibility on.” As superiors appended
their comments on forwarded messages, it became simpler to track the evo-
lution of commanders’ intentions as well.21 Even “chat rooms,” so ubiquitous
among idle teenagers, have a distinctly revolutionary aspect in that they per-
mit the transmission of information (along with attachments of imagery and
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other intelligence) without radio communication, thus preserving communica-
tions security within a theater.22
Video teleconferencing (VTC) has also led to “compressed command and
control processes” through its ability to span the strategic, operational, and tac-
tical levels. It is particularly useful for staffs that are widely dispersed geographi-
cally.23 A previous Sixth Fleet commander, Vice Admiral Dan Murphy, called
VTC “the wave of the future.” Video teleconferencing obviates the need to collo-
cate staffs and reduces ambiguity in commanders’ intentions.24 VTC and chat
functions collectively permit “distributed collaborative planning,” which
seeks to assemble problem solvers for rapid and effective response to time-
critical situations, while providing access to and ensuring the availability of in-
formation resources.25 Aircraft carrier battle groups are inherently dynamic
given the constant flow through them of ships, personnel, and new technology.
It is necessary to control this dynamism rather than be overwhelmed by it; ac-
cordingly, a battlegroup deployment involves a meticulous process of training
and planning through which all participating units and individuals become fa-
miliar with the synergies between processes, procedures, and systems. The prod-
uct is a specified “battle rhythm” (see figure 1). This battle rhythm requires that
everything within the group, system, individual, or ship, “not have an adverse ef-
fect on communications or information flow.” To this end, the battle group pro-
ceeds through a series of subunit and unit training exercises. These culminate in
the “comprehensive task unit exercise” that certifies the battle group for basic
functions and a final “joint task force exercise” that combines the CVBG with
other formations, such as amphibious groups and allied formations.26
ALLIED FORCE and subsequent operations in Kosovo are widely hailed as be-
ginning the introduction of network-centric operations, and ENDURING FREE-
DOM in Afghanistan has laid to rest many of the criticisms. This is especially so
since that operation saw the confrontation of a high-tech military against a rag-
tag, guerrilla-type army:
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Time Event
05:00 Receive unit operational reports
08:00 Brief battle group commander
09:00 Brief JTF commander
10:00 Warfare commanders’ coordination board
13:00 Planning cell meetings
18:00 Release commander’s intentions and situation report messages
20:00 Units receive commander’s intentions
00:00 Units release operational reports
FIGURE 1
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The Afghanistan operation may ultimately prove to be a boon to the Department of
Defense’s revolution in military affairs, in which the prize is not territory but infor-
mation. Only after a clear picture of the battlefield is assured—and that shared with
as many weapons platforms as possible—can the maximum potential of PGMs and
other high tech weaponry be unleashed both militarily and politically.
Particularly impressive has been the manner in which information from a
wide variety of sources has been processed and fused for both air and ground
forces, thus permitting midcourse updates, engagement zones, “moving target
options,” and cockpit target imagery.27
Equally evident, however, was the initial lack of allied participation in the
most secret and demanding operations. While this might have stemmed from a
general lack of allied logistical lift, other possibilities must also be considered. As
Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski, the “godfather” of network-centric warfare,
has noted, while the United States wants its partners to be as interoperable as
possible, “not being interoperable means that you are not on the net; so you are
not in a position to derive power from the information age.”28
NCW AND INFORMATION BARRIERS
Getting on the net may not be a simple process at all for allies and coalition part-
ners. Essentially, these nations face two distinct challenges: network access may
be hampered by technical incompatibilities inherent in their force structures,
but it may be obstructed also by design.29
Recent operations in the Balkans have underscored the difficulties of meeting
American expectations for rapid, information-dense operations. During opera-
tion SHARP GUARD, conducted by NATO and the Western European Union in the
mid-1990s, the ability of a ship to compile an operational picture was limited at
times to its own horizon. Further, the commander of NATO Naval Forces South,
in Naples, initially had no timely access to information being collected by units
under his command.30 During ALLIED FORCE, “existing data networks were not
adequate to support the flow of information of . . . data among key nodes of the
NATO information grid.” Further, the United States was unable to pass along
“high-fidelity data”; the alliance experienced accordingly difficulties attacking
time-sensitive targets, “because of the need for rapid exchange of precision tar-
geting data and continuous precision updates from sensor to shooter until the
target is destroyed.”31
Although some of these issues later found technical solutions (SHARP GUARD
units and command centers eventually received old U.S. Navy Joint Operational
Tactical System terminals, for example), the “need for speed” in network-centric
operations places the whole notion of multinational operations at risk.
Interoperability barriers may exclude even close allies. Connectivity problems
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are the “equivalent of changing to a different railway gauge at each national bor-
der”;32 high-tempo operations therefore ultimately become hostages to the units
with the slowest information and decision cycles.33 Just as pressing and in the
long term even more damaging than technology differentials may be lack of
physical access. Liaison officers have traditionally been exchanged by militaries
to ensure the transmission of information among partners, particularly when
there are interoperability problems.34 Today, liaison officers are often unable to
enter U.S. command centers because of security restrictions.35 Technology itself
may ultimately lead to the electronic equivalents of these physical barriers.
The growing use of video teleconferencing directly raises this issue, because
of the classified information frequently involved. In order to access a VTC link,
“all users must be on the same level of classification of network and have access
to the information on the network.”36 The lack of timely written documentation
and the instantaneous, experien-
tial nature of VTC hinder any
participation by those not on the
network.37 As Major General John
Kiszely of the British army has
pointed out more broadly, “Full interoperability between forces would depend
upon integrated collaborative planning based on the maintenance of a common
operating picture and common intelligence inputs. Without appropriate digital
communications, this would not be practical, and made all the more unlikely
because the U.S. SIPRNET is NOFORN [not releasable to foreign nationals].”38
Thus, network-centric operations in a coalition or alliance environment may
ultimately hinge on information releasability rules and the ability to exchange
information between networks of different security classifications.
The underlying trouble is that the guiding principle of NCW is to increase the
speed and efficiency of operations, whereas coalitions are rarely concerned
about combat efficiency. Coalitions are always about scarcity—in terms of oper-
ational resources, political legitimacy, or both. The trade-off is always in terms
of political influence over operational considerations; in coalitions, politics fre-
quently trump efficiency. Neither is information releasability policy oriented
around efficiency, but rather security. “Information release and control must be
conducted in a manner that prevents damaging foreign disclosure[;] this capa-
bility must be demonstrated to information owners” before any transfer can be
effected.39 Information, and what it may imply about the systems that collected
it, may be too sensitive to be entrusted to others.
In the absence of clearinghouses for information, information disclosure be-
tween nations is typically a tedious and cumbersome procedure.40 Further, be-
cause the long-term effect of individual disclosures can be difficult to ascertain
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and because the career impact of improper disclosure is so serious, “command-
ers often choose stringent release rules to avoid problems.”41 In this way,
releasability concerns have dictated separated networks operating at different
tempos. As Brigadier General Gary Salisbury, director of command, control, and
communications systems for U.S. European Command, characterized the situa-
tion in September 2001,
How do [combined planners] get these national communication and information
needs and fit these into a coalition environment? The bottom line is we are generally
operating two different networks at two different security levels. We run our net-
works at a coalition releaseability level that’s basically unclassified.42
It is ultimately these information security policies that prevent allies and
partners from operating at the same speed as the American military. Many of the
problems of interoperability between allies and coalition partners are the same
as those encountered in joint interoperability. Some have suggested that lessons
learned from the latter can be applied to coalitions.43 Nevertheless, the interven-
ing variable, not present in joint situations, is that of international politics. The
transnational element—particularly as it affects information security—makes
coalition and alliance interoperability an order more difficult than joint
interoperability.
It would be a gross overstatement to claim that the United States is uncon-
cerned by the issue of information releasability. Throughout the 1990s and still
today, the United States has sponsored Joint Warrior Interoperability Demon-
strations (JWIDs), intended to seek technical solutions to common and pressing
interoperability problems. These demonstrations have identified several techni-
cal solutions; for instance, “Radiant Mercury” and “SIREN” (Secure Informa-
tion Release Environment) decision-support software, which speed up the
sanitization and declassification of secret documents.44 The 1996 JWID identi-
fied the “Coalition Wide Area Network” (CWAN) as a “golden nugget.” CWAN
permits establishment of a common operational picture at a “coalition secret”
level. Separated (though not entirely) from the SIPRNET by software firewalls
and gateways, CWAN was initially introduced in the multinational RIMPAC
(“rim of the Pacific”) exercise series and is currently being widely used elsewhere
as well.45 Finally, the U.S. assistant secretary of defense for command and control
has sponsored a series of workshops and seminars among a working group com-
posed of Australia, Canada, Germany, Britain, and the United States, with
France as an observer. The working group seeks to identify the core needs of in-
formation exchange and to establish common doctrine and procedures prior to
any operation.46
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Dwight D. Eisenhower famously remarked, “Allied Commands depend on
mutual confidence.”47 Like relinquishing command and control, releasing sensi-
tive information is an act of trust between states surpassed only, perhaps, by
placing troops under even the limited control of an ally; releasing closely held
knowledge places technology, operations, and even personnel at risk.48 “Trust
involves a willingness to be vulnerable and to assume risk. Trust involves some
form of dependency.”49
Thus, we can expect that just as nations have always been unwilling to place
complete control of their troops under the control of foreign nations, they will
be unwilling to share completely all information they have: “As close as . . . Cana-
dian and British allies are in common interests and objectives, there will always
be limits to sharing the most highly classified information with these nations.”50
In the past, this reluctance did not typically jeopardize operations. However, in
network-centric warfare information is the cornerstone of all action; the exis-
tence of separate networks operating at different speeds will have an undeniable
impact on battle rhythms.
The United States is certainly willing to share most of its information with
certain partners. For forces of nations not in this privileged club, integration
into American networks will be increasingly difficult, depending on how often
they operate with the U.S. forces and the degree of trust extended to them.
Forces not permitted to take part in planning will ultimately be restricted sim-
ply to taking orders—possibly to assume high-casualty or politically distaste-
ful roles.51 The added risk is that multinational operations will become more
and more circumscribed, that allied participation will be accepted only under
the most restrictive circumstances. The United States is unlikely to hamstring
its own military forces or to slow its implementation of network-centric warfare
given its obvious benefits. It may decide simply to “pass” entirely on alliance
participation.52 Information releasability policy would ultimately decide,
then, not only the shape and nature of naval coalitions but possibly even their
very existence.
CANADIAN SHIPS IN AMERICAN CVBGS
One can get a sense of the challenges facing coalition naval network-centric war-
fare by examining the integration of Canadian warships into U.S. aircraft carrier
battle groups. In some respects, this case represents the crucible, for any difficul-
ties faced by Canadians are likely to be considerably more intense for navies out-
side the bonds of trust that have traditionally connected the Canadian and
American navies.
The Canadian navy began arranging to insert its ships into carrier battle
groups in the late 1990s in an effort to improve interoperability with the U.S.
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Navy (see figure 2). Initially, only West Coast ships, operating out of Canadian
Forces Base Esquimalt, in British Columbia, were involved. The West Coast fleet
had fewer recurring operational commitments (such as the NATO Standing Naval
Force Atlantic) than the East Coast command in Halifax, Nova Scotia. Further,
the West Coast fleet had a long tradition of operating with the U.S. Navy and
were therefore more doctrinally compatible with it than the Halifax squadrons,
which had been primarily influenced by their long history of NATO operations.
Since their introduction, the integration of Canadian ships into CVBGs has
been an evolutionary process. Canadian ships began as members of the Mari-
time Interdiction Force in the Persian Gulf, later gradually moving into actual
battle groups as mutual familiarity improved. What started first as an opera-
tional initiative eventually gained an explicit strategic stature (in the Canadian
context), when it became Department of National Defence policy to improve
interoperability with its allies, particularly the United States. The department
now seeks to develop and maintain “tactically self-sufficient units,” capable of
substantial military contributions while asserting their Canadian identity. (A
ground-forces equivalent would be the role Canadian Coyote LAV IIIs, armored
reconnaissance vehicles, played in Bosnia, Kosovo, and now Afghanistan.) Com-
modore Dan McNeil, Director for Force Planning and Programme Co-ordination,
has recently remarked, “We will never be able to field strategic level forces. . . .
We’re not ever going to be in that game. We’re going to be fielding tactical units.
[However,] if you properly use tactical units, you can achieve strategic effect.
That is what we are trying to do.”53
A revolutionary aspect of these carrier battlegroup operations has been the
fact that individual Canadian ships have often replaced American ones. This
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MARPAC Ships
1995, HMCS Calgary 50 days as independent ship in MIF
1997, HMCS Regina Surface action group
1998, HMCS Ottawa Abraham Lincoln BG, fully integrated
1999, HMCS Regina Constellation BG, replaced U.S. ship
2000, HMCS Calgary Surface action group, PacMEF
2001, HMCS Winnipeg Constellation BG, on-scene commander 17–24 July
02, TACON of all BG units
2001, HMCS Vancouver John C. Stennis BG
MARLANT Ships
2001, HMCS Charlottetown LANTMEF, joined Harry S. Truman BG in Med.
MIF Maritime Interdiction Force
BG battle group
PacMEF Pacific Marine Expeditionary Force
TACON tactical control
LANTMEF Atlantic Marine Expeditionary Force
FIGURE 2
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arrangement has been of mutual benefit; the United States has been able to ad-
dress its shortages of frigates and destroyers, and Canada has been afforded pro-
fessional opportunities that it could not hope to obtain on its own. These
opportunities include not only extended operations in groups larger than those
the Canadian navy typically sends to sea but also exposure to assets not in the
Canadian order of battle—carriers, cruisers, and nuclear submarines.
Canada has thus become a member of a select club, enjoying special access to
the command and control concepts developed by the U.S. Navy as it travels
down the road of network-centric warfare, as well as to military support not
normally offered to allies. Finally, CVBG operations enable the Canadian navy
to develop professional skills in the areas of littoral and interdiction operations,
for which there is no opportunity in North American waters.
At the same time, such deployments stress the mutual dependencies and vul-
nerabilities that are central to every good coalition operation. For the Canadian
navy, given the relative scarcity of Canadian ships (Canada has only twelve Halifax-
class frigates), each unit deployed has value out of proportion to its ultimate
contribution to a carrier battle group. Obviously, sending such ships into the
Persian and Arabian Gulfs, as is typical, is far more dangerous than assigning
them to the standard fisheries patrols in Canadian waters they would most likely
be conducting otherwise. Similarly, by replacing an American ship with a Cana-
dian one, rather than simply augmenting the group, the U.S. Navy is placing
considerable trust in the professionalism and competence of Canadian crews; as
one battle group commander has declared, “We need to be ready to go on game
day—and when we play, every game is game day.”54 Accepting a Canadian ship
into a battle group also constitutes a commitment to look after that ship.
To ensure that they are not liabilities for their new battle groups, Canadian
ships participate in the same exercises and workups that all American ships do.
Similarly, they carry the latest revisions of the Global Command and Control
System–Maritime (GCCS-M) and conduct training to ensure that they can
share and use the information and imagery distributed on that system. The Ca-
nadian navy has been increasingly challenged by such upgrades, however, due to
the legacy systems on board its ships. The CCS330 system that controls the ship
displays in the operations rooms of the Halifax frigates and Iroquois-class de-
stroyers is a closed-architecture system based on a unique operating system and
military-specific software and hardware. State of the art ten years ago, it is be-
coming increasingly a maintenance problem and, even more seriously, has a very
limited capacity for integration with new systems. New capabilities, like
GCCS-M, must be added to Canadian ships on a stand-alone basis. Canadian
display terminals, as a result, cannot send or receive operational messages; tacti-
cal networking requires separate consoles; and the information provided by
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systems like GCCS-M and the Canadian equivalent of the SIPRNET, known as
MCOIN III, become effectively “stovepiped.” The result is a cluttered operations
room where decision makers must consult a number of systems in order to
gather all the information necessary to perform their jobs—obviously not the
most efficient arrangement in the heat of battle.55
Interestingly, the Canadian navy’s effort to remain abreast of the fast-moving
electronics revolution in command and control technologies is not being driven
by American requirements. The United States is pleased that Canada strives to
prevent gaps in capabilities. However, Canadian naval officers stress, it is the
long history of naval cooperation
and overall familiarity between
the navies that has facilitated
these exchanges, not the technical
“kit” installed aboard Canadian
ships.56 The difficulties Canadian ships typically encounter in integrating them-
selves into American battle groups largely arise from the issue of accessibility.
In battlegroup operations, as noted, the Coalition Wide Area Network is the
principal means for coordinating action between Canadian and American ships;
the U.S. Navy is gradually migrating its command, control, communications,
planning, and execution functions to web and other digitally based delivery
methods, notably the SIPRNET. However, CWAN and SIPRNET have mutual
interface limitations. E-mail can pass between the two systems as long as the U.S.
user has a CWAN account. Nevertheless, a security “firewall” strips off attach-
ments before admitting messages into the CWAN. Thus a Canadian recipient
may receive a commander’s directive but not the supporting and amplifying in-
formation that originally accompanied it. Furthermore, messages from
SIPRNET users without registered CWAN accounts will not reach Canadian
ships, which may thereby miss important items.
The growing use of “chat” features to plan and coordinate has also been
noted, and CWAN has such features. However, there is no interconnection be-
tween SIPRNET chat and CWAN chat. In order for a Canadian ship to partici-
pate in a session with American counterparts, a CWAN liaison officer must type
into CWAN what was entered onto the SIPRNET system. Any attachment must
be “air-gapped” onto CWAN, which can be quite a complicated procedure, in-
volving multiple transfers between networks (SIPRNET to NATO Information
Tactical Display System to MCOIN III).57 As there is frequently only a single Ca-
nadian liaison officer on the carrier, accordingly, transfers between the two sys-
tems are likely to be delayed when that officer is not on watch.58 Canada urges
the U.S. flagships to man the CWAN terminal during these times, but it is likely
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to be overlooked in periods of high operational tempo—just when the Canadian
ships most need the information.
Finally, the web features of SIPRNET are limited on the CWAN side. CWAN
supports web pages, but they contain only information placed there by coalition
partners. In a U.S.-run operation, the majority of the information needed will
be originating from the United States. There is no direct connection between
SIPRNET web pages and CWAN web pages; web files must be “air-gapped.” As a
result, CWAN and MCOIN III are often out of date, sometimes by days. Further-
more, CWAN information is likely to be only a “snapshot” of that available to
SIPRNET, without the functional links that it has on the U.S. side, limiting the
ability of coalition officers to “surf ” for more information. Finally, the carrier is
usually the only U.S. ship in a battle group with a CWAN terminal, in which case
it is the sole unit capable of posting information there—making it all the more
possible that important information will not be posted at all.
TRUST AND UNILATERALISM
There may be nothing available but inefficient, work-around solutions to these
problems. The real difficulty is not so much technical as policy oriented. The
natural desire to protect sensitive information is at the root of all these issues,
and it is not unique to the United States—MCOIN III is a Canada-only system,
just as SIPRNET is U.S.-only. We should not expect this sensitivity to disappear
any time soon; in fact, 11 September 2001 doubtless heightened it. Releasability
software helps to move information onto coalition networks in a timely fashion,
but they are not gateways to the information that American officers use on a
day-to-day basis. This results in two quandaries for Canadian ships. First, they
often operate without even basic operational-procedure manuals; some publi-
cations have not been classified as releasable to Canada or to the Coalition Wide
Area Network. Without such formal guidance, U.S. officers are generally reluc-
tant to release even what is seemingly innocuous data for fear of making mis-
takes that could have repercussions for their careers.59 Second, since the makeup
of a carrier battle group is not permanent, information-sharing protocols must
be rebrokered for each deployment. Sometimes gaining access is a question of
proving one’s bona fides to the battle group; sometimes the battlegroup staff is
simply unaware what information has been passed, or is otherwise available, to
the Canadian ship. Often such problems are resolved when the battlegroup com-
mander becomes aware of them, but the necessity to approach “the flag” for such
matters highlights the impediments to network operations in a coalition
environment.
The Canadian experience with U.S. carrier battle groups is instructive in both
positive and negative senses for the overall question of network-centric
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operations in a coalition environment. It is positive in demonstrating that de-
spite technical limitations and differences between two navies, effective cooper-
ation can be achieved in the modern naval environment. Once willingness to
cooperate and a basis of trust between two forces has been established, technol-
ogy is not an impassable barrier. Canada’s close experience with the United
States may be helpful to other navies. In its vision document Leadmark, the Ca-
nadian navy has proposed to develop a “Gateway C4ISR”* function that would
allow less capable navies to integrate themselves into network-centric opera-
tions.60 The Canadian navy has performed such a function in the past. During
the Gulf War, among the deciding factors in the selection of Canada to lead the
Combat Logistics Force were its excellent interoperability with the United States
(a proposed French ship, Doudart de Lagrée, “lacked good communications
interoperability”), its multinational crews, and its remaining legacy communica-
tions systems (with which Canadian ships could talk with more or less all warships
present).61 At present, Canadian ships play an important intermediary role in
passing on information to other coalition partners in the Arabian Gulf.
However, there is a very large caveat—the relationship between the Canadian
navy and the U.S. Navy took decades to evolve, and even so significant impedi-
ments remain to the seamless integration of forces that network-centric warfare
demands. Further, while CVBGs must be prepared for all warfare eventualities,
Canadian ships have participated predominantly in maritime interdiction. One
wonders how welcome even Canadian ships might be in an operation domi-
nated by strike warfare, against an asymmetric surface threat, in the littoral.
Finally, the security demands of U.S. military networks are likely to be trouble-
some indeed for navies without the privileged access afforded to Canadian ships
and crews on the basis of long-shared operational experience and a wealth of
trust. Indeed, if the Canadian experience indicates that coalition network-
centric operations are possible, it also indicates that the price of admission will
remain very high. In a dynamic coalition environment, professional trust will be
critical, and the height of the bar will be set by both technology and policy. Be-
cause of the crippling effect of slower networks or nonnetworked ships in such a
setting, information releasability issues may be a stimulus to American
unilateralism.
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TRANSFORMING HOW WE FIGHT
A Conceptual Approach
Major Christopher D. Kolenda, U.S. Army
Transformation has been defined correctly as a process rather than an endstate. Still, nagging questions linger. What is the purpose of transformation?
Toward what goal is military transforming headed? What do we want the future
military to do? What should it look like? How should it fight? The transforma-
tion, to be meaningful, must lead coherently from a present state toward an envi-
sioned future condition. Transformation, therefore, is most precisely a strategy
designed purposefully to achieve a cogent vision of the future. Absent this artic-
ulation of purpose, transformation risks moving in the wrong direction—or in
no direction at all. The key, to paraphrase Secretary of Defense Donald R.
Rumsfeld, is to have the right ladder standing against the right wall.
The struggle from which such a purpose may be de-
rived has been a powerful subtext of the transforma-
tion debate and has indeed informed arguments over
war planning against Iraq. In the meantime, the ser-
vices have pursued a disaggregated transformation—
each trying to improve what it does best. Problems
naturally arise with this approach, particularly in
areas such as joint interoperability and lift, by air and
sea—areas that are crucial for effectiveness at the joint
level but that might get low priority from an individ-
ual service perspective. Still, it is important not to
rush; making the intellectual effort to get the vision
right is crucial. Heading, however purposefully, in a
self-defeating direction would be disastrous.
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Up to this point, unfortunately, the debate about transformation and the fu-
ture of the military has remained largely rooted in technology. We need to up-
date our understanding of the nature of war and use it as a touchstone. The
future will belong not necessarily to the most technologically advanced combat-
ant but the one that understands the nature of war and can most effectively cope
with and exploit it. Such understanding is a necessary backdrop for the develop-
ment of vision and thereafter the intellectual, cultural, organizational, and tech-
nological components of transformation.
This article seeks to expand the debate to the necessary scope by proposing a
set of ideas to synthesize the enduring nature of war with contemporary techno-
logical realities, to bridge the gap between new technology and broad transfor-
mation. These ideas emerge from five critical postulates about the enduring
nature of war:
1. Information in war is “essentially dispersed.”
2. War is Chaotic.
3. Combatants in war are complex adaptive systems.
4. War is a nonlinear phenomenon.
5. War is the realm of uncertainty.
The insights from those postulates suggest that our armed forces will be most
effective if we master the following concepts:
1. Decentralization: create and exploit a knowledge advantage by empowerment at
the appropriate levels.
2. Complexity: gain a complexity advantage by maximizing the number of meaning-
ful interactions with which the enemy must cope simultaneously or nearly so.
3. Resilience: sustain balance and equilibrium in our own force while creating and
exploiting instability and disorder in the enemy.
4. Tempo: sustain an intensity of operations over time with which the enemy cannot cope.
The apparent lessons from conflicts over the past ten years point to an emerg-
ing paradigm about transformation, known as the “information technology
revolution in military affairs” (IT-RMA). Simply put, this increasingly popular
thesis suggests that information superiority plus precision munitions equals
victory.1 Decision makers will have a “near-omniscient view of the battlefield”
that will enable them to direct precision munitions onto targets with such rapid
and lethal effect that enemies will be reduced to “awe,” “shock,” or “paralysis,”
and in any case be “locked out” of the objectives they wish to pursue. Either way,
in this view, the enemy will have no choice but to give up.
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Embedded in the paradigm is the assumption that standoff precision muni-
tions delivered primarily from air or sea forces will have maximum effect on the
enemy with minimal risk to American lives and of collateral damage. A related
assumption is that an omniscient view of the battlefield will make centralization
of authority possible, indeed inevitable.2 Recent events in Kosovo and Afghani-
stan illustrate the new reality.3 Indeed the commander in chief of U.S. Central
Command was reportedly admonished for a DESERT STORM–like plan for in-
vading Iraq and was told to make it “look more like Afghanistan.”4
By continuing to focus almost exclusively on technology, the U.S. armed
forces risk developing strategies, force structures, and warfighting concepts that
are at odds with the nature of war.5 As Secretary Rumsfeld has argued, trans-
forming America’s military means changing “how we think about war,” encour-
aging a culture of creativity and risk taking.6 Transformation, therefore, has
important intellectual and cultural components, which must turn technological
advances into a more effective military.7 Consideration of these other compo-
nents of transformation, however, has too often devolved into little more than a
glib hype of exhausted adjectives. Failure to come to grips with cultural and in-
tellectual elements of transformation risks dooming the U.S. armed forces to
“expensive irrelevance” and inconsequential lethality.8
THE NATURE OF WAR
It is time to challenge the validity of the prevailing IT-RMA thesis by examining
some key aspects of the nature of war and offering alternative concepts that, if
pursued, would move the U.S. armed forces along the path of true, rather than
merely technological, transformation.
Information in War Is Essentially Dispersed
The Nobel Prize–winning economist Friedrich von Hayek (1900–92) argued
that information is “essentially dispersed” in the “extended market order.” Al-
though economic theory often translates uneasily from a business to a military
context, Hayek’s concept is useful for analyzing individual and collective human
behavior. The idea provides a conceptual foundation that can enable leaders to
liberate and direct the creative genius of their people and organizations.
Hayek viewed the market as an evolutionary process of discovery and adap-
tation in which individuals gather, process, and interpret information and
make choices to maximize their interests. What appears to be a chaotic market
reflects in fact a “spontaneous order” that is beyond any central designing in-
telligence.9 “Modern economics explains how such an extended order can
come into being,” suggests Hayek, “and how it constitutes an information-
gathering process, able to call up, and put to use, widely dispersed information
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that no central planning agency, let alone any individual, could know as a
whole, possess, or control.”10
Hayek argues that information, knowledge, and understanding are dispersed
in space and time. Human beings perceive, interpret, and understand informa-
tion and make decisions that reflect the lenses through which they view the
world. In the terms of modern psychology, the rationality of individuals is
bounded by such factors as experience, bias, education, and emotion.11 As a re-
sult, two people can look at the same picture and derive completely opposite
conclusions and accordingly take radically different courses of action to pursue
their interests.
The apparent dissonance can be explained, in part, by the difference between
“explicit” and “tacit” knowledge. Explicit knowledge is concrete information of
the sort that can be entered into databases and information systems; tacit knowl-
edge comprises the implicit information and processing capabilities that indi-
viduals possess as a result of their cognitive maps and perceptual lenses.12 Tacit
knowledge comes into existence and manifests itself in ways peculiar and spe-
cific to context. It is drawn upon only in particular circumstances. It shapes the
way we behold information, how we create knowledge and understanding, and
the degree to which we consider each item relevant and appropriate to a
situation.
The essentially dispersed nature of information suggests that the fusion of ex-
plicit knowledge onto a situational-awareness screen does not result automati-
cally in homogeneity of interpretation and decision. Different people, looking at
the same situation, perceive different crises and opportunities; they make differ-
ent assessments of risk; and they ultimately make different decisions about how
to maximize the effectiveness of themselves and their organizations. Shared sit-
uational awareness of physical relationships on the battlefield, therefore, does
not mean shared appreciation of how to act upon the information. The essen-
tially dispersed nature of information will remain salient in warfare. Our chal-
lenge is to “leverage” it.
War Is Chaotic
Chaos theory is a relatively new and complex branch of science and mathemat-
ics, the implications of which for human systems have only begun to be ex-
plored.13 Chaos contends that a system contains a certain complex order that is
determined by the nature and interrelationships of each element within it and
by each force that acts upon it. Elements within the system interact with one an-
other and with external inputs. The system also interacts with the “feedback”
from the first interactions, creating “system perturbations” (subsequent orders
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of effects) that shape the system and ultimately make it unpredictable. The result
is a peculiar order.
Chaos need not imply disorder. A Chaotic system can be stable or unstable. It
is stable if “its particular brand of irregularity” persists in the face of distur-
bances (inputs), or if it returns eventually to its particular brand of irregularity.
The inputs generate certain responses from the system that may be immediately
unpredictable but stable over time.14 A Chaotic system is unstable if inputs result
in a permanent change in the system’s regime of behavior or nature.15 Chaotic
systems are thus complex and deterministic.16 Because of the system’s complex-
ity, it is impossible to predict with absolute fidelity the impact of specific inputs
or interactions.
War is Chaotic.17 Clausewitz argued that “war is more a true chameleon that
slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case.” The dominant tendencies in
war—the famous “trinity” (passion, probability and chance, and reason) and
“triangle” (people, military, and government)—give each war in general, and its
combatants in particular, unique characteristics. Depending on context, these
tendencies, singly or in combination, can be resilient or fragile with respect to
particular inputs and interactions. “Our task therefore is to develop a theory
that maintains a balance between these three tendencies [of the trinity], like an
object suspended between three magnets.”18 Such insight is an implicit recogni-
tion of the Chaotic nature of war and of the combatants that participate in it.19
In a similar vein, Clausewitz described the criticality of “moral factors” as the
true measurement of an organization’s combat capability. He eschewed the at-
tempt to reduce war to fixed formulas, equations, and calculations of raw num-
bers.20 The continuing interaction of opposites with deterministic systems
makes war uncertain and unpredictable. Strength in moral factors gives resil-
ience to the organization, but such resilience is not itself a fixed quantity—
moral factors can grow or recede over time. A strong and confident army can be-
come demoralized; an unconfident and untested force can develop high morale.
The Chaotic nature of war endures. The challenge is to turn the fact to
advantage.
Combatants Are “Complex Adaptive Systems”
Human organizations are complex and adaptive.21 The individuals and teams
within the system react to inputs and adapt to changes. Sometimes those adap-
tations are consciously designed to maintain effectiveness in the face of a
threatening input or to capitalize upon an opportunity for growth or value
maximization. Others are subconscious or unconscious adaptations. Morale
and confidence, for instance, might decrease as efforts to cope with interactions
prove futile or, conversely, might increase as those efforts succeed.
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A way to appreciate complexity, and its potential in war, is by contrasting it
with simple and compound systems. A simple system is linear: the force of a sin-
gle input will generate a proportional and predictable output. Decision making
in simplicity is fairly easy. The combatant must respond to only a single threat.
For instance, the presence of a bomber overhead will elicit a predictable “scatter”
response from a ground unit: to escape the effects of the bomber, the ground
unit disperses.
A compound system, on the other hand, is one in which two or more inputs
are present that force a combatant to make choices. Often the choice taken to
avoid one threat increases a combatant’s vulnerability to another. This time, the
ground unit is facing both a bomber and an opposing ground force. The best re-
action to the bomber is dispersion, but that choice will make the unit more vul-
nerable to the opposing ground force. Conversely, the best choice to oppose the
ground force is to concentrate the friendly ground forces; doing so, however,
makes it more vulnerable to the bomber. The commander is on the horns of a di-
lemma. The combination of threats in a specific battle or context increases the
challenge for the enemy. Compound systems account for interaction at the
friendly-versus-enemy level.
A complex system is one in which interactions take place on multiple levels.
Combatants interact with more than just the enemy. In war, commanders inter-
act within themselves—their own emotions, goals, biases, and experiences—
and with their staffs as they attempt to cope with war’s complexity while simul-
taneously trying to accomplish the war’s purpose. Commanders and organiza-
tions also interact with friendly forces. At the strategic level, this can be
interaction with the people and the government. At the operational and tactical
levels, this can mean interaction with adjacent forces or other instruments of na-
tional power. The activities of friendly forces shape the context in which our
own operations take place. In a similar vein, there is interaction with the external
environment. Examples of external forces are, among others, political directives,
coalitions, the physical environment, and third-party inputs to the system. The
complexity of war, therefore, increases with the number of critical interactions
and adaptations affecting the components of the Clausewitzian trinity and
triangle.
Warfare is not a single, isolated act. Interactions take place simultaneously on
various levels. As long as the system—the individual, the organization, the
country—remains resilient, it will attempt to adapt effectively to crises and op-
portunities. As the system becomes more fragile, its ability to sustain effective-
ness erodes. Adaptations aimed at other purposes (such as individual survival)
can rise to the fore, atomizing and unraveling the fabric of the combatant.
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Evolutionary biology theory lends insight into the unpredictability of com-
plex interaction within Chaotic systems. Although it is possible in hindsight to
trace backward the development of a species, predicting its evolution in advance
is not possible.22 Too many singular factors intervene to determine the outcome
ahead of time—that is, as in Chaotic systems, the result is deterministic but not
predictable.23 The outcomes of individual interactions, therefore, alter the gen-
eral situation and affect the choices of others. They shape the nature of future in-
teractions and thus exert successive effects.24
When applied to war, the concept of adaptive complexity suggests that the
number of possible outcomes increases unpredictably with the number of
meaningful inputs.25 As each side adapts to those inputs, interactions can gener-
ate effects and responses that defy prediction and expectation.26 Looking back-
ward from the outcome, one can readily perceive a logical, understandable
unfolding of interactions.27 From the perspective of the observer in the midst of
the process in time and space, however, the result was only one of myriad
possibilities.
War Is a “Nonlinear Phenomenon”
The Chaotic nature and adaptive complexity of war render it a nonlinear phe-
nomenon.28 A linear outcome is one in which the strength of the input yields an
output of proportional strength; a nonlinear outcome is one that is not directly
proportional to the input.29 Nonlinear systems, as historian Alan Beyerchen ex-
plains, “are those that disobey proportionality or additivity. They may exhibit
erratic behavior through disproportionately large or disproportionately small
outputs, or they may involve ‘synergistic’ interactions in which the whole is not
equal to the sum of its parts.”30 In a nutshell, a nonlinear outcome is one that de-
fies the logic and science of linearity.
Nonlinear systems are living, animate, and adaptive. They can change over
time and by interaction with their contexts.31 As Chaos and complexity theories
suggest, the alterations that result can move the system into a qualitatively dif-
ferent nature or regime of behavior. Nonlinearity helps to explain why even
subtle inputs to the system sometimes yield inordinately large outputs and, con-
versely, why large inputs may have only minor effects. Small changes to initial
conditions in a fragile system can lead to outcomes that defy proportionality,
while large inputs to a resilient system might simply be absorbed. A given input
can yield different outcomes at different times, because the nature of the system
at any moment is dependent upon context.32 As Beyerchen summarizes, “The
heart of the matter is that the system’s variables cannot be effectively isolated
from each other or from their context; linearization is not possible, because dy-
namic interaction is one of the system’s defining characteristics.”33
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To recognize war as a nonlinear phenomenon is to acknowledge that no sin-
gle formula, equation, methodology, or capability can predict outcomes or guar-
antee victory. Inputs can cause effects that are disproportionately large or small;
they can cause “system perturbations” and unintended consequences, responses
to which can lead in turn to successive effects that change the situation funda-
mentally but could scarcely have been anticipated.34 Effective adaptation to the
unpredictability of warfare remains a fundamental challenge.
War Is the “Realm of Uncertainty”
Warfare, then, is by nature uncertain.35 Prevailing concepts of uncertainty, how-
ever, are inadequate. Uncertainty is commonly understood as a matter of infor-
mation.36 If that is the case, the argument that information superiority, or
“dominant battlespace knowledge,” can “lift the fog of war” is plausible.37 Uncer-
tainty, however, is not reducible to information. To be sure, simple uncertainties,
unknown but attainable pieces of information, can be reduced radically by tech-
nology. But simple uncertainties merely scratch the surface of the issue.
An uncertainty not necessarily reducible to existing information concerns
the future. According to one influential study, such situations of future uncer-
tainty can be grouped into four categories. In the first, a “clear enough future,”
forecast precisely enough for strategic development, is apparent—though abso-
lute certainty is impossible, the future seems to point inexorably in a single stra-
tegic direction. In other cases, “alternate futures,” a few discrete outcomes are
plausible. In a third category the actual outcome can lie anywhere along a broad
(but bounded) continuum: a “range of futures” in which no discrete outcomes
are obvious. True “ambiguity” is the last category. In this case there is no basis
upon which to forecast the future.38
Aside from those that result from gaps in information and those relating to
the future, there are several other types of uncertainty that are crucial to an un-
derstanding of war.39 Intrinsic uncertainty results from “bounded rationality”—
the existence of a gulf between perception and reality. Cognitive biases, emo-
tions, assumptions, experiences, education, and heuristics all shape the meaning
people elicit from information. This type of uncertainty accounts for the phe-
nomenon of two people seeing the same things and deriving different conclu-
sions. Particularly in complex, unique, and ambiguous environments, the
decisions and actions arising from bounded rationality can be highly unpredict-
able. Frictional uncertainty deals with the inability to predict precisely how the
“friction of war” will manifest itself. Equipment failures and performance
anomalies form a part, but more importantly, so do poor communication, fear,
danger, exhaustion, disobedience, initiative, will, inertia, and other human
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factors. These frictions can affect individuals and organizations in ways that
defy prediction and expectation.
Dynamic uncertainty is the most problematic, because it results from interac-
tion. The concepts of Chaos, adaptive complexity, and nonlinearity underscore
the inherent unpredictability in war that results when forces interact. An input
that generates a certain response from one system will likely elicit a much differ-
ent one from another. Destroying a communications network, for instance,
might make one combatant unwilling to continue the war; it might merely stim-
ulate another combatant to increase the intensity of resistance. Such outcomes
result from complex interactions that defy precise modeling and forecasting.40
Intrinsic, frictional, and future uncertainties exacerbate the problem.
Coping with uncertainty has traditionally meant collecting more informa-
tion. In this approach, the decision maker must have a sense of what is know-
able and accessible and what is not. He or she must also understand the cost of
additional information and determine whether the effort is worthwhile. The
decision maker uses analyses refined on the basis of the new information to de-
velop strategies to shape or adapt to developments and to determine the right
“portfolio of actions” in response to them.41 Uncertainty has been something
to be overcome (by information) or something to “bind” (by anticipating the
future).
The existence of frictional, intrinsic, and dynamic uncertainties suggests that
the old paradigm is incomplete. Chaos, adaptive complexity, and nonlinearity
suggest that instability and fragility in the system can lead to highly contingent,
disproportionate, and dysfunctional outcomes. Coping in advance with uncer-
tainty requires creating the conditions necessary for resilience. Second, uncer-
tainty demands versatility and flexibility if crises and opportunities are to be
responded to in a manner that derives maximum advantage. Last, this broader
concept demands an approach to war that focuses on the creation and exploita-
tion of uncertainty in the enemy.
TRANSFORMING HOW WE FIGHT
A combatant who understands the nature of war and can not only cope with
but exploit it will have a decided advantage. This perspective can open new and
more appropriate pathways toward real transformation. It also can serve as a
reference point from which to evaluate the IT-RMA thesis and to suggest alter-
natives to a myopic focus on technology. Our ability to do so will in many ways
determine the effectiveness of our armed forces in both the present and the
future; it depends, in turn, on our ability to master four basic conceptual
approaches.
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Decentralization
A knowledge advantage can be exploited by empowering people at the lowest
possible level. The notion that information is essentially dispersed in the ex-
tended order of the battlefield, coupled with the fact that shared information
does not necessarily imply a shared appreciation as to how to respond to it, leads
to fundamental questions regarding how organizations should be commanded
and controlled. One part of the issue concerns whether a centralized or decen-
tralized approach is more effective.42
The increasing transparency of the battlefield makes the impulse for central-
ization more difficult to control. The argument is that very senior commanders
now have “dominant battlespace knowledge”; that they know everything neces-
sary to make rapid and sound decisions. The interconnectedness of the organi-
zation, in this view, enables the commander to transmit those decisions
instantaneously to subordinates and monitor precisely how those orders are im-
plemented. The core assumptions of this argument are that shared informa-
tion leads to shared understanding, that decisions are made most effectively at
higher echelons of organization, that organizations consist of “decision entities”
controlling “actor entities”—and that networks permit fewer of the former to
control more of the latter.
Such centralization of authority, however, would suboptimize the perfor-
mance of the military and the people who constitute it, because, as studies in the
behavioral sciences have shown, bounded rationality is intrinsic to human na-
ture. In a crisis, as we have seen, one person might respond conservatively while
another person recognizes a fleeting opportunity worth significant risk.43 Cen-
tralizing authority has the unfortunate consequence of limiting battlefield un-
derstanding to a single “decision entity.” That might seem safe, in that a senior
commander is presumably less likely, by virtue of experience and education, to
make a poor decision than a more junior commander. However, the creative ten-
sion that results from competing perspectives is lost.44 Moreover, removing from
junior leaders the sense of responsibility, “ownership,” and empowerment de-
creases motivation, retards creative thinking and problem solving, and results
generally in less effective execution. The likelihood that decisions will not be ex-
ecuted in the manner intended increases with psychological distance between
decision maker and actor.45
Empowerment of professionals at the lowest possible levels is the most effec-
tive guarantor of excellence. Technology should unleash the power of people
rather than handcuff it. Liberating the creative genius of people can create a cer-
tain complex order in an operation that no central authority could conceive or
direct and that no enemy could fully comprehend or counter. In any case, the
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idea that information is essentially dispersed argues for a similar decentraliza-
tion of authority.46
Decentralization, it is important to note, has its limits. Empowering un-
trained subordinates merely leads to poor decisions made more quickly; dissem-
ination of authority in the absence of direction or guidance can produce
disjointed activity that fails to accomplish the purpose of the operation, even
impedes it. Leaders must define the creative space in which their subordinates
are free to act. Statements of commander’s intent, mission, boundaries, rules of
engagement, and main effort are traditional methods of bounding that space
and providing reference points. A new approach to the same problem is “effects
basing”—explaining the effects a commander wants to achieve and how ground,
sea, and space forces and other elements of national power interrelate, while al-
lowing subordinate commanders to determine precisely how to achieve those ef-
fects. Leaders can also utilize “permissive” rules of engagement, instructions,
and control measures designed to accelerate the decision-action cycle.47
To be sure, the senior leader must have confidence that a subordinate will
make sound decisions. Training, education, and mutual understanding gained
through acquaintanceships are natural foundations of mutual trust. Ad hoc or-
ganizations, accordingly, have difficulty with decentralization. We need to de-
velop understanding and trust in the necessary depth at the operational level in
peacetime so that it can be drawn upon in war. Standing joint task force staffs
that train and communicate routinely with the tactical commanders and orga-
nizations they are likely to employ in action might prove important. We should
also examine institutional impediments that create impulses toward micro-
management: how long officers remain in command positions, the education
and training they receive, and how often command teams and staff teams oper-
ate together.
Information in the hands of people who cannot act on it is worth little; in the
hands of those who can, it creates complex synergies of unimaginable power. We
can guarantee suboptimal performance by centralizing authority while placing
relatively powerless people in harm’s way, or we can create a culture that truly
transforms how we operate. Technology is neutral in this regard. A “culture of
confidence” requires self-discipline and a relentless passion for excellence. Such
a culture likewise relies upon junior professionals to be worthy of trust—an is-
sue, to be sure, that deserves more attention.48 The ability of commanders to ed-
ucate and train professional subordinates, give them the authority they need,
promote innovative thinking and responsible risk taking, and resist the urge to
micromanage is crucial to warfighting effectiveness. Finally, creating the right
culture requires institutions and systems that enhance rather than impede de-
centralization. Technology gives us tools to fight with. The degree to which we
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can liberate and focus the creative genius of educated and trained professionals
will determine how well we fight.
Complexity
A complexity advantage can be achieved by maximizing the number of mean-
ingful interactions with which the enemy must cope simultaneously or nearly
so. Complexity increases further if interactions occur at multiple levels. It also
rises when response to one interaction creates “system perturbations” to which a
combatant must respond as well. The most effective way to gain the complexity
advantage is by combining the concept of “effects-based operations” with joint
capabilities.49
The notion that standoff precision munitions alone can generate the right ef-
fects and produce the psychological collapse of the enemy is at odds with the
idea of adaptive complexity. A thinking enemy who is determined to win will
find ways to mitigate the effects of standoff precision munitions.50 Despite their
destructive power, such weapons, employed in isolation, have limited psycho-
logical impact. Their shock value erodes rapidly, and their effects can be coun-
tered with relatively few adverse consequences.51
“Complex” should not be confused with “complicated”; neither should “sim-
ple” be conflated with “simplistic.” Simple actions that pose diverse threats,
when integrated properly, produce complexity for the enemy. At the tactical
level, tasks relatively simple to understand and implement—defend from a battle
position; emplace obstacles; employ indirect fires, close air support, and rotary-
wing aviation; and counterattack by fire—can create, when integrated into a de-
fensive operation, a very complex challenge for the enemy. Each threat by itself
may be easy to deal with; when they are integrated, attempts to evade or defeat
one will result in increased vulnerability to others. Threats from multiple direc-
tions and in multiple dimensions—sea, air, ground, and space—exacerbate the
complexity.
The principle applies similarly at the operational and strategic levels. Balanced,
synergistic employment of complementary capabilities to achieve effects along
“multiple lines of operation” integrates simple individual tasks into complexity
for the enemy.52 The simultaneous, integrated employment of precision-strike
and ground maneuver forces on enemy formations and critical vulnerabilities,
coupled with operational fires on second-echelon or reserve forces; special oper-
ations forces operations on strategic targets; strikes against the enemy’s commu-
nications, economy, and infrastructure; public and private diplomacy aimed at
coalition partners and third parties; and the use of economic instruments of
power are ways to generate complexity at the operational and strategic levels of
war. The increased number of options available to a balanced force to employ all
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of its elements of power in an integrated manner will complicate further the
range of problems with which the enemy must cope.53
In addition, bringing to bear a whole array of capabilities can cause “virtual
attrition”—the diversion of assets to deal with anticipated threats—which can
make our operations even more effective at the points of focus. Faced with such
complexity, the enemy becomes more likely to make critical, even self-defeating
errors. By making our actions unpredictable enough, we may create such uncer-
tainty for the enemy as to induce cognitive or psychological collapse. A complex
operation is far more likely to do so than a simplistic assault by a single
capability.
Resilience
Related to complexity is the concept of resilience, by which balance and equilib-
rium can be sustained in our own force while instability and disorder are created
and exploited in the enemy. Chaotic, complex adaptive systems such as combat-
ants at war range in robustness from resilient to fragile. Resilient systems can ab-
sorb inputs and yet sustain, or quickly return to, their “normal” regimes of
behavior, while fragile systems become disordered and incoherent.54 Both are in-
herently nonlinear. We see unpredictable outcomes in war routinely—the small
resilient unit withstands and rebuffs an attack despite being vastly outnum-
bered; another defending unit collapses entirely in the face of an attack by a nu-
merically weaker foe.55 We cannot predict with certainty such disproportionate
outcomes, but we can approach the Chaotic, complex, and nonlinear natures of
war from the perspectives of resilience and fragility in order to tilt the outcomes
of interaction in our favor.
Clausewitz described the nature of combatant states in terms of the “trinity”
and “triangle,” and of the strength of armed forces with respect to physical size,
moral factors, and the relative genius of their commanders. Although such a
framework is not perfect, it does capture significant “points of attraction” that
together influence the degree of resilience in the system.56 Combatants must cul-
tivate and sustain resilience by attending to these points of attraction at the stra-
tegic, operational, and tactical levels. It will be critically important to the process
of military transformation to develop the factors that influence morale, cohe-
sion, and leadership with the same amount of energy and enthusiasm now de-
voted to technology.
The opposite side of the coin naturally concerns the enemy’s degree of resil-
ience; operations should create and exploit fragility in the enemy in order to in-
duce nonlinear outcomes in our favor. As we have seen, however, a note of
caution is in order—we must not assume that any single weapon can bring
about the inevitable collapse of the enemy. Some enemies are indeed fragile
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enough to be defeated by standoff precision munitions alone, as believed by
some theorists. A more resilient enemy, however, will sustain the will to fight.
Rather than relying on problematic assumptions of inevitable collapse after
precision-guided missile (PGM) attacks, the U.S. military needs to focus instead
on creating the conditions in which the will to fight becomes increasingly diffi-
cult to sustain. By maximizing the level of complexity and exploiting fragility we
inflict the greatest possible pressure on the enemy’s will. The complexity gener-
ated by a properly employed, balanced, joint force will create the conditions nec-
essary for successful military operations whether the enemy’s will is strong or
weak. Understanding the nature of combatants and the relationships between
complexity and resilience is the basis of a sounder approach to warfighting.
Tempo
The concept of tempo—sustaining an intensity of operations with which the en-
emy cannot cope—integrates decentralization, complexity, and resilience. A
combatant’s will to resist is rarely broken by single spikes in the intensity of op-
erations; in the respites that follow during periods of transition, the enemy re-
covers, adapts, and resumes the fight.57 Instead, intense, complex interactions
need to be created and maintained over an extended period of time. Operations
that integrate effects, generating the most possible at each level of war, and do so
unrelentingly have the most potential to break the enemy’s will.
Organizations require considerable structural resilience and balance to
mount such operations at high sustained tempo without exceeding the limits of
their own capability or endurance.58 To dominate transitions we need to elimi-
nate the operational pauses that result from too little numerical strength to sus-
tain tempo or from improperly assembled forces that cannot overcome the
effects of terrain and weather.
Studies of combat psychiatry and nonlinear dynamics indicate that dispro-
portionate negative outcomes—cognitive or psychological collapse—occur
when systems, whether organizations or individual humans, do not have time to
recover their equilibrium.59 The ability, then, to sustain constant pressure
against the enemy’s points of leverage becomes crucial—to deny the enemy peri-
ods of rest in our transitions between offense and defense or between our suc-
cessive offensive or defensive operations. Constant pressure requires not only a
balanced force but one able to win the initial fight and then to commit fresh
units to maintain pressure while the previously engaged units recover.60 The na-
ture of the enemy determines whether and when cognitive or psychological col-
lapse will be achieved, but we can stretch his moral factors to the limit by
“nesting” significant effects at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels and
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by dominating transitions so as to deny the enemy any chance to recover
equilibrium.
RELEASING CREATIVE GENIUS
Technological improvement is important but, pursued in isolation, will lead us
only so far.61 We must simultaneously examine desired operational capabilities
and cultural and intellectual concepts that express how we want to fight. The
synergistic interaction of analysis and synthesis among broad categories leads to
innovation that is greater than any single approach can contribute on its own.
We will fail if we focus exclusively on technology.
One of the problems with technological evolution and revolutions in military
affairs is that the first organizations to experience such changes do not necessar-
ily come to grips with them most effectively.62 Technological and conceptual
change must be integrated in a manner consistent with the enduring nature of
war.
Information technology, of course, can radically improve the speed at which
orders are transmitted; create forums for dialogue between commanders strug-
gling to interpret reality on the basis of what they see on the ground and on their
computer screens; enable commanders to apply combat power quickly to exploit
fleeting opportunities; and permit an order-of-magnitude increase in the tempo
of operations. A technology-based common operating picture can help com-
manders unleash the creative energies of their subordinates while ensuring that
their actions and decisions remain within the framework of their own intent.63
However, the true magic of high-performing organizations is that professionals,
given the authority and autonomy they need within the parameters of their se-
niors’ vision, creatively employ their interdependent efforts in a manner that
leads to the success of the whole organization. Information technology should,
in the hands of mature and thoughtful leaders, result in empowerment and ini-
tiative rather than rigidity and overmanagement.64
True transformation will be measured not by the speed of microchips but by
the effectiveness of soldiers, leaders, and organizations in the next war. We need
to stimulate and release the creative genius of our people. We must develop lead-
ers who possess intellectual courage, who understand the theory and history—
the art and science—of their profession, who can combine education and expe-
rience into wisdom, and who can cope with the enduring nature of war and turn
it to their advantage. We need to develop resilient organizations that are cohe-
sive, trained, confident, and ready to fight and win. Implementing warfighting
concepts and doctrines that promote resilience and agility while generating
higher complexity and operational tempo than the enemy can handle will en-
sure dominance even if an enemy can match or mitigate our technological
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advantages. A balanced, truly joint force armed with effective leaders, versatile
commands, and sound warfighting concepts and doctrines will be the founda-
tion of a truly dominant military in the twenty-first century.
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bridgehead, defeat an impending French
counterattack, and only then resume the at-
tack toward the Channel coast. Guderian
eventually had his way through a combina-
tion of obfuscation and downright disobedi-
ence. Had the more “prudent” approach
prevailed, the outcome of the campaign in
France might have altered significantly. For
more development see Robert Allan Doughty,
The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of
France, May 1940 (Hamden, Conn.: Archon
Books, 1990), pp. 218–38, and Heinz
Guderian, Panzer Leader (New York: Da Capo
Press, 1996), pp. 97–106.
44. The fear of subordinate leaders making
suboptimal decisions can be addressed
through training and education; see Kolenda,
“Discipline.”
45. “Distance” in this case can be viewed as psy-
chological distance between leader and sub-
ordinate. As the psychological distance grows,
the subordinate might feel less responsible for
successful implementation of a decision or
plan. The stronger the identity of actors with
decisions, the more likely they will have a
sense of ownership and desire to see the deci-
sions implemented properly.
46. Empowered professional individuals and
leaders throughout an organization will make
decisions and take actions designed to maxi-
mize the contributions of themselves and
their organizations toward achieving the
commander’s intent. When coupled with the
levels of excellence created by ownership and
sense of responsibility, this complex order in-
creases the effectiveness of operations by an
order of magnitude.
47. A “free-fire area” is an example of a permis-
sive control measure. Although restrictive in
that it prevents friendly forces from entering,
it is permissive in that enemy forces within
the area can be struck immediately without
cumbersome clearance-of-fire procedures.
48. Much ink and emotion have been spent re-
cently about the increasing penchant for
oversupervision. A dispassionate analysis
would undoubtedly reveal that lack of confi-
dence in the competence and judgment of
subordinates, whether justified or not, is an
important part of the cause. Recent conflicts
may have left senior leaders with relatively lit-
tle to do other than micromanage affairs, but
a conflict of greater complexity might come
along that demands attention at senior levels
and faith in junior leaders to perform without
direct and overwhelming supervision. The di-
rection taken during transformation with re-
spect to centralization versus decentralization
of authority might make the difference be-
tween winning and losing. The term “culture
of confidence” is used effectively by Kevin
Farrell in his discussion of the German army
in the Second World War; see “Culture of
Confidence: Tactical Excellence of the Ger-
man Army in the Second World War,” in
Leadership, ed. Kolenda.
49. For discussions of effects-based operations
see Arthur Cebrowski [Vice Adm., USN],
“President’s Forum” (pp. 5–14), and Edward
A. Smith, Jr., “Network-centric Warfare:
What’s the Point?” (pp. 59–75), Naval War
College Review 54, no. 1 (Winter 2001).
Theorists of maneuver warfare and network-
centric warfare acknowledge the Chaotic na-
ture of war. They call for operations aimed at
generating effects upon the enemy’s will to
create paralysis, shock, and dislocation rather
than merely focusing on the physical destruc-
tion of the enemy’s forces. They recognize
implicitly that interactions that create dys-
functional instability in the enemy’s system
can result in the loss of will to fight. Nesting
effects on the enemy’s command and control
structures, on the morale of enemy armed
forces, and on a combatant’s economic infra-
structure are examples of such methods. The
degree to which such operations are success-
ful, however, depends upon the ability to
generate the destabilizing inputs and upon
the resilience of the enemy. For articles on the
necessity of balance in force structure see
Robert Scales, Future Warfare Anthology
(Carlisle, Penna.: Strategic Studies Institute,
1999).
50. Placing air defense sites, command and con-
trol facilities, and other critical assets next to
hospitals, places of worship, and highly popu-
lated areas are adaptations designed to take
advantage of American aversion to civilian
casualties and collateral damage. Dispersing
and hiding armored forces, using decoys,
and relying more heavily on small-unit in-
fantry operations are some ways to limit
the effectiveness of precision munitions.
Multirole chemical factories that can make
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pharmaceuticals and baby formula as well as
chemical and biological weapons are also
adaptations.
51. The campaign in Kosovo, Operation ALLIED
FORCE, is used by IT-RMA enthusiasts and
strategic bombing advocates as an example,
par excellence, of the notion that airpower
alone can win war on the cheap and should
usher in a new American way of war. The re-
ality is a bit more complicated. Recent schol-
arship over the past year had added much
needed substance to the debate on all sides.
See Andrew J. Bacevich and Eliot A. Cohen,
War over Kosovo (New York: Columbia Univ.
Press, 2001); Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s
Air War for Kosovo (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 2001); and Stephen T. Hosmer, Why
Milošević Decided to Settle When He Did
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001). For an
incisive analysis of the three books see Ste-
phen Biddle, “The New Way of War? De-
bating the Kosovo Model,” Foreign Affairs
(May–June 2002), pp. 138–44.
52. “Lines of operation” is a term General
Tommy R. Franks used in an address to the
Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island,
on 23 May 2002 to describe the different ave-
nues he was employing in Operation EN-
DURING FREEDOM.
53. Employing ground forces does increase the
potential for U.S. casualties, and therefore,
critics argue, might undermine the war effort
in a casualty-averse society. A number of
problems exist with this argument. First, ca-
sualty aversion seems to have far more to do
with the stakes of the war than a reflexive im-
pulse to avoid putting Americans in harm’s
way. Second, as we learned in Kosovo, taking
ground troops “off the table” simplified the
conflict for the Serbians and led to a belief
that they could endure the bombing while
completing the ethnic cleansing of the prov-
ince. Such myopic rationality on the part of
NATO to avoid casualties by taking away the
ground force option highlights a third prob-
lem: making adaptations easier by simplifying
the war for the enemy can prolong the con-
flict, thereby actually increasing the total
number of casualties and amount of destruc-
tion. For relevant polling data for the war on
terrorism see CNN/USA Today/Gallup, ABC
News/Washington Post, and CBS News, 12
September 2001; Washington Post/ABC
News, 8 November 2001, and contrast with
polls concerning U.S. forces deploying to
Bosnia in CNN/USA Today, 15–18 December
1995.
54. It is also possible for inputs to strengthen or
weaken a system. For instance, a change to
better leadership, a battlefield victory, and re-
fitting can make an organization more resil-
ient, whereas a change to poor leadership, a
series of defeats, and lack of logistical support
can erode resilience and make an organiza-
tion more fragile.
55. For further discussion see Kolenda, Uncer-
tainty in War.
56. While physical size is important, for instance,
a large force with poor morale and incompe-
tent leadership is far more fragile than a
smaller force with high morale and superb
leadership.
57. Transitions are characterized by pauses in
war as each side prepares for a subsequent
operation. The period between initial deploy-
ment and the conduct of offensive or defen-
sive operations is a transition. The pause that
results when an offensive operation culmi-
nates and the unit prepares to defend or re-
sume the offensive is another type of
transition. Likewise, the period between con-
ducting a defensive operation and a subse-
quent offensive operation is a transition.
These transition periods, and others like
them, are typically times when an organiza-
tion can recover and restore equilibrium.
58. See Watts, pp. 82–89.
59. See Czerwinski; Beyerchen; and Kolenda,
Uncertainty in War.
60. There seems to exist, therefore, an organiza-
tional threshold for the management of tran-
sitions. Below a certain number of robust
subordinate units, the organization cannot
dominate both fights. The U.S. Army, for in-
stance, can employ cavalry forces to dominate
transitions in war. These forces are tradition-
ally organized and equipped to operate au-
tonomously in a geographically dispersed
manner to cover the entire battlespace of
their parent unit. Intelligently employed, cav-
alry organizations give army divisions and
corps the capability to dominate transitions
and thus set the conditions to induce adverse
nonlinear effects on the enemy.
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61. John Boyd’s “conceptual spiral” provides im-
portant insight into the transformation and
future of the military. See John Boyd, “Con-
ceptual Spiral,” lecture, Naval War College,
Newport, Rhode Island, August 1990. For
further discussion of Boyd see Grant Tedrick
Hammond, The Mind of War: John Boyd and
American Security (Washington, D.C.: Smith-
sonian Institute Press, 2001).
62. It was not the British and the French, the
technological leaders in mechanized systems
during the interwar period, who imple-
mented the concepts of “blitzkrieg” or “Deep
Battle.” In May 1940 the side with the tech-
nologically superior tanks lost to the side that
employed inferior and fewer machines more
effectively. While the Germans and Soviets
were conceptualizing the power of deep pene-
trations by mechanized formations supported
by artillery and aviation, the British and
French focused on using “penny packets” of
tanks to plug holes in defensive positions. See
Robert Allan Doughty, The Breaking Point,
Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden,
Conn.: Archon Books, 1990), pp. 7–32, and
The Seeds of Disaster: The Development of
French Army Doctrine, 1919–1939 (Hamden,
Conn.: Archon Books, 1985); and Frederick
W. Kagan, “Soviet Operational Art: Theory
and Practice of Initiative, 1917–1945,” in
Leadership, ed. Kolenda.
63. The Marine Corps has captured these ideas
most effectively. See U.S. Navy Dept.,
Warfighting, Fleet Marine Field Manual 1
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Print-
ing Office, 1997); U.S. House, Procurement
Subcommittee and Research and Develop-
ment Subcommittee of the House National
Security Committee, testimony of Lt. Gen.
Paul Van Riper, USMC, 20 March 2001; and
H. T. Hayden ed., Warfighting: Maneuver
Warfare in the U.S. Marine Corps (London:
Greenhill Books, 1995).
64. See Kolenda, “Discipline.”
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RESEARCH & DEBATE
STILL WORTH DYING FOR NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE NATURE OF STRATEGY
P. H. Liotta
I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to James Miskel’s well written if
logically flawed essay mistitled “National Interests: Grand Purposes or Catch-
phrases?” (in the Autumn 2002 issue of this journal). The substance of his essay,
after all, is not just about the evident “value” of national interests; Miskel, rather,
questions why presidential administrations publish and revise national security
strategies, per congressional mandate, over the course of their terms. In present-
ing his case, he conflates the distinction between in-
terests and objectives; consistently misses several
truths that the Bush administration’s National Secu-
rity Strategy of 17 September 2002 recognizes as en-
during; misstates the analytical perspectives of
liberalism and realism; and offers an interpretation of
national interests and the nature of strategy that is
both narrow and deterministic.1
Yet, before proceeding farther, I should admit an
obvious bias in my response. Jim Miskel is a close per-
sonal friend and a colleague for whom I hold great
respect. While we have certainly disagreed on funda-
mental strategic issues before, my concern for bias
here is not that I will be harsh in my comments but
that I will not be harsh enough.
My greatest contention with Miskel’s argument lies
in the beginning and the conclusion of his essay,
where he opines, “The congressional requirement for
unclassified national security reports has clearly
Dr. Liotta is the Jerome E. Levy Chair of Economic
Geography and National Security at the Naval War
College. A former Fulbright scholar to Yugoslavia dur-
ing its breakup as a nation-state and attaché to the Hel-
lenic Republic, he has lived in and traveled extensively
throughout the former Soviet Union, Central and
Southwest Asia (including Iran), Europe, and the Bal-
kan Peninsula. He has received a Pulitzer Prize nomi-
nation, a National Endowment for the Arts literature
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from the Poetry Society of America. His recent work in-
cludes Dismembering the State: The Death of Yugo-
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proven to have little value in terms of furthering the debate. Congress would do
well to consider whether the public interest would be better served if national se-
curity reports were required only once in a presidential term—on the assump-
tion that interests and strategies do not, or at least should not, change annually. . . .
Implicit in [this debate] . . . are two assumptions. One is that national interests
can be defined precisely. . . . The second assumption is that statesmen actually at-
tempt to define national interests with precision.”2
WHAT’S GOING ON?
MISSING THE GRAND PURPOSE BY FOCUSING ON
THE CATCHPHRASE
While there are some basic truths in Miskel’s skillfully worded sentences—
namely, that national security strategies are marketing strategies of administra-
tion achievements as much as clear statements of strategic vision—the flaws in
Miskel’s argument seem apparent as well.
First, Miskel fails to recognize that U.S. national interests, far from what he
terms “vague platitudes,” are in fact long-term, enduring, abstract principles
that are embedded in the U.S. Constitution.3 Secondly, Miskel’s suggestion that
national security strategies are simply expressions of national interests is just
plain wrong. National security strategies are presidential declarations of strate-
gic interests and policy objectives, as well as explanations of the means offered to
achieve these ends. Objectives, therefore—which Miskel never recognizes in his
essay as distinct from interests—are the goals of policy, meant to secure
long-term, abstract strategic interests.
Miskel’s failure to distinguish, or recognize a difference, between abstract in-
terests and short-term objectives seriously weakens his argument. At the most
fundamental level, basic national interests are enduring and unlikely to change
over time: to guarantee the security and prosperity of the nation-state. It ought
to be obvious to even the most casual observer of international affairs that the
involvement of the United States in the global landscape is also a critical aspect
of its national interests; rightly or wrongly, we cannot secure our interests with-
out our involvement in the international arena. Thus, the fundamental “model
for national success: freedom, democracy, and free enterprise,” which forms the
initial template for the Bush National Security Strategy (or NSS), differs little
from the previous administration’s emphasis on “engagement” in the globally
interdependent environment and “enlargement” of democratic communities
throughout the world.4 The three “strategic postures” of the previous NSS only
emphasize this essential interest orientation: “Enhancing Security at Home
and Abroad,” “Promoting Prosperity,” and “Promoting Democracy.” (Despite
Miskel’s rejection of these postures as a “laundry list of bromides and unfulfilled
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wishes,” the previous administration deserves credit for its emphasis on home-
land security—which has become the central focus of the latest national secu-
rity, and which was largely ignored or given far less significant priority in
previous national strategies.)
How one achieves that security and prosperity is not always obvious; one
must rely on specific policy objectives meant to secure these interests. Therefore,
while the interests of the Clinton administration and of the current administra-
tion, for example, are decidedly similar in their purposes, their objectives are de-
cidedly at odds. Consider these key areas of policy objective differences—
despite similar declarations of national interests—between the 1999 Clinton
strategy and the 2002 Bush strategy, as given in figure 1.
Thirdly, Miskel actually seems serious in suggesting that such speeches as the
30 January 2002 address, to which he refers as the “axis of evil” speech, are more
“useful” and “clarifying” than the publication of national security strategies he
broadly dismisses as “collective arm [twisting]” and that are published “without
enthusiasm.” He further claims that the “axis of evil” speech—which he never
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once refers to as the president’s first State of the Union address, much else of
which no one seems to remember, let alone quote—is “a positive step in terms of
debating and defining more rigorously than usual [our] national interests.”5
To be sure, the State of the Union address did indeed provoke a vigorous de-
bate about terrorists, weapons, and tyrants. But Miskel performs some enter-
taining leaps of faith in suggesting that the “‘axis of evil’ epithet”—which is
nothing more than a specific platitude—is “preferable to platitudes about the
survival and vitality of the United States.” Significantly, the Bush administration
distanced itself in its 17 September national strategy from the claims made in the
previous State of the Union address. Iran, for example—part of President Bush’s
“axis of evil”—is not even mentioned as a rogue state in the NSS. Iraq and North
Korea, further, have historically shown that they understand deterrence; in Oc-
tober 2002, North Korea admitted to nuclear-weapons status and professed to
seek a “diplomatic solution.” President Bush has also publicly stated that neither
North Korea nor Iran were candidate targets for U.S.-initiated use of force. So
much for the value of speeches instead of strategies . . .
Miskel’s argument again suffers when he fails to acknowledge that the
Clinton and Bush administrations each published its various strategy revisions
when it felt both compelled and ready to publish them, not on an annual basis.
(The first Clinton national security strategy, for example, went through
twenty-one drafts prior to its 1994 publication.)6 Further, Bush’s national secu-
rity adviser, Condoleezza Rice, has repeatedly emphasized the critical impor-
tance of the National Security Strategy and was quite emphatic in her enthusiasm
for its publication.7 Further, Rice has publicly stated that—aside from the “axis
of evil” designation of Iran, Iraq, and North Korea—there are certainly more
than three “rogue states” in the world, though “it’s probably best not to name
them. . . . Countries can change their behavior, I suppose.”8
Finally, the heated debate on the preeminence of U.S. armed forces, by which
adversaries will be dissuaded from pursuing “military buildup[s] in hopes of
surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States,” has put into print a con-
viction that has been present since early drafts of the 1992 Defense Planning
Guidance (under the direction of then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney).
Stating such a position in a national strategy, which is a claim to primacy, makes
clear an administration’s position and relative emphasis on aspects of national
interests in a way no other official document, or speech, could.
As further proof of why national strategies should be open to debate (and in-
evitably will undergo subsequent revisions), much attention has focused on the
Bush strategy’s emphasis on preemption. While the Bush National Security
Strategy does not suggest preempting China, Russia, India, or other major pow-
ers, it argues for preemption against terrorists, in terms not radically different
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from the strategies employed by previous administrations. But the Bush strategy
becomes more debatable regarding “rogue states,” where it rests, according to a
recent Brookings Institution policy brief, on a disputed conjecture that “deter-
rence based upon the threat of retaliation is less likely to work against the leaders
of rogue states willing to take risks.”9 Equally, the Bush national strategy pro-
vides no guidance on when to preempt, fails to acknowledge that a preemptive
attack could cause the very attacks it seeks to prevent (in the Middle East or on
the Korean Peninsula, for example), and may allow “partners” against terrorism
merely to settle private national security differences—as Russia has already
hinted it is ready to do in Georgia. Even Henry Kissinger argues that “it cannot
be either the American national interest or the world’s interest to develop princi-
ples that grant every nation an unfettered right of preemption against its own
definition of threats to its security.”10
Surely, then, there is a necessity, in declaring the significance of national in-
terests to strategy, to pronounce why. Such declarations of interests are hardly
bromides, wish lists, or platitudes. Such interests stem from the analytical per-
spective of the decision maker, yet Miskel may have simplified too cleanly in dis-
tinguishing these perspectives—as the next section briefly suggests.
CONFLICT OF INTERESTS?
CONFUSING PERSPECTIVES, CONFOUNDING ANALYSIS
Before presenting an argument on the necessity of national interests, I would
like to question Miskel’s broad description of “the two basic schools of thought
about how national interests should be defined,” which he offers as realism
(whose “avatars” are von Bismarck and Nixon, and who would favor military
force as the most tangible form of power for the state) and Kantian idealists or
liberals (though he never actually gives a name to the latter but credits both
Woodrow Wilson and Vladimir Lenin as being members of that “school”).
Miskel’s analysis is clear and readable, but it is also wrong. Numerous advocates
of realism, particularly those of the strategic-primacy bent (such as Robert
Kagan), would strongly support U.S. and NATO intervention in the Balkans, de-
spite Miskel’s argument to the contrary. Indeed, such realists would argue that
U.S. intervention came too late, rather than that it should not have occurred at all.
Thus, to claim that only the Wilson “idealists” favored intervention in
Rwanda or the Balkans is simply not correct. On the one hand, the Clinton ad-
ministration, which Miskel implies was more infected by the idealist school than
by realism, had clear intelligence and probable foreknowledge of genocide but
chose not to act for any number of reasons—to include an assessment of
Rwanda as not in the realm of defined, stated, vital, or important national secu-
rity interests.11 In the same vein, it is a clear truth that—unlike Somalia or
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Rwanda—vital national interests were at stake in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in
Kosovo: the U.S. commitment to NATO (a permanent alliance) and the preven-
tion of spillover of conflict into neighboring states, including NATO members
Greece and Turkey. Humanitarianism, therefore, was not the only reason we in-
tervened in the Balkans. Moreover, Miskel’s analysis that U.S. interests were “un-
certain” during the “air war on Serbia in 2000”—which was actually not a war,
took place in 1999 against Yugoslavia (not just Serbia), and was set to become a
ground intervention as well if airpower did not succeed—is flatly misdirected.
Miloševiæ knew exactly what would happen to him; he simply had no other
choice left and had to hope for the best.
I acknowledge the merit in much of Miskel’s subsequent focus in his essay,
which centers on the Arab-Israeli conflict and draws upon the dynamics of the
domestic political process and the “marketing of the American public and Con-
gress.” But his focus, like his analysis of the dynamics of the realist and liberal
schools, is far too narrow.
By my last count, there are at least seventeen “schools” of analytical perspec-
tives. All of them—and I can hear many of our colleagues, most not well
grounded in international relations theory, already screaming their denials—
have some form of influence on national security decision making. After all, the
most “Wilsonian” of presidents in the last half of the twentieth century, as schol-
ars such as G. John Ikenberry have repeatedly argued, was Ronald Reagan.12 Fur-
ther, and to be blunt, the “realism” of Richard Nixon has almost no place in the
administration of George Walker Bush. To the contrary, the current administra-
tion and the political debate that centers around its national strategy is primarily
divided between three “schools”: the realists, the liberals, and the moralists (or,
more correctly, the idealists). The moralists are firm in their belief that spread-
ing American “values” and American democracy will best achieve the ends of
our national security, and thus far, both in the declaration of national interests
and in the execution of national strategy to remake the world and to win the war
on terror, they appear to be carrying the day.13
TO DIE FOR: NATIONAL INTERESTS AND THE
NATURE OF STRATEGY
The national interest, admittedly, is a pretty slippery concept. Yet how one views,
focuses on, and consistently acts upon such interest will prove the true test of
larger “grand” strategic perspectives. The bottom line, after all, remains un-
changed: what a nation wants and its citizens are willing to go to war over—and
to die for—remains unchanged as a fundamental interest.
Miskel is not the first scholar to argue forcefully that there can be no agree-
ment among Americans themselves about what constitutes the national interest.
1 2 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
132
Naval War College Review, Vol. 56 [2003], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol56/iss2/1
Peter Trubowitz, in a study meant to define the meaning of American national
interests, came to the conclusion that those “who assume that America has a dis-
cernible national interest whose defense should determine its relations with
other nations are unable to explain the persistent failure to achieve domestic
consensus on international objectives.”14 Others, such as historian Martin van
Creveld, have become more cynical about the utility of interest:
To say that peoples go to war for their “interests,” and that “interest” comprises
whatever any society considers good and useful for itself, is as self-evident as it is
trite. Saying so means that we regard our particular modern combination of might
and right as eternally valid instead of taking it for what it really is, a historical phe-
nomenon with a clear beginning and presumably an end. Even if we do assume that
men are always motivated by their interests, there are no good grounds for assuming
that the things that are bundled together under this rubric will necessarily be the
same in the future as they are today. . . . The logic of strategy itself requires that the
opponent’s motives be understood, since on this rests any prospect of success in war.
If, in the process, the notion of interest has to be thrown overboard, then so be it.15
Yet surely the purpose of any administration is to set the tone for leadership
by declaring specific interests in writing, and by showing demonstrated com-
mitment to those writings. The best possible way to do this is through the publi-
cation and revision of a national strategy. This is not to say that employment of
the traditional military, economic, and political instruments of power ought to
continue in the ad hoc manner in which they were applied during the 1990s. Re-
garding the military instrument in particular, Kissinger noted in late 1999, with
particular reference to the Kosovo engagement, “I am uneasy with the readiness
with which the military instrument is being used as the key solution for humani-
tarian crises.”16 Yet this potential weakness also emphasizes the extraordinary
magnitude of American strength at the beginning of the twenty-first century:
There are few countries or crises that can threaten American vital interests. Yet our
“sole superpower” status means the U.S. will continue to use its influence, and per-
haps its military forces, to save lives, right wrongs, and keep the peace. . . . We are in
an era in which U.S. interventions may be seen as important but not vital. In such in-
stances, U.S. leaders, supported by public opinion, may be willing to use military
force for humanitarian reasons.17
Setting Power and Priorities: The Hierarchy of Interests
Interests are a starting point, not an end state. At its simplest understanding, the
national interest demands that a state be willing to uphold its moral and na-
tional values with its treasure, blood, time, and energy, to achieve sometimes
specific and sometimes unspecific ends. National interests reflect the identity of
a people—geography, culture, political sympathies, and social consensus, as well
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as economic prosperity and demographic makeup. Thus, national interests con-
stitute little more than a broad set of often abstract guidelines that allow a nation
to function the way it believes it should function. National interests also answer
the fundamental but essential question, “What are we willing to die for?”
Hans J. Morgenthau, the classic realist thinker, saw two levels of national in-
terest, the vital and the secondary.18 Vital interests assure a state of its security,
the defense of its freedom and independence, protection of its institutions, and
enshrinement of its values. Vital interests also negate compromise; they repre-
sent issues over which the state is willing to wage war. Secondary interests are
more difficult to define, except that they involve compromise and negotiation.
How a nation identifies such vital and secondary interests has to do with the
kind of national identity—or polity, as Aristotle termed it—its people want to
assume for themselves. This identity can change over time. America, for exam-
ple, has not been since the 1940s the isolationist nation it once prided itself on
being. In 1941, Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt jointly pro-
claimed, in the Atlantic Charter, the liberal principles that would guide the post–
World War II world. In 1944, representatives at the Bretton Woods conference
established the core principles of economic order that are embodied today in the
World Trade Organization; that same year, political leaders at Dumbarton Oaks
presented aspects of a vision of future order in their proposals for a United
Nations.
What America became committed to in the postwar order was a broader in-
ternationalist conception of vital interests that was in many ways antithetical to
the isolationist leanings of the founders of the American republic. George Wash-
ington’s farewell address revealed a preference for American national interests
that seems oddly out of place in today’s environment: “Europe has a set of pri-
mary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence she must
be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign
to our concerns.”19 If anything, Europe’s interests—as a result of both common
histories and struggles—are now at the core of American interests.
It seems significant, therefore, that the Bush NSS does not precisely define na-
tional interests in its introductory session, “Overview of America’s National
Strategy,” and instead refers to “American internationalism that reflects the
union of our values and our national interests”—“political and economic free-
dom, peaceful relations with other states” and “the non-negotiable demands of
human dignity.” (By contrast, the previous Clinton strategies prioritized inter-
ests in categories termed “vital,” “important,” and “humanitarian.”) Indeed, not
until much later in the Bush document is a distinction even made between val-
ues and interests:
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In Africa, promise and opportunity sit side by side with disease, war, and desperate
poverty. This threatens both a core value of the United States—preserving human
dignity—and our strategic priority—combating global terror. American interests and
American principles, therefore, lead in the same direction: we will work with others
for an African continent that lives in liberty, peace, and growing prosperity. Together
with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa’s fragile states, help build
indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforce-
ment and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists.20
Core Strategic Interests and Interests of Significant Value
At their most basic and abstract level, U.S. national interests in the contempo-
rary world are simple to describe: to ensure the security and prosperity of the
American people in the global environment. But distinguishing core strategic
interests from significant interests that might require the United States to com-
mit its treasure, blood, time, and energy is almost never easy. Indeed, the misrep-
resentation of what constitutes a national interest may well embody the central
strategic dilemma the United States faces in this next century. It was no accident
that political scientist Arnold Wolfers, five decades ago, referred to the concepts
of “national security” and “national interest” as “ambiguous symbols.”21
More frequently than often admitted, policy makers cannot know exactly
how a potential crisis may impact the real national interest. Even seemingly ob-
jective and clear “threats” are difficult to sort through. The connection between
Iraq’s 1991 invasion of Kuwait and Serbia’s refusal to sign the 1999 Rambouillet
agreement may involve a difficult chain of causes and events that must be dealt
with in relation to the idea of “interest”:
Different people see different risks and dangers. And priorities vary: reasonable peo-
ple can disagree, for example, about how much insurance to buy against remote
threats and whether to do so before pursuing other values (such as human rights). In
a democracy, such political struggles over the exact definition of national interests—
and how to pursue them—are both inevitable and healthy. Foreign-policy experts
can help clarify causation and tradeoffs in particular cases, but experts alone cannot
decide. Nor should they. The national interest is too important to leave solely to the
geopoliticians. Elected officials must play the key role.22
The three-tiered approach to assessment of interests as basis for action for
policy makers, strategists, and force planners is meant to illustrate this necessar-
ily complex process. The first tier resembles Donald Neuchterlein’s hierarchy of
intensity and applicability.23 This “sliding matrix of interests” (figure 2) suggests
that nominal issues under the rubric of “favorable world order” (support for hu-
man rights, sovereignty versus individual liberties of the citizen, and control or
prevention of intrastate conflict) can also have direct implications for core stra-
tegic interests.
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Issues such as “favorable world” or “promotion of values” can enter the realm of
vital, core strategic interests more often—and more quickly—than is commonly
thought.24 When a situation becomes so significant that policy makers are unwilling
to compromise, the issue—no matter how seemingly peripheral or secondary—
becomes a core strategic interest. Witness Kosovo in 1999, for example: NATO na-
tions, by effectively declaring war against Yugoslavia on 24 March, were acting both
in the “self-interest”of NATO and European security and, equally, in support of hu-
man rights and individual freedoms. Nonetheless, the world community’s obliga-
tion and mandate to stop ethnic cleansing and genocide whenever able—and to
ignore the sovereignty of individual states, if necessary—seem far from certain.
Former secretary of state Madeleine Albright was far less confident when
speaking about the potential for such “new” doctrine: “Some hope . . . that Kosovo
will be a precedent for similar interventions around the globe. I would caution
against such sweeping conclusions. Every circumstance is unique. Decisions on
the use of force will be made . . . on a case-by-case basis.”25 Former national secu-
rity advisor Sandy Berger, a month later, complicated the case for humanitarian
intervention by suggesting (in the specific case of East Timor) that the United
States should “weigh its national interests” in a country before deciding to use
military power.
In practice, “case-by-caseism” and humanitarian intervention anytime/any-
where prove equally problematic. The above examples, far from implying vacil-
lation by decision makers, only suggest how difficult it is initially to distinguish
between core strategic and significant value interests (or what others have
termed “vital” and “secondary” interests).
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Thus, aside from determining a first-tier order that provides the decision maker a
useful, systematic means to think about interests, there should be a second tier for
assessing how aspects of such interest will affect policy decision, implementation,
and overall strategy. The table in figure 3 is meant to illustrate this difficulty.
Two pertinent examples of how focus, influence, importance, and attention
to interests develop over time can be drawn from American involvement in the
Balkans during the 1990s. In 1994, as Bosnia-Herzegovina descended into com-
plete chaos and Great Britain and the United States came to loggerheads over
whether or not NATO should intervene in the former Yugoslavia, President
Clinton declared that “Europe must bear most of the responsibility for solving”
problems in the Balkans.26 By 1995, the president was declaring that the former
Yugoslavia, being within Central Europe, was “a region of the world that is vital
to our national interests.”27 During the intervening months, events themselves
had not changed so much as the American perspective on the need for interven-
tion in the former Yugoslavia. Put another way, not only had American interests
moved from significant to core strategic (or from “secondary” to “vital”) but the
focus had shifted from general to specific.
This second-tier “taxonomy of interest” can also point to some difficult rec-
ognitions (and seeming weaknesses) in strictly categorizing interests in all spe-
cific instances. The United States, for example, felt the sting of the “Kosovo
effect” in late 1999 when Russian decision makers informed the Clinton admin-
istration that they were following in Chechnya the example of NATO intervention
in the Balkans (by declaring both the interest-based need to protect sovereign
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Ensure the free flow of energy resources





Deny Serbian oppression of Kosovars





Support for arms control/disarmament






Committing military forces overseas
Source: With the exception of the “influence” interest proposed here, these interest types have been adapted from works of Hans
J. Morgenthau, “Another Great Debate: The National Interest of the United States,” American Political Science Review 46 (1952),
p. 973; “Alliances in Theory and Practice,” in Alliance Policy in the Cold War, ed. Arnold Wolfers (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press,
1964), p. 203; and A New Foreign Policy for the United States (New York: Praeger, 1969).
FIGURE 3
NATIONAL INTEREST TAXONOMY
(requiring consideration of second and third-order consequences)
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Russian territory and the “human rights” of Russian citizens) as Russian
airpower systematically destroyed the capital, Grozny, and its vicinity, leaving
tens of thousands of refugees and a ruined Chechnyan infrastructure. One Rus-
sian diplomat is said (the anecdote may be apocryphal) to have asked a U.S. State
Department official what the difference between Kosovo and Chechnya was and
to have received the reply: “You [Russians] had nuclear weapons.”28 Similarly, in
the aftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, the Indian defense minister, when asked
what single lesson he had learned from the “international community” inter-
vention against Iraq, responded, “Don’t fight the United States unless you have
nuclear weapons.”29
Such contentious responses to the application of American power that sup-
ports U.S. interests prove useful for appreciating the complexity of national in-
terests under strategic uncertainty. Distinguishing how such second-tier
categories of interest conflict with initial first-tier interest-level assessments fur-
ther sharpens the useful recognition that interests are not always in harmony,
policy decisions are difficult and often nuanced, and strategy can at times seem
hypocritical. While we do not hesitate to impose economic sanctions against
Myanmar for its atrocious human rights record, we refrain from similar sanc-
tions against the People’s Republic of China. The reason is obvious: our eco-
nomic prosperity interests (of core strategic importance, specific focus, and
enduring influence) would almost always predominate over “lesser” interests (of
significant value, general focus, and uncertain duration).
In an ideal world, support for human rights would not conflict with “abso-
lute” interests for which Americans would be willing to die. In Iraq in 1991,
rightly or wrongly, Americans were willing to accept up to ten thousand casual-
ties, but in 1994 they would not have been willing to accept as many casualties to
stem the genocide (over eight hundred thousand deaths) of the Tutsi population
by Hutus. There was one specific reason for this: Americans are reluctant to ac-
cept casualties, or even to intervene, when their only foreign policy goals are
“unreciprocated humanitarian interests.”30
Thus, a third-tier approach to addressing potential interests, strategic impact,
and decision should include a methodology for assessing the relationship of fac-
tors that affect the relative position of first-tier interests. There exists a method-
ology (see figure 4) that is simple and logical and can reveal how seemingly
“lesser” interests can quickly influence “core” interests. A North Korean invasion
of South Korean territory, for instance, would be an event that self-evidently im-
pacted core strategic interests. Yet Eritrea’s continuing disputes with Ethiopia,
Chechnya’s perpetual struggles within the Russian Federation, Islamic revolu-
tionary movements within Central Asia, the inability of the Colombian govern-
ment to limit the growing power of the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de
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Colombia (FARC) and the Ejército de Liberacíon Nacional (ELN), or the sys-
tematic abuse of citizens (or a sector of a population) by a government—all
these require a far more difficult logic chain to determine whether the United
States should act or not.
Understanding levels of importance, the relationship between specific and
general aspects of this perceived importance, and how a potential chain of
linked events might lead to a “reaction” that will impact core strategic interests
should improve determinations of whether an issue requires action for the sake
of interest. The necessary choices a decision maker might face include the fol-
lowing: How plausible are postulated outcomes? How long is the chain of inter-
related events? How far removed are these events from core strategic interests?
How, specifically, will the issue affect obvious (and not so obvious) relationships
to which the United States is committed? If the United States does not act on a
specific issue, what are plausible second, third, fourth, and fifth-order conse-
quences? Ultimately, it is essential to address these consequences with respect to
potential interests. The three-tiered approach attempts a more balanced meth-
odology for a complex process.
Sorting through Interests
At best, the most general set of criteria for which the “traditional” instruments
of power support national interests might be expressed as:31
• Militarily, to ensure American territorial integrity and support for alliances
to which the nation is committed; to safeguard American citizens against
intimidation or attack; to bolster American external interests in concert
with political and economic interests, while fostering a nonbelligerent
engagement with other states, regions, and alliances.
L I O T T A 1 3 5
Immediacy of threat/challenge/opportunity
Geographic proximity that might affect identified interests
Magnitude of challenge to potential interests
Contagion effect and its ability to degrade interests
Connectivity between event and major detriment to interests
(the domino effect)
Source: Partially adapted from Robert D. Blackwill, “A Taxonomy for Defining U.S. National Security Interests in the 1990s
and Beyond,” in Europe in Global Change: Strategies and Options for Europe, ed. Werner Weidenfeld and Josef Janning
(Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation, 1993), p. 105. Blackwill, however, focuses perhaps too narrowly on
“threat” assessment.
FIGURE 4
A METHODOLOGY FOR CHAIN REACTIONS:
HOW DOES IT IMPACT “NATIONAL INTEREST”?
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• Politically, to support and preserve American values of freedom, individual
rights, the rule of law, democratic institutions, and the principles of
constitutional liberalism.
• Economically, to sustain individual and societal prosperity through
principles of economic reforms, macroeconomic coordination, and free
market practice tempered by agreed rules, labor and environmental rules,
and regional/international standardization.
As Robert Blackwill notes, the issue of human rights—as one example—con-
nects “directly to U.S. vital and important national security interests/core na-
tional objectives.”32 A national interest may therefore constitute much more than
traditional, narrow realist understandings.
Consider, as an example, the declared interest of “defense of the homeland.” Under a
schema of liberal internationalism, military forces, both as instruments of national
power and in support of other cooperative security endeavors, defend the homeland
by supporting American interests abroad. American power, as part of a democratic
security community, promotes “defense of the homeland” through force presence
and involvement outside America’s borders. Thus, in order to ensure the nation’s ter-
ritorial integrity, forces often will be deployed in instances that do not satisfy, at first
glance, the narrow criteria of “survival” or protection of territorial interest. U.S.
armed forces frequently support American interests by “playing away games.”
Moreover, whether one agrees with the concept or not, there should be some
recognition of how “human security” has entered the arena of state, non-
governmental, and international organizational thinking. In an age when nontra-
ditional threats like terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, and ethnic
conflict are linked to such security challenges as population growth, environmen-
tal decline, denial of human rights, lack of development, and poverty rates that
foster economic stagnation, social instability, and state collapse, it ought to be ob-
vious that a new set of traditional problems has emerged. These problems require
a fundamental rethinking of interests.
Ultimately, the requirement to state, define, and defend national interests in a
public national strategy should remain. For the United States, stating, defining,
and defending interests in the NSS both demonstrate a commitment to demo-
cratic process and explain how America sees its role in the world. While the
American people by and large wish neither to be neo-isolationist nor to become,
by virtue of the primacy of the United States, a global police force, principles as
well as power constitute the idea of the national interest. It is as if the ghosts of
Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson were in constant tension, defining
who we are as a people and for what achievable ends we are willing to commit
our means—and what ends are worth dying for.
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N O T E S
1. While Miskel repeatedly draws on the meta-
phor of “Delphic ambiguity” and suggests
that contemporary statesmen refuse to define
national interests in anything but the broad-
est terms, there is a basic problem here as
well. It is, bluntly, his references to the Del-
phic oracle are not well grounded in the cul-
tural or historical truths of Hellenism. While
oracles often produced (ambiguous) prophe-
cies that had serious consequence for future
events, the oracles themselves, over time, be-
came corrupted by political manipulation.
Eventually, Delphi was known as a “festival of
madmen.” Extending the analogy, Miskel’s
prescription here—to deemphasize the im-
portance of declaring national interests and
of periodically publishing and revising na-
tional security strategies—would amount to
the same decline and would likely infect,
rather than improve, the national security
decision-making process.
2. These statements are taken, in reverse order,
from the opening and closing paragraphs of
Miskel’s essay, pp. 104 and 96, respectively.
3. Fortunately, Miskel does not directly state,
but only implies, that U.S. constitutional
principles are so obvious they are themselves
“platitudes.” Since many American lives were
lost both to secure and to uphold these prin-
ciples over our history as a republic, and since
many nation-states around the globe have
patterned themselves on the American con-
stitutional example, Miskel’s argument—had
he stated this—would have self-destructed be-
fore it even began.
4. George W. Bush, “Preface,” National Security
Strategy of the United States [hereafter NSS]
(Washington, D.C.: White House, 17 Decem-
ber 2002), p. iv. To secure national interests,
the Clinton administration consistently em-
phasized three “strategic postures” in its later
national security strategies: “Enhancing Secu-
rity at Home and Abroad,” “Promoting Pros-
perity,” and “Promoting Democracy.”
5. President Bush’s first State of the Union ad-
dress ought to be remembered for a number
of reasons other than the “axis of evil” decla-
ration, not the least of which is his opening
statement: “Tonight, our nation is at war, our
economy is in recession, and the civilized
world faces unprecedented dangers. Yet the
state of our Union has never been stronger.”
For a complete text of the address see BBC News,
on-line at news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/
1790537.stm (17 November 2002).
6. John Lewis Gaddis, “A Grand Strategy,” For-
eign Policy, November/December 2002, p. 53,
sidebar, “Power’s Paper Trail.”
7. Although Rice’s support for the national
strategy is a matter of public record, her spe-
cific enthusiasm can be found in Nicholas
Lemann’s “Without a Doubt: Has
Condoleezza Rice Changed George Bush or
Has He Changed Her?” The New Yorker, 14
and 21 October 2002, p. 175, on-line at
www.newyorker.com/fact/content/
?021014fa_fact3.
8. Ibid., p. 175.
9. The quote itself is from the Bush National Se-
curity Strategy. The notion that this might be
a disputed “conjecture” is from Ivo H.
Daalder, James M. Lindsay, and James B.
Steinberg, The Bush National Security Strat-
egy: An Evaluation (Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 4 October 2002), p. 7,
on the World Wide Web at www.brookings
.edu (5 October 2002).
10. Ibid., p. 8.
11. Admittedly, the Clinton administration sub-
sequently publicly acknowledged and apolo-
gized for its failure to act in 1994 in Rwanda.
12. The sense in which President Reagan might
consider himself as being, according to
Miskel’s assessment, of the same “school” as
Vladimir Lenin might be a humorous, if
fruitless, matter for discussion. Perhaps, for
the sake of symmetry, Miskel could have
compared the “realism” of Nixon and Stalin
to the “idealism” of Wilson and Lenin.
13. One of the most effective reviews of this tri-
lateral analytical tension is Nicholas Lemann,
“The War on What? The White House and
Whom to Fight Next.” The New Yorker, 16
September 2002, pp. 36–44.
14. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., “Redefining the National
Interest,” Foreign Affairs 78, no. 4 (July–
August 1999), p. 23.
15. Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of
War (New York: Free Press, 1991), p. 217.
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ests Lie?” 18 September 1999, p. 30.
17. Phillip S. Meilinger, “Beware of the ‘Ground
Nuts,’” Chicago Tribune, 21 July 1999,
on-line at ebird.dtic.mil/Jul1999/
s19990722beware.htm (22 July 1999).
18. Hans J. Morgenthau, The Impasse of Ameri-
can Foreign Policy (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1962), p. 191.
19. Henry Steele Commager and Milton Cantor,
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(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1988),
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20. Bush, NSS, pp. 10–11.
21. Arnold Wolfers, “‘National Security’ as Am-
biguous Symbol,” Political Science Quarterly
67, no. 4 (December 1952), pp. 481–502.
22. Nye, p. 23.
23. Donald E. Neuchterlein, America Overcom-
mitted: United States National Interests in the
1980s (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky, 1985),
p. 15. Neuchterlein also presents this matrix
in a subsequent book, America Recommitted:
United States National Interests in a Restruc-
tured World (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky,
1991).
24. Neuchterlein admits to the possibility of
“promotion of values” as possibly becoming a
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military security, realist-based conceptions of
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25. Ivo H. Daalder and Michael E. O’Hanlon,
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26. William Jefferson Clinton, A National Secu-
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IN MY VIEW
THE MILITARY’S PLACE IN MODERN AMERICAN SOCIETY
Madame:
In “The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the United States Today”
[Naval War College Review, Summer 2002, pp. 9–59], Richard Kohn presented an
account of where the U.S. military has stood with regard to civilian authority
within U.S. society. Professor Kohn comments several times that there was no
immediate crisis resulting from an altered posture, but that as he saw it, the
“power of the military within the policy process has been growing steadily.”
I read Dr. Kohn’s article several times and have great respect for the research and
insights which it contains. I think he surveyed the landscape very well but drew all
the wrong conclusions from it. The article came from a lecture by Dr. Kohn at the
Air Force Academy in December 1999. That was near the end of the Clinton admin-
istration, and I think that is where at least part of the problem arises.
The first half of the article catalogues numerous instances of conflict between
the military and the civilian authorities during the Clinton administration. Dr.
Kohn makes note of the many reasons that the military leadership had for not
considering William J. Clinton of a like mind with them. He then sets out a litany
of incidents in the political-military sphere that occurred during the Clinton
years, and which he attempts to lump into a pattern. In presenting this part of his
argument, Dr. Kohn uses mild verbs or adjectives to describe the actions or his-
tory of President Clinton and his administration. Hence, Bill Clinton is not a
draft dodger but rather “As a youth, . . . had avoided the draft.” The chairmen of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Generals Shalikashvili and Shelton) “appeared to have
been liked and respected by civilians in the Clinton administration”—which
could be rewritten as “they played well together.” No such mildness appears
when Dr. Kohn is describing actions that he attributes to the military, their sup-
porters, or those who opposed the Clinton administration on a variety of mat-
ters. Now the words become sharper: “the newly elected president was publicly
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insulted by service people,” or, “the undermining and driving from office of Secre-
tary of Defense Les Aspin.” This first part of the article is somewhat balanced in
incident, time, and space, but the wording implies a bias toward the then admin-
istration and its leader, Mr. Clinton.
Dr. Kohn admits many faults of the Clinton administration and comments
on a number of them. Where his argument misses the point is that he never to-
tally measures the Clinton administration against others with regard to political-
military unity. He says there is a greater gap between the military and its civilian
superiors now but treats it as a continuance of one that existed earlier and may
have widened as a result of recent events. In fact the Clinton administration was
the most militarily inexperienced, ignorant, and unsympathetic of the last cen-
tury, if not of the length of the Great Democracy’s existence. The gap between the
military and the Clinton administration was enormous, not merely a slight varia-
tion from previous administrations. Dr. Kohn sees the events of 1992–2000 as a
slight aberration from the norm, whereas the reality is much greater. The gap be-
tween the military’s outlook and that of its political leaders was at its peak during
the Clinton administration. Dr. Kohn takes that peak as his starting point and
from it draws conclusions that the gap is wide and growing. Instead, as soon as
Clinton left, the gap returned to a more traditional narrowness.
Having misread the Clinton years, Dr. Kohn’s article next reviews civil-military
relations in a larger view and time span and again comes up with some interesting
observations and insights—but alas, again the wrong conclusions. He cites the
media as now being less capable and either missing, or unable to address, issues of
civilian control of the military. I think this view is wrong. Agreed, the press is less
capable today. Far more important, and completely missed by Dr. Kohn, is the fact
that the media today are all but completely politically biased. This leaves the mili-
tary always in a confrontation of sorts with one side of the media or the other. Dr.
Kohn says that the military is “partisan in political affiliation, and overwhelmingly
Republican.” This is certainly not true. While the military may share more basic
views with today’s Republicans than it does the Democrats, there is in no sense a
direct tie to the party, nor should there be. It remains an individual choice.
Dr. Kohn goes on to say that there is “in fact no tradition of resignation in the
American military.” There is a deep and continuous tradition of resignation
throughout American political life. It includes Dean Acheson, William Rehnquist,
and Cyrus Vance. It also includes the military. It is the very thought of the poten-
tial power that a military resignation might bring that has kept it from being used.
This brings us to the crux of Dr. Kohn’s misreading of the present status of the
politicians and the military. Dr. Kohn maintains that recent events, beyond the
embarrassing Clinton years, have strengthened military opposition to the politi-
cal leadership. I would argue the opposite. Relatively speaking, the military has
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maintained its historical focus and obedient role; its power in the relationship
has not grown, nor is the military anxious to see it do so. It is the political leader-
ship that has grown in power; professionally and socially united with the media
within a culture that is overwhelmingly media oriented, the politicians are
stronger relative to a military which is still devoted to basic, sworn ideals.
The answer to Dr. Kohn’s listing of troubles in U.S. civil-military relations would
be a return to the draft; that would bring back “reliance on the citizen soldier,” with
all that that implies for shared national political/military values. That solution is not
coming again soon, or maybe ever, short of a major national calamity.
The military, as correctly noted by Dr. Kohn, bases its strength in the oath of its
officers to support and defend the Constitution of the United States and bear true
faith and allegiance to the same. Increasingly the political leadership is pushing the
highly competent and technically adept U.S. military to be a vanguard for a new-
found “globalism.” The real test of the existing U.S. political-military relationship is
coming. It will arise when the believers in “duty, honor, country” are committed to
major combat in the interests of someone else’s country, or for the generation of




While Mr. Barry has done me the honor of several readings, he has missed one of
my chief points and ignored the supporting evidence: that the diminution of ci-
vilian control long antedated the Clinton administration and has continued into
the Bush administration. (My research included material to the spring of 2002.)
Given my extensive criticism of Mr. Clinton and his administration in military
affairs, the accusation of bias in favor of the Clintonites perplexes me. Nor do I
understand Mr. Barry’s point about the media, whose neglect of civilian control
seems to me obvious by the almost total silence on the subject over the last
generation.
On the subject of resignation, Mr. Barry is simply incorrect. Despite a few
exceptions—Secretaries of State William Jennings Bryan and Cyrus Vance, and
Attorney General Elliott Richardson and his deputy William Ruckelshaus (not
Mr. Rehnquist), among others—only a very few senior political appointees,
notable for their small numbers, have ever done so.
Mr. Barry may assert that the politicians have grown stronger in civil-military
relations, but I believe both the scholarship and the evidence indicate otherwise.
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Over time conscription would have a salutary effect on civil-military relations,
but the likelihood is so small as to make any discussion irrelevant.
The figures on the political affiliation of officers cited in the article, and the
changes of the last twenty-five years, confirm much anecdotal evidence about a
change in officer attitudes, from a purposeful nonpartisanship bordering on
nonparticipation to overwhelming identification with the Republican Party.
Denying the facts will not make them go away. The degree to which this sours
civil-military relations is unclear, but it does not take much imagination to con-
clude that it exacerbated civil-military relations during the Clinton years, deep-
ened a dislike for Democrats that extends back a generation, and is likely to
complicate relations in some future administration. Mr. Barry’s closing warning
about future conflict seems to me apocalyptic. I doubt that military professional-
ism would ever grow so weak, or the political leadership so obtuse, as to provoke
an open confrontation. But if Mr. Barry’s views reflect a significant slice of officer
attitudes, and my research indicates that it does, then the possibility exists.
Lieutenant Colonel Karen Kwiakowski, U.S. Air Force (writing in the Winter
2003 Review) also discounts the figures on party affiliation. My own suspicion is
that the percentage of Republicans is actually higher than the research indicated.
Some officers may have chosen not to return the survey, or to mark “indepen-
dent” on the form, because they sensed that identifying with a political party
runs counter to the American military ethos.
She may well be correct, however, that the rise of the neoconservative
ideologues in the Republican party will increase friction with the military. The
new National Security Strategy of the United States—the presence of some arro-
gant, belligerent, unilateralist rhetoric—does indeed suggest future adventurism.
One can only hope that when the full implications of that document dawn on Con-
gress and the public, cooler heads will prevail. Apparently that occurred in August
and September 2002, when the Bush administration pulled back from attacking
Iraq without consulting either Congress or the international community.
Clearly, in the future American military leaders will be obligated, as they have
always been, to speak their minds clearly and forcefully to the civilian leadership,
in private, with the same cold, hard analysis their predecessors have for the most
part offered. Such courage and candor lie at the heart of the professional code,
just as does the necessity to support, and accede to, civilian control.
RICHARD H. KOHN
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
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SEA BASING AND MEDICAL SUPPORT
Madame:
Rear Admiral Rempt suggests, in his “President’s Forum” in the Autumn 2002
Naval War College Review, that the United States, in response to political and
economic realities, is unlikely to utilize the extensive network of overseas bases
that had previously been employable for sustaining our national military objec-
tives. He likewise recalls the Navy’s apparent historical ability to operate for ex-
tended periods at sea, no doubt referring to nuclear-powered aircraft carriers
supported by a fossil-fueled mobile logistic chain. He subsequently discusses the
concept of secure sea bases as a means for providing joint and combined force
commanders with the ability to commence military operations, while serving
the greater tactical advantages of reception, staging, onward movement, and in-
tegration of both Marine Corps and Army forces at sea.
While Admiral Rempt appropriately reminds us that the key to sustained
combat operations has always been the logistical support of engaged forces, the
concept of “stand-alone” sea basing provides little insight into the realities of
supporting the physical integrity of the commander’s greatest asset—the hu-
man flesh-and-blood elements of his operational forces (the most rational ele-
ments of his weapons systems). The constitution and utilization of services to
support the combat injured and infirm may ultimately serve as pivotal factors in
determining a commander’s success or failure, and they can hardly be ignored in
any operational concept, including that of sea basing.
What specifically are line-leadership expectations of fleet medical support?
Are existing seagoing platforms with medical facilities indeed suitable for sup-
porting the sea base medical requirements? The answers remain unclear, for
while the fleet currently has a very robust operational medical system, including
hospital ships and casualty receiving and treatment facilities aboard large-deck
amphibious assault ships (these assets were originally designed for major Cold
War conflicts), there is no assurance that the doctrinal mission of afloat medical
resources has been altered toward specifically supporting littoral warfare. This is
because both Navy line expectations of medical support services, as well as the
specific capabilities that fleet medical assets must provide in order to meet Ma-
rine Corps requirements, have not yet been clearly defined, much less ade-
quately validated.
T-AH hospital ships, for example, although possessing remarkable medical
capabilities and capable of delivering large numbers of beds to a theater, are lim-
ited by their deep drafts to deep-water anchorages. Casualties can be brought to
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them only via their single helicopter pad, or alternatively by surface craft, access
by which is unsatisfactory even in the calmest sea state. Such ships also require
enormous logistical support and may not be able to “man up” in a timely fash-
ion, even for minor conflicts, without severely draining the manpower of facili-
ties in the United States. Similarly, the usefulness of the casualty receiving and
treatment facilities aboard the large-deck multipurpose, amphibious assault
ships of the LHA/LHD types may be compromised, since these vessels will inevi-
tably have operational missions conflicting with casualty retrieval. Further-
more, the large number of contained hospital beds on these platforms is
misleading, for they are mostly suited for light casualties; these ships have signif-
icantly less capability for managing the severely traumatized.
Notwithstanding the stand-alone implication of Admiral Rempt’s com-
ments, afloat medical support services have historically not existed in a vacuum.
From a logistical perspective, there has always been an inextricable relationship
between events at sea and those on land. In the past, forward-based medical fa-
cilities on land, distant from the combat zone, have been critical to the support
of naval warfare. The availability of land bases has frequently determined
whether navies have had the overseas infrastructure to undergird their deploy-
ments. Several examples are enlightening:
• In the matured theater of operations that existed during the latter stages of
World War II, large numbers of mobile, base, and fleet hospitals—creations
of the Navy’s Advanced Base Functional Component System (ABFC)—
were deployed overseas. Their value to the fleet was highlighted during the
invasion of Okinawa, when kamikaze attacks upon the Fifth Fleet created
high numbers of casualties among the forces afloat. For continuity of naval
operations, six hospital ship transports were required for evacuating the
mounting shipboard casualties to hospital facilities on Guam.
• Several decades later, during the Falklands conflict of 1983, British
shipboard casualties at times exceeded combat casualties ashore and
occasionally had to be evacuated to the combat zone hospital ashore for
stabilization. For example, the Argentine bombing of the British auxiliary
landing ship RFA Sir Galahad suddenly produced 179 casualties, including
eighty-three burn victims, many with quite severe injuries requiring
significant logistical support. Many were quickly transferred to medical
facilities ashore for initial care, prior to transfer to the hospital ship
Uganda. In addition, the Royal Navy was obliged to acquire a neutral
land-based staging point in Montevideo, Uruguay, for transfer of 593
casualties from Uganda, in order to empty medical facilities afloat and
prepare them for the arrival of new casualties.
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• The amphibious insertion of forces of Task Force 58 into Afghanistan in
late 2001 from the merged USS Peleliu (LHA 5) and Bataan (LHD 5) ready
groups culminated in the creation of Forward Operating Base (FOB)
RHINO, four hundred miles and approximately four hours’ helicopter flying
time (including in-flight refueling) from the sea base. Following a 5
December fratricide bombing, thirty-nine casualties were brought to FOB
RHINO. Following triage, nineteen seriously wounded U.S. personnel were
transported by a U.S. Air Force C-130 to a well-equipped Air Force surgical
facility in Seeb, Oman, classified as possessing greater capability than those
in the sea base. Twenty other Afghan injured were transported by CH-53 to
the afloat task force. A subsequent land-mine injury of a Marine in
Kandahar likewise resulted in medical evacuation to Seeb.
Another important unresolved issue will need to be addressed as well by
those advocating sea basing: whether to apply for “protected” Geneva Conven-
tion status of casualty-reception vessels associated with the afloat sea bases,
given the fact that use of “unprotected” casualty-evacuation vehicles or secure
communications may violate their neutral status, notwithstanding the pre-
sumed perimeter protection of such formations by combatant vessels. Immedi-
ately prior to the British invasion of the Falklands, a civilian-operated passenger
vessel, the luxury passenger liner SS Canberra, was rapidly converted to a troop
carrier with a major surgical facility. Original plans called for Canberra to re-
ceive casualties, although it did not qualify for Geneva Convention neutrality by
virtue of having transported troops and combat equipment to the theater via
military convoy. This lack of protected neutrality was originally felt to be an ad-
vantage, since troops it received as casualties and successfully treated could be
returned to the field directly, whereas the Geneva Convention prohibits return of
such casualties from protected hospital ships. Unfortunately, as a result of fierce
Argentine aerial attacks upon the fleet supporting the landing force, a command
decision removed the unprotected Canberra from the San Carlos Water opera-
tional area, leaving the remaining hospital ship, Uganda, which conformed to the
requirements of protected neutrality, as the only floating hospital. Elements of the
Canberra medical organization were hurriedly put ashore at Ajax Bay, where they
established in a deserted slaughterhouse and meat processing plant a casualty
handling and treatment facility that effectively served the needs of both ground
combatants and evacuees from the bombing of Sir Galahad.
The unique design and intensity of military munitions create large numbers
of profoundly complex injuries simultaneously, many of them never seen in
peacetime settings. The sheer volume of these often life-threatening injuries
precludes standard logistical formulas. Competent personnel and capable
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facilities in the evacuation chain are needed, but the essential factor in their
treatment is time. The commander of any over-the-water assault must therefore
make certain choices. If he does not give appropriate priority to forward medical
care, evacuation, and a sophisticated casualty-regulation network, he runs the
risk of suffering a huge logistical burden and an adverse impact upon morale be-
cause the dead and injured will remain ashore. On the other hand, there will be
an adverse impact upon the transport of assault echelons if medical evacuation
back to casualty receiving ships is not planned, practiced, and controlled. Inat-
tention to these issues by those remaining behind in their secure offshore sea
bases will result in the loss of trained troops who could have been treated and re-
turned to duty had enlightened and realistic medical planning and resources
been appropriately integrated into overall operational plans.
ARTHUR M. SMITH
Captain, Medical Corps, U.S. Naval Reserve (Ret.)
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BOOK REVIEWS
A VERY OLD KIND OF WAR
Ledeen, Michael A. The War against the Terror Masters. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002. 262pp. $24.95
Some twenty years ago, en route to a Gulf
deployment, this reviewer and other
watchstanders received various briefings
on how to defend against Harpoons and
other U.S. weapons sold to the newly
hostile Iranians. This occasioned more
than a little angry puzzlement at how we
found ourselves in such a situation, but we
had no uncertainty about who the foe was.
Today, the United States once again faces
conflict in the wider Mideast region, in-
cluding the Gulf. Again we have foes that
use our own tools against us (e.g., airlin-
ers as cruise missiles). However, unlike
then, today we arguably face a funda-
mental confusion about who the enemy
is and what this war is about. This makes
it extraordinarily difficult to know what
to plan and execute against or to know the
overall campaign context for individual
combat operations. Ultimately, such con-
fusion is a formula for failure in this war.
In The War against the Terror Masters,
Mike Ledeen, noted political analyst,
Middle East scholar, and frequent con-
tributor to the Wall Street Journal and
other media outlets, presents a compell-
ing picture of what the threat actually is,
how it developed, and how the United
States can and must defeat it. He avers
that this war is not a “global war on ter-
rorism” at all but is specifically about Is-
lamic, not generic, terrorism—motivated
and underwritten by militant Islamic
fundamentalism and abetted by many re-
gional regimes. However, many in the
West are most reluctant to frame the
conflict this way, for fear of being ac-
cused of “engaging in a war against Is-
lam.” Ledeen’s account thus is quite
“politically incorrect,” but as one Euro-
pean leader recently (and encouragingly)
noted, “to solve a problem, you must
start by giving it a proper name.”
President Bush, in his earliest “post–9/11”
speeches to the nation, emphasized that
the United States must wage war against
the terrorists and the countries that support
or harbor them, recognizing immediately
that major terrorist organizations would
be crippled absent state support. However,
in the ensuing year this crucial distinction
was largely honored in the breach. With
the notable exception of Afghanistan, the
emphasis has almost exclusively been on
fighting terrorists, not their state facilita-
tors. Much of the senior leadership of the
Department of State, the CIA, and the
U.S. military, as well as most European
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elites, consider terrorists primarily as
criminals and therefore urge a legal par-
adigm, or crime-fighting approach, per-
haps with selective military assistance,
rather than actual warfighting. The conse-
quence arguably has been a dangerously
lethargic campaign of which the ultimate
objectives remain vague and uncertain.
The conventional wisdom is that the
United States is engaged in a totally new
kind of war against clandestine organi-
zations rather than nation-states.
Ledeen argues compellingly that this is
at best partially true. Rather, “our
prime enemies are the terror masters—
the rulers of the countries that sponsor
terrorism, and the leaders and soldiers
of the terrorist organizations them-
selves.” Moreover, “the main part of the
war—the campaign against the terror
masters who rule countries hostile to
us—is a very old kind of war . . . a
revolutionary war, right out of the eigh-
teenth century, the very kind of war
that gave us our national identity.”
Ledeen starts by asking “why it hap-
pened,” and recounts how the (Islamic)
terror network developed, from the
start of the Palestine Liberation Organi-
zation (PLO) to today’s al-Qa‘ida, in-
cluding “an analysis of the importance
of Islamic fundamentalism within the
terror network, as well as the crucial
roles of several Middle Eastern re-
gimes.” He argues that the al-Qa‘ida
and other Islamic terrorist groups have
a fanatical desire to destroy the West,
based on “a deep-seated Muslim rage
and buttressed by a powerful Muslim
doctrine. Without the rage and the doc-
trine—the ideology of the terror mas-
ters—there might be Islamic terrorists
(there have been for centuries) but
there would not be the global Islamic
terrorist network, resting on an Islamic
fundamentalist mass movement.”
Ledeen then poses the equally impor-
tant question, “Why weren’t we prop-
erly prepared?” He notes the woeful
record of U.S. policy making and intel-
ligence vis-à-vis terrorism and the Mid-
dle East since the late 1970s, when
American policy makers failed to
understand the epochal nature of
Ayatollah Khomeini’s triumph in Iran.
The 1980s and 1990s saw a long, com-
pounding litany of disasters and missed
opportunities. Some were due to bu-
reaucratic dysfunctionality and poor
communications among various orga-
nizations, while others were results of
deliberate, ideologically based castra-
tion of agencies like the FBI and CIA
throughout much of the 1990s, when
weltfremd policy decisions left the “CIA
as a cross between the Post Office and
the Department of Agriculture,” in the
words of one senior CIA official. How-
ever, many mistakes stemmed from a
fundamental misunderstanding of
“human nature and the true nature of
human history”—in essence, for a va-
riety of reasons, U.S. policy makers
consistently fooled themselves about
the reality of the threat. Progress is
being made to correct some of the
egregious flaws, but again, the pace
is slow.
Lastly, Ledeen asks “How will we win?”
He notes that if the key terror masters
are in fact the rulers of their countries,
the United States must defeat those re-
gimes in some meaningful sense if it is
to prevail. Noting these regimes’ fragil-
ity, he suggests bringing them down will
help the United States “show the Mus-
lims that they have been led astray by the
terror masters, that they should look
within themselves for the source of
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their centuries-long failure, and that
the best hope for them lies in coopera-
tion with the civilized world and in
greater freedom for all their people.”
This can be characterized as a “revolu-
tionary war against the tyrants,” one
“entirely in keeping with our own na-
tional tradition of fighting tyranny.”
The War against the Terror Masters is a
book that U.S. military leaders should
read as a matter of urgency in order to
understand the deadly threat that con-
fronts the United States and its armed
forces. The confusion about whether
the United States is fighting terrorists
or a much more formidable phenom-
enon, militant Islamic fundamentalism,
is exacting a heavy toll. Though the cost
has been paid largely in terms of inter-
national political support through late
2002, arguably America has been very
lucky that it has not been reckoned in
lives and destruction from another
large-scale atrocity. It is little wonder
that Mike Ledeen for months has ended
his newspaper columns with “Faster
please,” and more recently, “Faster




Hoffman, Frank G. Homeland Security: A Com-
petitive Strategies Approach. Washington, D.C.:
Center for Defense Information, 2002. 67pp. (no
price given)
O’Hanlon, Michael E., et al. Protecting the Ameri-
can Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
188pp. $17.95
Since the events of 11 September 2001, a
multitude of homeland defensive plans
have been discussed at every level of
government and the military, centering
on the restructuring of existing organi-
zations or increased financing. Each plan
focuses on a single phase or group be-
lieved to be essential to the safety of our
nation. These two books for review take
different approaches. Homeland Security:
A Competitive Strategies Approach, by
Frank G. Hoffman, stays out of the tacti-
cal and operational level of the “war”
and focuses on the strategic level and the
planning cycle. Protecting the American
Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis, by
Michael E. O’Hanlon, Peter R. Orszag,
Ivo H. Daalder, I. M. Destler, David L.
Gunter, Robert E. Litan, and James B.
Steinberg, analyzes the problems of na-
tional security, determines the progress
of current programs, and designs an
agenda for future endeavors.
Homeland Security offers a process to
enhance U.S. capabilities through a
simple “course of action” analysis based
on comparisons of known and per-
ceived threats with strategies used by
policy makers in recent history. The au-
thors envision three possible categories
of attacks against the United States. The
first is a missile attack, from interconti-
nental ballistic missiles or cruise mis-
siles; the second is covert attack or
catastrophic terrorism, involving an ar-
ray of weapons of mass destruction
smuggled into the United States; finally,
they consider a cyber attack designed to
destroy the U.S. information infrastruc-
ture. Each method is considered in
terms of known and projected capabili-
ties of national and transnational play-
ers, and of the four classic strategies of
nonproliferation, deterrence, counter-
proliferation, and preemption. Each
“style” has been filtered through these
four perspectives to discern strengths
and weaknesses.
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U.S. vulnerabilities are extensive. It will
not be easy to protect the American
people. The current approach of orga-
nizational restructuring to counter or
prevent an attack, and the current as-
sumption that the U.S. military can de-
fend against an assault, may not meet
the future need. Hoffman proposes a
“serious policy debate” to consider the
threat and risks and how to create an
environment that will prevent an attack
or at least make it very difficult for one
to achieve the desired results. Hoffman
provides valuable insights into the vari-
ous strategies of homeland security that
could be undertaken by the United
States, making it clear that no single
plan will suffice. Hoffman also dis-
cusses consequence management; if an
attack is successful, a plan must be in
place to mitigate its results.
Protecting the American Homeland ar-
gues that much could be achieved to
improve homeland security at a cost
that could be absorbed by both the fed-
eral government and the private sector.
Working under the assumption that our
large, open society provides little protec-
tion against terrorism, O’Hanlon’s team
presents a scheme to complicate ter-
rorists’ actions and therefore force
them to engage less lucrative targets
(“displacement”) or to continue to plan
for a difficult attack in ways that offer an
opportunity for U.S. authorities to pre-
vent the attack. The authors argue that
first identifying U.S. weaknesses and vul-
nerabilities will make it possible to cor-
rect them or at least lessen the effects of
attacks we cannot prevent.
O’Hanlon and his coauthors describe a
four-tier approach. Securing U.S. bor-
ders is the initial step. They consider it
possible only if air defense systems are
expanded, a cruise missile defense
system is created, and the Coast Guard
and the U.S. Customs Service is ex-
tended, so as to improve security at sea,
in ports, and over roads and rails. The
second step entails preventive measures
within U.S. borders to eliminate or re-
duce the possibility of an attack. This
can be achieved by increasing FBI and
state and local law-enforcement staffs;
improving data collection, analysis, and
dissemination; and providing incentives
to the private sector by way of insur-
ance and tax incentives to increase se-
curity and tracking of employees,
production, and the storage and ship-
ment of hazardous materials. The third
measure would protect obvious targets.
Once again, the concept of displace-
ment is discussed—redirecting terrorist
activities from a disastrous plan to one
that is considerably less damaging. By
concentrating on the protection of tar-
gets upon which attacks could be cata-
strophic—such as nuclear and chemical
facilities, large buildings or arenas, na-
tional symbols, or critical parts of the
national infrastructure—it may be pos-
sible to reduce the risk to essential in-
terests. The fourth step deals with
consequence management, or the miti-
gation of the effects of a terrorist act. Ef-
fective preparation of first responders is
essential here. This preparation can be
handled through training for the re-
sponders, added capacity to enable the
health system to deal with the event,
communications and information for
the coordination of the relief efforts,
and research and development in vac-
cines and detection equipment.
The remainder of the book deals with
the principles for implementing and fi-
nancing the organizational challenges
of homeland security. The book pro-
poses a balance between regulatory and
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insurance measures that would pass the
cost to users and producers vice the
population as a whole. Such measures
would have to, as noted, provide incen-
tives (reduced insurance rates) to im-
prove security. Organizationally, the
United States could either attempt the
“lead agency” approach (a single entity
with responsibility for security of the
homeland) or the “interagency” ap-
proach, an entity that coordinates the
many agencies responsible for various
segments of the security problem. The
authors believe that the Bush adminis-
tration is on the right track with the in-
teragency method.
Homeland Security is an excellent intro-
duction to strategic approaches to the
threats that face this nation. It provides
a backdrop for further research into
homeland defense. Protecting the Amer-
ican Homeland is a logical, flowing,
step-by-step analysis to defining pol-
icy issues involving the development of
a comprehensive protection plan. Both
books are useful and thoughtful analy-
ses of homeland security issues.
WARREN M. WIGGINS
Naval War College
Peters, Ralph. Beyond Terror: Strategy in a
Changing World. Mechanicsburg, Penna.: Stack-
pole, 2002. 353pp. $22.95
In Beyond Terror, author, historian, and
pragmatist Ralph Peters has assembled
a collection of his own essays that puts
the “post–9/11” world in perspective in
terms of the U.S. reaction to the attacks
and the historical context in which
those attacks occurred.
A retired Army lieutenant colonel and
former intelligence officer, Peters has
been engaged in every major U.S.
theater, focusing the better part of his
professional life on assessing the threats
to U.S. national security. Beyond Terror
offers a clear, unfettered, down-to-
earth perspective of the world, as it is,
not as the media “spinmeisters” or the
“intellectual elite” would have one be-
lieve. His is a refreshing and invigorat-
ing view of what has made America the
singular global force that it is today and
what will allow it to maintain that stat-
ure in the long-term. He unabashedly
believes that this country’s effort to
protect its borders and global interests
is a righteous one, and he offers some
insightful and common sense prescrip-
tions for how the United States should
proceed. Peters tempers the enthusiasm
for quick fixes to terrorist threats and
endeavors to steel the American public
for a long, protracted effort that will re-
quire every facet of American power and
will: “Like crime, terrorism will never be
completely eliminated.” What is needed,
Peters argues, if the effect of terrorism on
the American way of life is to be reduced,
is not hand-wringing but an under-
standing of the terrorists’ intentions and
motives, and of their ever more complex
tools and planning processes.
The collection of essays presented in
this work is arranged in two “theme
sets.” In the first, Peters establishes the
American reality in a hostile world
from a historical perspective. In es-
sence, the United States presently finds
itself dealing with the colossal failures
of the European colonial era, particu-
larly with respect to the Islamic world,
in which Western social, political, and
economic ideals failed to take root and
now take the terrorists’ blame for the
failure and decay of their societies at
large. In the context of these failing
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cultures, Peters categorizes the emer-
gence of two types of terrorists: the
practical terrorist (or freedom fighter)
whose actions reflect the yearning for
social and political change, and the
apocalyptic terrorist, who is “possessed
and governed by a devilish vision . . .
whose true goal is simply the punish-
ment of others, in the largest possible
numbers . . . as an offering to the blood-
thirsty and vengeful God that they have
created for themselves.” Unlike for the
practical terrorist, “No change in the
world order will ever content the
apocalyptic terrorist, since his actual
discontents are internal to himself.”
Describing the latter as an unalterable
menace to whom destruction and vio-
lence are not means to an end but ends
in themselves, Peters suggests timely
precepts (twenty-five to be exact) for
the application of American power in
the war on terror. The one that stands
out as the key to long-term success is,
“Do not be afraid to be powerful.” The
rest flow logically from it and provide a
viable framework in which U.S. na-
tional security policy should be exe-
cuted in the “new world paradigm.” To
strengthen the American sense of pur-
pose, and more interestingly, provide
an insight into the real character of
American power, Peters describes the
unique aspects of American social and
cultural norms that will allow it to con-
tinue to be the preemptive global
power: the ability of our society to
break from “historical norms,” to adapt
and be responsive to changing dynam-
ics, and the ability to compromise and
yet assume a sense of responsibility for
who and what we are.
The second series of essays deals primarily
with recommendations for a “blueprint”
for future warfare in the campaign against
terror. It debunks social myths closely
held by past U.S. presidential administra-
tions. Peters attacks the present line of
force planning by pointing out that the
United States is well suited to fight the
old Soviet threat, which never material-
ized: “We have the most powerful mili-
tary in history, but its power is designed
to defeat conventional threats. When
the enemy does not ‘fight fair’ and de-
ploy tanks, ships, and aircraft, we find
ourselves punching thin air. We have
prepared to fight machines. But the en-
emy is belief.” He then exquisitely de-
scribes the warfare challenge of the
future with respect to the “human ter-
rain of urban operations” in the context
of three city “types”: hierarchical (syn-
onymous to a typical U.S. city); multi-
cultural (in contrast to “the fantasies of
Liberal Arts Faculties,” in these cities
“contending systems of custom and be-
lief [are] often aggravated by ethnic di-
visions struggling for dominance”—
these “cockpits of struggle” are repre-
sentative of future combat challenges
for U.S. ground forces); and tribal (the
most “difficult urban environment for
peacekeeping operations; ethnic con-
flicts in this environment can be the
most intractable and merciless.”)
Against this backdrop, Peters argues the
shallowness in the use of U.S. military
power in the past administration and
then emphatically debunks the “casu-
alty myth” that wove its way into the
political thought and leadership of the
last administration. He is outraged that
an “elitist” administration could have
so underestimated the will of the Amer-
ican people to commit blood and trea-
sure in worthy causes that its attempts
to steer into harm’s way merely put
the ship of state hopelessly “in irons.”
The subsequent “low risk” approaches
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(casualty avoidance via air “delivery” of
military power) taken to “punish”
violators of human rights and interna-
tional law, Peters declares, merely em-
boldened lawless rogues to perpetrate
more aggressive acts of human carnage
and suffering.
Beyond Terror is a must-read for those
who desire to get at the heart of the is-
sues at hand without being hamstrung
by political biases or organizational loy-
alties. The opinions of Peters will serve
as a superb starting point for more de-
tailed discussions on U.S. national secu-
rity strategy and the direction that the
war on terror should take in the future.
JOHN A. KUNERT
Captain, U.S. Navy
Director, War Gaming Department
Naval War College
Buckley, Roger. The United States in the Asia-
Pacific since 1945. New York: Cambridge Univ.
Press, 2002. 258pp. $23
Even as the world remains focused on
the war on terror, Roger Buckley’s
examination of U.S. policy in the
Asia-Pacific since 1945 reminds us of
the danger of ignoring Asia. Although
this area has been crisscrossed in the
post–Cold War period by such formal
and informal regional organizations as
the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) and the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC),
Buckley cautions that “any future Asia
without America is widely seen to be a
recipe for possible chaos,” since “Wash-
ington alone possesses the political and
military strengths to deter aggression and
thereby provide the essential foundations
for nation-building, economic advance-
ment and regional building.”
This book recounts the wars and Amer-
ica’s postwar difficulties after World
War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Cold
War. Washington’s challenges are far
from over, and Buckley’s list of con-
temporary difficulties includes “two
Koreas, two Chinas, nuclear and con-
ventional weaponry on a massive scale
and the absence of a Russo-Japanese
peace treaty.” He argues the United
States must prepare to resolve such
problems through cooperative partner-
ships that will rely less on bilateral and
vertical relations and more on a variety
of Asian nations accepting a greater
share of the responsibility; simulta-
neously, the United States must retain a
combination of “regional muscle,” the
“political will to readily deploy” forces,
and the “necessary weapon systems and
Pacific Rim basing facilities” to act ef-
fectively as “insurance against aggres-
sion” and “reassurance to its allies.”
According to Buckley, by far the most
dangerous Asian problem is the poten-
tial threat posed by the People’s Repub-
lic of China. Whether intentionally or
not, this book’s focus on wars and their
aftermaths suggests that a conflict be-
tween China and America is in the
offing. In particular, Beijing sees Wash-
ington as wielding arbitrary and exces-
sive force in a way that undermines a
more equitable distribution of power.
Although some have predicted the evo-
lution of a cooperative Sino-U.S.-
Japanese triad, China’s chagrin at the
extent of U.S. power, and its anti-
hegemonic stance, will make it even
more likely that the region will see a
“distancing of Beijing from an already
long-established U.S.-Japan partner-
ship.” Assuming this happens, “the
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entire region will be increasingly in-
volved in dealing with a more ambi-
tious and yet dissatisfied Communist
state, since China still recalls the humil-
iations of the nineteenth century when
it was ‘sliced’ like a melon among rival
imperialists and still shares disputed
land and sea borders with many coun-
tries.” America’s potential problems
with China have been exacerbated in
recent years by the disappearance of the
European powers from Southeast Asia,
Hong Kong, and Macao, and the pre-
cipitous decline of Russia in Northeast
Asia, making China the only “possible
contender for the American laurels.”
Buckley, a Hong Kong–born, British-
educated, and Japan-based scholar, is
generally friendly to the United States
and supportive of its East Asian poli-
cies. However, he has his fair share of
criticism for U.S. policy makers, in par-
ticular Franklin Roosevelt’s “casual-
ness” in his dickering with Stalin at
Yalta, Harry Truman’s huge military re-
ductions immediately prior to the Ko-
rean War, and Lyndon Johnson’s and
Richard Nixon’s “humiliating” defeat in
Vietnam. In the near term, Buckley
warns, in addition to remaining the
bulwark of Asia Washington must initi-
ate wider regional interdependence
among East Asian countries. Asian na-
tions, instead of focusing on the United
States as the Holy Grail for everything
from democracy to human rights to
capitalism, might do better to look at
“British, European and Anglo-Pacific
approaches to such issues” in order to
spread their cultural horizons. To the
extent that “globalization is frequently
equated with Americanization,” Buck-
ley warns, the Asia-Pacific region may
one day resent such influence as an un-
welcome American intrusion.
This book went to press immediately
before “9/11” and the war on terror. As
a result, Buckley underestimates Japan’s
potential naval contribution to any
multinational military effort, suggesting
instead that “Japan appears most un-
likely to deploy its so-called self-defense
forces for anything much beyond the
rescue of its own citizens in emergency
situations abroad.” Buckley’s emphasis
on the close interaction and interde-
pendence of U.S. security and economic
policies throughout the Asia-Pacific re-
gion are, however, as relevant now as
ever. Buckley concludes by warning
that Americans must energetically face
up to the myriad of risks—chief among
them the growing threat from China—




Knox, MacGregor and Williamson Murray, eds.
The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300–2050.
New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001. 203pp.
$28
The editors of this slim volume of es-
says have wide ambitions. In 194 pages
of text, they seek to define the nature
of military revolutions; describe the
tripartite sources of the concept in the
still-controversial work of historian
Michael Roberts on seventeenth-
century European land warfare, Soviet
military theory, and studies by Andrew
W. Marshall’s Office of Net Assessment;
and critique contemporary develop-
ments in American ground and air war-
fare. Furthermore, to support their
arguments, Knox and Murray present
case studies from seven centuries of
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armed conflict in the West. Between
their introductory essay on the concept
of a revolution in military affairs (RMA)
and their concluding analysis of the
shortcomings of the “American RMA,”
Knox and Murray place eight chapters
on historical examples of military revo-
lutions. There is one essay each by
Knox and Murray (on the French Revo-
lutionary army and the German blitz-
krieg, respectively). The others are by
equally prominent military historians:
Clifford J. Rogers on fourteenth-
century military developments under
England’s Edward III; John A. Lynn on
Louis XIV’s army; Mark Grimsley on
the U.S. Civil War; Dennis E. Showalter
on the mid-nineteenth-century Prus-
sian army; Holger H. Herwig on
changes in naval warfare, 1885–1914,
exemplified by the British and Ger-
mans; and Jonathan B. A. Bailey on the
creation of modern warfare in World
War I. The accuracy, comprehensive-
ness, and thoughtfulness of every essay
are outstanding—a rare achievement
in an anthology. The editors deserve
commendation.
Each part of this volume is excellent,
yet Knox and Murray have set them-
selves such a daunting goal—to inte-
grate coherently arguments based on
episodes of Western military history
with contemporary defense policy anal-
ysis—that they fall somewhat short.
While all the essays are fine offerings,
Rogers’s essay fits awkwardly alongside
case studies of RMAs from the time of
Louis XIV to the present, and Herwig’s
accentuates the absence of other essays
on the transformations of naval warfare
in the age of sail and after 1918. Histori-
cal examples drawn almost exclusively
from British, French, German, and
American military history suggest a
certain cultural bias; the selection ne-
glects significant contributions over the
past four and a half centuries to trans-
forming western military theory and
practice by the Dutch, Danes, Swedes,
Spanish, Italians, Poles, and Russians.
Since the editors stress the Soviet con-
tribution to the RMA concept, their
failure to include a Red Army case
study seems egregious. The origins of
the book in papers delivered at a small
conference at Quantico in 1996 help ex-
plain its limitations. Nonetheless, a
work of such ambitious intellectual
scope would have benefited from dou-
ble or even triple the number of chap-
ters, with a greater geographical and
topical inclusiveness.
Paradoxically, this reviewer’s disap-
pointment arises from the great contri-
butions this book does make to
understanding RMAs and redirecting
present American efforts to achieve
one. As all the authors emphasize, and
as Knox and Murray reiterate in their
conclusion, military revolutions are not
actually based on technology. In fact, an
RMA can occur without major techno-
logical innovation at all, as in late-
eighteenth-century France. Instead, a
military revolution is a reshaping of
military institutions to solve strategic
and political challenges. Adopting new
weapons and equipment alone, without
institutional reconfiguration, produces
armies such as the British and French
fielded against the Wehrmacht in May
1940. The editors present convincing
arguments that the U.S. military has
adopted new technologies without
interservice integration or, far more im-
portant, without attempts to relate
weapons systems, doctrine, force struc-
ture, and training to the strategic prob-
lems facing the nation. In mitigation,
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Knox and Murray admit that achieving
an RMA in the absence of an identifi-
able foe as the focus of strategy presents
enormous difficulties. Be that as it may,
they warn, the obstacle the United
States presents to the ambitions of enti-
ties outside the Western alliance could
make it the object of someone else’s
RMA. Perhaps that is the greatest warn-
ing to arise from the coincidental ap-
pearance of this book following 11
September 2001. The Dynamics of Mili-
tary Revolution raises critical questions
about how the United States might re-
shape its military to counter strategies
based on asymmetrical warfare. Beyond
the valuable contribution the book
makes to military history, one hopes
this volume will also help shape the na-




Gilbert, Marc Jason, ed. Why the North Won the
Vietnam War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2002. 254pp. $69.95
Since the fall of Saigon in the spring of
1975, Americans have sought to under-
stand how their government could have
lost the Vietnam War. Given the enor-
mous gap in resources between the
United States and the Vietnamese revo-
lutionaries, it is difficult for even schol-
ars of the war to explain why this
nation’s mighty military machine failed
to defeat its enemy’s forces. Many who
have written about the war have fo-
cused on the alleged mistakes of Ameri-
can civilian and military leaders,
arguing that more enlightened policies,
such as fewer restrictions on military
operations or more emphasis on pacifi-
cation, would have turned the tide in
South Vietnam. The purpose of the
eight essays in this volume is to place
American policies in a broader context—
or, as Gilbert writes, to recognize that
“the outcome of that war was deter-
mined less at MACV [Military Assis-
tance Command, Vietnam] and
Washington than by the persistence of
the enemy on the battlefield and in po-
litical cultures of the Saigon regime, the
National Liberation Front, and its part-
ners in Hanoi.”
The most original essays in this volume,
by William J. Duiker, George C. Her-
ring, and Robert K. Brigham, pursue as-
pects of this theme. Duiker traces the
efforts of the government in Hanoi “to
manipulate the international and diplo-
matic environment to its own advan-
tage” and its complicated relations with
China and the Soviet Union, allies
whose aid was vital to the North Viet-
namese war effort. Herring emphasizes
the international dimensions of Amer-
ica’s defeat, noting how the inability of
the Lyndon Johnson administration to
gain support from European allies un-
dermined the U.S. war effort. Brigham
challenges the traditional distinction
between northerners and southerners,
arguing that it is misleading to divide
“the struggle along geographical lines
that have no cultural or historical pre-
cedent.” Northerners, he argues, did
not make all of the key decisions in the
war; rather, southerners came to domi-
nate party councils in Hanoi and were
able to convince their northern com-
rades to pursue a more aggressive strat-
egy in the South.
The other five essays focus, with varying
degrees of success, more on the American
side of the war. In a forcefully argued
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essay, Jeffrey Record points out that those
who emphasize the failures of civilian
policy makers in Washington ignore both
the achievements of Vietnamese revolu-
tionaries and “the defective professional
U.S. military performance in Vietnam
within the political limitations imposed
on the use of force.” If politicians were
stabbing the military in the back, “the
military also was shooting itself in the
foot.” He concludes that it is unlikely
that the United States could have done
more than increase the price of an en-
emy victory. John Prados analyzes the
uses of intelligence by both sides, em-
phasizing the difficulties of the Ameri-
cans and South Vietnamese in
collecting accurate information, and
the extent of North Vietnamese and
Vietcong penetration of the Saigon
government and army. Gilbert chal-
lenges the views of Harry Summers,
Jr., and William E. Colby, both of
whom, he believes, fail to understand
that America in Vietnam was betrayed
“by its own collective limited vision of
the nature of the war and the require-
ments of victory.” Andrew Rotter ex-
amines the respective economic
cultures of America and North Vietnam
that shaped each side’s response to the
war, while Marilyn Young explores the
impact of the American peace movement,
suggesting that whatever its effect on the
length of the conflict, widespread protests
“increased the price to the government of
continued prosecution of the war.”
In a thoughtful reflection on these es-
says, Lloyd Gardner writes that “the re-
ality of Vietnam was as elusive to
American policymakers as the enemy
forces were to the men they sent to this
hall of mirrors. They saw only their
own reflections, multiplied over and
over.” Like policy makers at the time,
many historians have also been in a hall
of mirrors, preoccupied with the Amer-
ican side of the struggle. It is the great
strength of this volume that, at least in
part, it suggests the insights that can be




Peattie, Mark R. Sunburst: The Rise of Japanese
Naval Air Power, 1909–1941. Annapolis, Md.: Na-
val Institute Press, 2002. 392pp. $36.95
This work compellingly describes how
Japanese naval aviation, both land and
carrier based—like that of its principal
adversary in the Pacific War, the United
States—grew to maturity through trial
and error. Its maturation period ex-
tended from the earliest days of pow-
ered flight through the bloody crucible
of war with China. The story of U.S. na-
val aviation during this time is a famil-
iar one, but that of the Japanese is less
so, due to the formidable barrier posed
by language. As more scholars equip
themselves with the tools necessary to
mine riches from the sources and publi-
cations of a former enemy, however,
the other side of the story is becoming
known. One such diligent student of
Japanese naval history is Mark R.
Peattie, familiar as the coauthor (with
David C. Evans) of the highly praised
Kaigun: Tactics and Technology in the
Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887–1941
(Naval Institute Press, 1997). Holder of
a doctorate in modern Japanese history
from Princeton University and author,
coauthor, or editor of seven other
works, Peattie brings unique qualifica-
tions to the daunting task.
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Sunburst’s meat lies in seven chapters
that discuss the early development of
Japanese naval aviation (1909–21), Jap-
anese naval aircraft and the tactics de-
veloped for their employment (1920–
36), the design and construction of Jap-
anese aircraft carriers and formulation
of doctrine for their employment
(1920–41), the Japanese aircraft indus-
try and the design and construction of
aircraft (1937–41), and Japanese naval
aviation, both land and carrier based
during the undeclared war with China
(1937–41). Paralleling the wartime ex-
perience is a chapter on the develop-
ment of Japanese naval air power in
projecting the empire’s power as it pre-
pared for the Pacific conflict. The final
chapter, “Descending the Flame,” be-
gins with the attack on Pearl Harbor
and with the destruction, at sea and un-
der way, of the British battleship HMS
Prince of Wales and battle cruiser HMS
Repulse. It ends with the battle of the
Philippine Sea in June 1944, after which
“the Japanese Navy never again launched
a significant effort to contest the hege-
mony of the skies over the Pacific.”
Augmenting the text are nine appendi-
ces: biographical sketches of those men-
tioned in the text; a glossary of naval
aviation terms; the generic organization
of Japanese naval aviation; naval aviation
ships (carriers, seaplane carriers, and the
like); naval air bases and air groups; prin-
cipal naval aircraft; aircraft designation
systems; principal engines; and a descrip-
tion of the “turning-in” maneuver. A
common thread found in the graphics
that appears throughout the text is the
superb work of Jon Parschall, who ren-
ders tactical maneuvers, ordnance, air-
craft, and ships with equal facility.
Sunburst, which Peattie affectionately
dedicates to his former coauthor,
concludes that the “catastrophic col-
lapse” of Japanese naval air power lay in
the Imperial Navy’s failure “to antici-
pate the kind of air combat it would be
obliged to wage,” its failure “to make
the right kinds of decisions” to cope
with the realities of a “new kind of air
war,” and, importantly, “the inability of
Japanese industry and technology to
support Japanese naval aviation against
the emerging numerical and qualitative
superiority of American air power.” In
that connection, this reviewer was par-
ticularly pleased with how Peattie dis-
poses of the most common of persistent
Midway myths, that the battle resulted
in the catastrophic loss of aircrew.
While heavy, the loss of pilots and ob-
servers by no means equaled the loss of
the “trained maintenance personnel,”
invaluable to maintain modern naval
aircraft, who went down with their
ships. “Similarly,” he contends, “the
loss of skilled ground crews, often
abandoned to their fates when the navy
evacuated remaining aircrews from is-
lands under siege, substantially weak-
ened the land-based air groups.”
“In the end,” Peattie concludes, “the
Japanese naval air service was outpro-
duced, outorganized, outmanned, and
outfought.” Yet in the ashes of defeat,
however, “the precision, skill, and . . .
technical mastery” with which the Japa-
nese crafted the Zero fighter “gave wings
to the phoenix of postwar Japanese tech-
nology.” Students of the Pacific War will
find Sunburst (based on an impressive
array of Japanese sources, including the
official war history volumes and a variety
of book or article-length studies) invalu-
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Dunmore, Spencer. Lost Subs: From the Hunley to
the Kursk, the Greatest Submarines Ever Lost—
and Found. Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo, 2002.
176pp. $35
Service in the Confederate submarine
CSS Hunley was not for the faint of
heart—on its first two sea trials, it sank
with a loss of nearly all hands. With a
fresh and stalwart crew, Hunley crept
from Charleston on the night of 17
February 1864 and sank the USS
Housatonic with a contact torpedo.
However, in the ensuing confusion and
gunfire, Hunley was lost.
For over one hundred years Hunley lay
undisturbed in the mud and silt of
Charleston’s harbor, until August 2000,
when it was raised with an elaborate
cat’s cradle of slings, braces, and foam
pads. CSS Hunley is now undergoing an
archaeological examination that is
yielding a treasure trove of artifacts as
well as insights into the technology of
its time.
Spencer Dunmore’s work, a hand-
somely produced coffee-table book, has
more substance than one might initially
expect. Dunmore’s accounts of the loss
and recovery of the CSS Hunley, USS
Squalus, HMS Thetis, and the Russian
Kursk, and the losses of the USS
Thresher and USS Scorpion, are interest-
ing and contain notable new material.
Like aircraft, submarines are inherently
safe but very unforgiving of human and
mechanical failures. Squalus (1939),
Thetis (1939), and Thresher (1963) each
was lost when its hull was breached
and seawater flooded in. The main
air-induction valve stuck open when
Squalis submerged, a torpedo-tube
outer door was inadvertently opened on
Thetis, and a seawater inlet pipe appar-
ently failed catastrophically on Thresher.
Torpedoes can be as lethal to the sub-
marine that carries them as to the en-
emy. In the years since the loss of
Scorpion in 1968, its wreckage has been
photographed several times by deep-sea
reconnaissance vehicles. These photo-
graphs (many of which have been re-
leased and are in Dunmore’s book), the
troubled history of the batteries used by
the submarine’s Mark 37 torpedoes,
and engineering analysis suggest that a
spontaneous and violent initiation of a
torpedo battery led to a warhead deto-
nation and hull rupture.
The Russian submarine Kursk appears
to have suffered a similar fate in the
Barents Sea in 2000. Western acoustic
detection systems picked up two mas-
sive explosions that correlated with
Kursk’s position. Naval engineers cited
by Dunmore build a good case for the
theory that the first of these explosions
came from the hydrogen peroxide that
was carried in Kursk’s torpedoes and
that the second resulted from the deto-
nation of the torpedo’s warhead.
The most fascinating and yet disap-
pointing aspect of Dunmore’s book is
his descriptions of crew rescues and sal-
vage—fascinating because these opera-
tions are high among underwater
engineering feats, disappointing be-
cause Dunmore treats them shallowly.
When Squalus sank off Portsmouth,
New Hampshire, the Navy had just
placed into service a diving bell for sub-
marine rescue. Winching itself down a
half-inch wire fastened to the forward
hatch of the Squalus 243 feet below, the
bell ultimately rescued thirty-three of
the fifty-five men aboard. The following
summer, Squalus was raised with a
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complex system of cradles and support-
ing pontoons. With each lift, it was
moved into shallower water, grounded,
then lifted again. It reached Portsmouth
Harbor in September 1939. The techni-
cal details of its salvage are one of the
truly great stories of deep-sea salvage
operations.
Kursk was raised in the fall of 2001 and
carried back to Roslyakovo Shipyard.
Raising the sub was no mean feat of un-
derwater engineering—it weighed
twenty-four thousand tons underwater
and lay in 350 feet of water. Unfortu-
nately, Dunmore gives but four pages to
this accomplishment. Happily, two of
them are devoted to excellent drawings
of the techniques by which the damaged
bow was removed, lift points attached to
the hull, and the submarine drawn up
into a specially prepared floating dry
dock. One could well spend a serious
amount of time studying these drawings
alone.
As a comprehensive treatment of sub-
marine loss and recovery, Lost Subs is
uneven and technically superficial.
However, its treatment of the Scorpion
and Kursk disasters and the rich collec-
tion of underwater and salvage photo-
graphs will please the generalist and fill
niches for the naval scholar.
FRANK C. MAHNCKE
Joint Warfare Analysis Center
Stiehm, Judith Hicks. The U.S. Army War College:
Military Education in a Democracy. Temple Univ.
Press, 2002. 200pp. $69.50
This is an in-depth and insightful exami-
nation of the U.S. Army War College,
one of the nation’s six senior service col-
leges. Stiehm offers a comprehensive
book that reviews the history of the
college, provides a typical class profile,
offers a look at the faculty and the cur-
riculum, and describes what a typical
“Carlisle year” is like for the students.
While analyzing the administration,
Stiehm offers recommendations for im-
proving the institution’s ability to pro-
duce quality graduates. Stiehm believes
that after following her prescription for
improvements, the graduates would be
better able to fight and win the nation’s
wars and would be better prepared to
provide sound, thoughtful advice to se-
nior decision makers on matters of na-
tional security and the application of
military force in the pursuit of national
objectives.
Stiehm is uniquely qualified to write
this book. She attended the Army War
College as a student-participant ob-
server during the first semester of aca-
demic year 1996–97, with the class of
1997. Stiehm was fully integrated into
the seminar experience of the war col-
lege and shared both the academic and
social experiences of her classmates. She
also served as a visiting professor at the
U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute and
at the Army’s Strategic Studies Insti-
tute, both located at Carlisle Barracks.
Stiehm’s critical examination of the
Army War College is valuable for the
insightful information she shares,
which is otherwise not available to the
general reader, but more importantly
should prove valuable to the Depart-
ment of Defense policy makers and de-
cision makers responsible for the
establishment and maintenance of de-
fense institutions. The complex and
multidimensional nature of the global
war on terrorism has caused the United
States to think about warfare in a new
way. Stiehm’s work challenges those in
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power to review the administration,
curricula, and faculty of the Army War
College with an eye toward ensuring
that the institution is able to address
contemporary issues effectively and is
positioned to adapt and change.
Stiehm organizes her conclusions and
recommendations around the three
thematic issues of “training and educa-
tion,” “civil-military relations,” and
“war and peace.” The first deals with
the basic function of the institution.
Carlisle’s mission statement is focused
on the preparation and education of se-
lected military, civilian, and interna-
tional leaders. Is the mission of Carlisle
to train or to educate? The differences
are not subtle. Stiehm argues that the
nature and composition of the faculty,
design of the curriculum, and manner
of course presentation all lead one to
conclude that Carlisle is a training insti-
tution, not optimized for education,
and that if the mission of Carlisle is in
fact education, significant changes are
required.
The second deals with the most basic
constitutional issue of civilian control
of the military. Stiehm concludes that
the Army War College does not ade-
quately prepare future senior leaders
for the complications of realpolitik. She
posits that there is an erosion of civilian
control of the military and that this ero-
sion is partially the result of the failure
by the senior service colleges to ensure
that graduates appreciate the unique
position of the military, as it relates to
government officials elected by the
citizenry.
The third issue deals with the notion
that we preserve the peace by preparing
for war. Stiehm concludes that the
Army War College may be spending too
much time preparing for the wrong war
and is unresponsive to today’s security
environment. She argues that the col-
lege could become a powerful change
agent for military strategy, structure,
and procurement, if certain of her rec-
ommendations were adopted. Among
her recommendations are increased hir-
ing of civilian Ph.D.s rather than retired
military officers with doctorates, who,
according to Stiehm, are of limited util-
ity; increased independent research by
the faculty; redesign of the curriculum
to create “discomfort” (that is, to cause
students to think outside of their com-
fort zones); and offer master’s degrees
to only a limited number of students.
Stiehm provides much grist for the in-
tellectual mill and does the Army War
College a service by creating a frame-
work for professional dialogue and of-




de Montbrial, Thierry and Jean Klein, eds.
Dictionnaire de Stratégie. Paris: Presses universi-
taires de France, 2000. 604pp. $130.92
At a moment when American and
French perceptions of security threats
and appropriate policy responses in the
Middle East are in apparent collision, it
is well to be reminded how little Ameri-
cans in the defense intellectual commu-
nity know of their French counterparts.
Yet as this volume shows, strategic stud-
ies in France are not only alive and well
but well informed, intellectually sophis-
ticated, and surprisingly free of
anti-American animus.
Thierry de Montbrial, director of the
prestigious French Institute of
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International Relations (IFRI), and Jean
Klein, a professor at the Sorbonne, have
assembled a wide-ranging collection of
articles emphasizing the historical and
theoretical dimensions of strategy,
though without neglecting such current
topics as terrorism, the Yugoslav crisis,
NATO, or the revolution in military af-
fairs. There are substantial pieces on
various national schools of strategic
theorizing, beginning with the ancient
Greeks, Romans, and Chinese, and end-
ing with the Soviets and the “Anglo-
Saxons.” Carl von Clausewitz is given
due deference throughout, but the book
also broadly acknowledges the reality of
“culture” in shaping strategic rational-
ity. There is a good general article on
“strategic culture,” as well as useful sep-
arate essays on Chinese and Asiatic stra-
tegic culture by Valérie Niquet, author
of a treatise on Chinese strategy (Les
fondements de la stratégie chinoise, Paris,
1997) that ought to be more widely
known on this side of the Atlantic.
Great commanders (even Napoleon)
are given short shrift by the editors ex-
cept as contributors to the development
of the art of war, but there are individ-
ual articles on strategic thinkers both
minor and major. From the Anglo-
Saxon world, Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Julian Corbett, J. F. C. Fuller, T. E.
Lawrence, Liddell Hart, Bernard
Brodie, and Herbert Rosinski make up
what is perhaps not an obvious selec-
tion. (Particularly interesting is the ap-
preciation of Rosinski, a German
refugee who, while on the faculty of the
Naval War College, produced notable
yet today almost completely neglected
works on the historical development of
strategy and on naval strategy.) From
the French tradition, there are the stan-
dard figures—Antoine Henri Jomini,
Ardant du Picq, Ferdinand Foch,
Charles de Gaulle, Raymond Aron,
Raoul Castex (the foremost French na-
val theorist), André Beaufre, Pierre
Gallois, and others; there are also ob-
scure yet interesting names, like
Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy (1719–
80), who apparently introduced the term
“strategy” in reference to the higher
component of the art of war, and the
contemporary strategist Lucien Poirier.
Montbrial’s own substantial essay on
the theory of strategy deserves particu-
lar attention. Montbrial distinguishes
his own view from that of certain of the
other contributors, defining strategy in
a broad sense to encompass aspects that
transcend the art of war as such. He is
well versed in game theory and the
American business strategy literature,
yet, unusually, reserves a place for
“glory” in the strategic calculus. Of the
other contributors, mention should
also be made of Hervé Coutau-Bégarie,
author of a Traité de stratégie (Paris,
1999) as well as a number of works on
naval history and strategy, and François
Géré, who has produced studies of
American strategy and military policy
and of psychological warfare. It is to be
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
SIENA COLLEGE MULTIDISCIPLINARY SYMPOSIA
Announcement
Siena College, in Loudonville, New York, announces the eighteenth in its
multidisciplinary symposia, to be held 5–6 June 2003 on the theme “World War
II: A Sixty-Year Perspective.” The focuses will be fascism and Nazism; New
Guinea and the Southwest Pacific theater, the Central Pacific campaigns, the air
war, Sicily and Italy, and the North Atlantic; diplomatic, political, and military
history; literature, art, film, and popular culture; and women’s and Jewish stud-
ies. Asian, African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern topics of relevance are
solicited, as well as collaboration and collaborationist themes, the home front,
conscription, and dissent. Inquiries to Dr. Karl Barbir, Department of History,
Siena College, 515 Loudon Road, Loudonville, NY 12211-1462, tel. (518)
783-2512, fax (518) 786-5052, e-mail barbir@siena.edu.
AECT “CRYSTAL AWARD”
The web-enhanced course offered by the Naval War College’s National Security
Decision Making Department has won the prestigious Association for Educa-
tional Communications and Technology 2002 “Crystal Award.” Founded in
1923, the AECT is a professional association of thousands of educators and oth-
ers devoted to improving instruction through technology. It interprets “tech-
nology” in terms not merely of hardware and software applications but also of
how this technology enhances the learning process for students and their under-
standing of the people, events, places, and things through which they learn.
There are only two awards each year, one of them for distance education. Each
award recognizes the most innovative and outstanding multimedia-based
instructional and distance-learning projects for 2001–2002. The award commit-
tee selected the NSDM web-enhanced course on the basis of innovative and cre-
ative use of the medium, instructional value and relevance, instructional
strategy, quality of production, evidence of successful utilization and imple-
mentation, and evidence of achievement of goals and objectives. The award is an
important recognition of the entire NSDM faculty and their colleagues in the
College of Distance Education of the Naval War College.
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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE STRATEGIC LANDPOWER
ESSAY CONTEST 2003
The U.S. Army War College, in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, and the U.S. Army War
College Foundation have announced the fifth annual Strategic Landpower Essay
Contest. Topics must relate to the advancement of professional knowledge of the
strategic role of landpower in joint and multinational operations. Eligibility to
enter and win is open to all except those involved in the judging. The USAWC
Foundation will award a prize of one thousand dollars to the author of the best
essay and five hundred dollars to the runner-up. For information and a copy of
the rules, contact Dr. Jerome J. Comello, U.S. Army War College, Department of
Military Strategy, Planning and Operations, 122 Forbes Avenue, Carlisle, PA
17013-5242. Essays must be postmarked before 1 June 2003.
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